2016 is a very important year for Zimbabwe in many respects particularly the coming together of citizens into forming 'online' movements to protest against the government over the crises. This study explores the changing role of the social media in mass mobilization and the erasure of political identities into a national movement advocating for the restoration of Zimbabwe's economy. It engages with the ongoing conversations which have considered the seeming aloofness of the Zimbabweans and lack of confrontational approaches as passive docility. While this has found traction in mainstream scholarship as well as the social media platforms such as WhatsApp where Zimbabwean online activists are caricatured and ridiculed as weak when compared with their peers in countries such as South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt who have shaped policy and changed the course of things using the media and confrontation, in this paper we argue that these conclusions cannot be any further from the reality. The Zimbabweans are not docile and comparing them with developments anywhere would be missing the point. The battles, battle fronts and nature of the 'enemies' are different and we argue that Zimbabweans have in fact appropriated the social media and through jokes, queries, critical posts have managed to change the course of a number of things as well as negotiate survival. In doing this, we examine the #Thisflag, #Tajamuka and #Occupyunitysquare movements as well as protests over the banning of quail-bird (chihuta), late payment of salaries and the current controversy over introduction of bond notes.

This paper was developed in collaboration with Wesley Mwatwara.

This paper explores the manner in which the winds of change became gusts in colonial Zimbabwe. The paper suggests that the independence of the Congo and the chaos that ensued soon thereafter had a transformative impact on Zimbabwean society. The paper explores the manner in which the changing regional context shaped political discourse and actions in Zimbabwe's capital, Salisbury, and second city, Bulawayo.

Across a two-week period in July, several thousand whites fled the Congo and transited through these two urban centers. Zimbabwe's European community mobilized to support the refugees, donating clothing, money, and time for refugee relief. These efforts kindled a sense of community mobilization that would later be relied upon to support the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the continuation of the isolated Rhodesian regime. The presence of these European refugees also lent credence to rumors of atrocities committed against whites by the African population of the Congo.

At the end of the month, the two cities that had hosted most of these refugees, Salisbury and Bulawayo, experienced several instances of violence in their respective African townships. The violence followed a number of attempts by the authorities to disrupt the primary African opposition, the National Democratic Party. The paper argues that this domestic unrest was inspired by, and entangled with, a larger body of regional unrest, particularly events taking place in the Congo.

The concise time period facilitates efforts to illuminate the lingering impact of regional trends on the political discourse prevalent in Zimbabwe's urban centers.

This paper explains the role that the rural migrant had in the construction of the nationalist discourse which emerged in colonial Zimbabwe from the mid 1950s and in linking rural and urban protest strategies. It examines these initiatives that entailed breaking away from the 'created' rural ethnic identities and ascribing to a multi-ethnic/national affiliation that found articulation in nationalism. The act of migration itself, as the article argues, was a form of political resistance as this greatly weakened the powers of colonial institutions as migrants grew increasingly independent of the coloniser's reach. The article also assesses earlier forms of overt resistance that were spread by returning migrants through such bodies as the Rhodesian Native Association (RNA). I argue that migrants were indispensable to such processes and the eventual reach that nationalism attained in the imagination of the envisioned post-colonial order. The article speaks directly to the case study area of Harare (Salisbury) and Goromonzi and intends to bring out some saliencies that can easily be papered over in national accounts of similar subject matter. The article makes case specific analysis of the impact of the 1970s liberation struggle in the Goromonzi District. This entails an assessment of the disruption of the social processes and changes that had been carried over into the rural spaces prior to the outbreak of the war. The article observes the differential impact of war in different communities without making generalised assumptions on displacement, destruction of property, death etc.

The paper unpacks how policy decrees by the Zimbabwean state are re-negotiated, re-routed or overtly resisted by urban communities located at the margins. This specific case pertains to developments at Beitbridge border post in July 2016 where communities engaged in violent protest against the government's ban on importation of goods by individuals without licenses. Although sporadic and short-lived the protests sent signals to the state which prompted the Minster of Industry and Trade to offer some concessions, though minimal, to the cross-border traders. These protests in part gave momentum to a national shutdown of business activities in the country the following week, spearheaded by what have been referred to as hash tag movements. It is argued in this paper that the occurrence of protests in borderlands adds a fresh perspective to scholarly understandings of resistance among borderland communities. The norm in most of the literature is to conceptualise smuggling by communities who live astride international borders as a form of resistance to extortion by the predatory state—a norm which this paper will depart from.

In Zimbabwe, urban civil society already played a prominent role in promoting state transformation in the colonial period. Urban-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have driven the democratic civil society movement since campaigning for constitutional reform in the 1990s. After the end of power-sharing and the regime's landslide victory in the flawed July 2013 elections, secular urban-based groups have faced formidable organisational and strategic challenges owing to the prevalent national and international political environment. Whereas several well-established NGOs decayed, new movements that rely on social media have emerged. Although gaining tremendous momentum in the short term, these movements face the same limitations the regime imposed on civil society when the crisis began, and must yet prove whether they are viable platforms to advance democratic and accountable governance.

Our paper, firstly, maps the major developments in Zimbabwe's secular urban-based civil society since the July 2013 elections, and outlines its operational environment. Secondly, it assesses the efforts undertaken by selected groups to promote the authoritarian state's transformation. Thirdly, the paper identifies viable strategies for urban groups to advance democratic and accountable governance under the conditions prevalent in the current political dispensation. The discussion is based on interviews with Zimbabwean activists that will be conducted in February 2017, and a review of online publications and newspapers. The selected groups comprise NGOs such as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and NANGO, as well as movements like #thisflag and #tajamuka. The paper will offer new insights on recent developments in civil society that have received little scholarly scrutiny.

In analysing Zimbabwean history, intellectuals have continued to highlight the critical nature of rural-urban linkages that have been pivotal in fuelling protests and urban-based movements in Zimbabwe for political change. My paper will explore how the 2016 uprisings and stay-aways mobilized by a young urban citizenry, have challenged the dominant national patriotic discourse that has characterised the nature of politics in Zimbabwe for many decades. My paper will focus on; the emerging alternative discourses and symbolism used in the mobilisation of these urban-based citizenry movements, the space these movements have occupied in attempting to depoliticise the political space by constructing a new form of patriotism and national identity which has for so long been missing in Zimbabwe, and the role that social media has played particularly in fostering diasporic engagement and political mobilisation for these movements in a new and dynamic way. I will also explore the potential avenues, if any, these movements can explore to foster deeper engagement amongst the rural populations which will be critical for their long-term survival and impact, as well as the implications this will have for the way forward in Zimbabwe.

Between 2000 and 2008, student leaders mobilised thousands of university students to protest the government in events that were convened in partnership with civic society and the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change. The majority of these students were outraged at the damage caused by economic and political crises on their education and hopes for the future. This paper argues that the engine of the mass student protest was the government's ideological transgression of the 'moral economy of hope' that underpinned people's investment in their education and which had a long history in Zimbabwe.

The futures that many students imagined for themselves, and the country at large, were being robbed: the formal economy shrunk dramatically, statutory funding of public institutions declined and currency instability wrecked havoc with household finances. Compounding the economic realities was the ruling party's attempts to restructure professional state institutions and private sector companies in accordance with 'patriotic' values that meant employing people that supported ZANU(PF). These realities were drawn into anti-ZANU(PF) political campaigns by student leaders, who often used their activism to gain material resources and to imagine political careers for themselves.

Using ethnographic material and several life histories, this paper argues that the failure of the Government of National Unity to bring about the reinstatement of an older meritocratic social and economic order has inaugurated a new era of politics in Zimbabwe, one in which protest is secondary to patronage, and in which mass student activism plays a much diminished role.

Advocates of secularism and liberalism tend to rule out Pentecostal Charismatic Churches (PCCs) as a force to reckon with in socio-economic and political transformation, on allegation that PCCs emphasize the prosperity and wealth Gospel that promises fortunes to those who faithfully support the ministry of the church. They argue that, while PCCs might inspire people with ideas on how to save money, start small businesses, for the success of these initiatives, members revert to the miraculous powers of the prophets.

This paper will argue for the ambivalence of Pentecostalism in political transformation, by asserting that, while the democratic spirit among Pentecostals in Zimbabwe is very low, there are cases of PCCs-influenced religio-political organizations operating outside the purview of mainline churches that have been involved in protests in pursuit of democratization. I will make reference to the urban activism of Bishop Ancelimo Magaya of Grace Ablaze Ministries International and Evan Mawarire's #ThisFlag movement. Such individuals and organizations practice faith-based activism through which their objective is to transform the socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. Their discourses and practices emphasize flexible structures as opposed to hierarchic and bureaucratic systems and structures, and embodiment of values of civility and public reason. These have an elective affinity with the priesthood of all believers out of which they problematize citizenship in Zimbabwe, hence elective affinity between Pentecostalism and democracy. These organizations assert that they are based on biblical principles and narratives. They engage in activities such as prayer rallies and demonstrations.

Harare's oldest township, Mbare has long been the hub of a vibrant popular music and dance scene. Since the mid-2000s, Harare has seen the growth of Zimdancehall, a distinctive local style of music, with roots in Jamaican reggae and dancehall, and lyrics in Shona and English. Zimdancehall producers and artists largely originate from Mbare and the poorer suburbs of Harare. Some argue that Zimdancehall provides a voice to those that endure poverty and isolation from the mainstream; while critics associate Zimdancehall with drugs and violence. Previous forms of popular music, such as chimurenga and 'urban grooves' came to enjoy a close relationship with the state (Willems, 2015). Zimdancehall has also become popular among Zimbabwean political elites. Major artists have performed at state-sponsored events, such as Grace Mugabe's birthday party in Borrowdale in July 2015. This paper situates Zimdancehall within a longer history of music and nationalist politics in Zimbabwe. Based on empirical research in Harare in 2015, and analysis of songs, newspaper reports, and oral testimony, this paper asks to what extent Zimdancehall represents a form of co-optation or resistance. Can we consider Zimdancehall as a vehicle for youth engagement in urban politics? And what does this popular musical genre tell us about political subjectivities among youth in urban Zimbabwe?