There is an increasing scholarship that is beginning to explore the phenomenon of election-related violence across a number of contexts, debating its conceptualisation, its causes and drivers, and its consequences. Much of this literature has focussed upon high-profile episodes of widespread or intense election violence - such as that of Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, and Cote D'Ivoire in 2010. Far less attention, however, has been paid to elections that experience more low-intensity forms of the phenomenon, despite the fact that existing research has found this to be a more pervasive form of election violence across sub-Saharan Africa (Straus and Taylor 2012). This paper seeks to address this existing gap in the literature through an analysis of the Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 elections. These elections have widely been hailed as being successful and relatively peaceful, seeing a transfer of power from outgoing presidents to new challengers. However, these elections were marked by a significant securitisation of the electoral process and a pervasive politics of fear. The emphasis on order and security, the uncertainty with which the elections were widely perceived, and the low-intensity forms of violence that took place in the lead-up to the elections, on polling days, and in the immediate aftermath, have significant implications for democracy and the democratic process.

Competitive elections test the durability of democracies. Multi-party elections in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been characterized by violence. Even more stable democracies such as Ghana have not escaped the menace of electoral violence. In preparation for the country's seventh general election since re-democratization, the Ghana Police Service in September 2016, identified over 5,000 hotspots where election related violence was likely to occur. Electoral violence was likely to surface in nearly 30 percent of the country's 275 constituencies. What criteria are used in mapping electoral violence hotspots? Three factors are crucial: (i) history of electoral violence and security development in the area, (ii) conflicts trends between ethnic communities (including chieftaincy & land disputes), and (iii) campaign rhetoric of the main political parties and how the media reports it. The paper's analysis will make three important contributions. Theoretically, this paper will contribute to our understanding of the spatial distribution of violence involving political parties. Methodologically, it will show the criteria used by all major stakeholders in identifying violence hotspots. Empirically, the paper will make a significant contribution to the dataset on election related violence in a maturing democracy.

Why are some regions in a country more likely than others to see electoral violence? In spite of recent promising scholarly developments, we still know little about the causes of such violence. In particular, few studies have explored these issues on a sub-national level, seeking to explain why some geographical localities are more violence-prone than others. The purpose of this paper is to address this research question. We do so through an in-depth case study of Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone, a region where elections have been accompanied by high levels of violence.

We argue that the reason is to be found in Kono's position as a political swing state. In a country otherwise strongly governed by an overlapping ethnic and regional logic, Kono is ethnically diversified and politically split, and may swing in either direction. This renders Kono a highly courted district by all political parties, contributing to raising the stakes of elections. Aspiring politicians approach the large number of young people - many of which are ex-combatants - who reside in Kono in the hope of profiting from the diamond mining business, and promise them short-term benefits in exchange for mobilising electoral support and carrying out attacks on their political opponents. Similarly, they make use of local chiefs who are dependent on political connections and economic resources to retain their influence. In this way, national and local interests collide in the establishment of mutually dependent relations that contribute to increase the risk of violence around elections in Kono.

Using a gendered analysis, this paper examines the post election violence (PEV) in Kibera, Kenya, between December 2007 and February 2008. Through in depth interviews with Kibera residents, the article interrogates how gender influenced violent mobilizations in Kenya's most notorious slum. Most scholarly analyses have tended to understand the post-election violence as a result of politicized ethnic identities, class, and local socio-economic dynamics. Implicitly or explicitly, these frameworks assume that women are victims of violence while men are its perpetrators, and ignore the ways in which gender, which cuts across these categories, produces and shapes conflict. Kibera's conflict is often ascribed to the mobilization of disaffected male youths by political "Big Men." But the research findings show how men, who would ordinarily not go to war, are obliged to fight to "save face" in their communities and how women become

integral to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations. Significantly, notions of masculinity and femininity modified the character of Kibera's conflict. Acts of gender-based violence, gang rapes, and forced circumcisions became intensely entwined with ethno-political performances to annihilate opposing groups. The battle for political power was also a battle of masculinities.