The Colliery shootings of 1949 in which eighteen workers and three protesters were shot by colonial police represents one of the most tragic episode in the history of labour and industrial relations in Nigeria. The peculiarity of the 1949 incident and its wide publicity lay in its characteristic fatalities. In addition to peaceful protests by African miners at Iva valley, the timely co-occurrence of the shootings with nationalist fervour drew sympathy from Nigerian educated elites who formed National Emergency Committee (NEC), and the youths whose organised protest was channelled through the Zikist Movement. While the waves of protest and violence that immediately followed the shootings have been well documented, little is known about non-violent response of Nigerians to the Colliery crisis. This paper seeks to go beyond dominant narratives that ignore non-violent strategies of protest as alternative response adopted in solving the Colliery shootings. Specifically, the paper will examine the miners' peaceful strategies of agitation, mediatory roles played by the NEC and non-violent strategies adopted by Nigerian youths organised under the Zikist Movement. The data for this work are derived from relevant archival documents, newspaper reports and editorial on the Zikist activities, and writings of major actors of the Movement.

Nigeria has been experiencing rising and more persistent levels of violence in recent years, with the conflict in its northeast between the state and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lida'awati wal Jihad (JAS), commonly known as Boko Haram, continuing to make national and international headlines. A persistent narrative has emerged among politicians, analysts, media outlets and communities themselves, that youth (seen primarily as young men), especially those who are not in regular paid employment are ticking time bombs ready to explode. Not only does this narrative serve to stereotype unemployed young men, increase the stigma they face and ignore the ways young women express their frustration and marginalisation but it also occludes the realities of many young people who choose not to be violent but rather are engaged in peace building activities.

This paper will first give an overview of the context and review the evidence of why young people join JAS and other violent groups in Nigeria, highlighting the roles of gender inequality and masculinity based on research conducted in 2015. It will then present analysis of interviews with young people who chose not to join violent groups and instead have been involved in working for peace. Based primarily on research conducted in 2016 and 2017 in Borno state, the epicentre of the JAS related conflict, the paper will tell their stories, showcase their work, examine the reasons for their decisions and explore the factors that support and challenge young people along these paths.

Niger, a country enclaved in the middle of the Sahel, surrounded by conflict ridden countries such as Libya, Mali and Nigeria has so far been described as the secure hub in an all else security tormented region. Niger's population is not only rapidly growing and majoritarian male, but it also has a very young population. School enrolment rates are very low with unemployment rates being overly high. One has to ask: where does the resilience come from? Since 2013 the country is heavily affected by neighboring Nigeria's insurgency of the radical extremist group Boko Haram. In late 2014 recruitment among the local population by the group has been confirmed for Diffa region, situated in the east of Niger, sharing the southern border with Nigeria. There is not much, it seems, for Niger's youth, and yet despite the current severe challenges the country is facing, it is holding it together. This is not least due to the many associative structures that have emerged in recent years among young Nigeriens starting to organize themselves. Those different structures have been able to create auto-managed networks and self-help systems where the state is notably absent. This article focuses on these very mechanisms of 'self-security' developed by Nigerien youth. Data is collected using semi-structured interviews conducted in Niamey and Agadez among youth of five different organizations exploring the factors for Niger's resilience.

Starting from early 2000s, the Sahel region experienced a surge of Jihadist insurgencies, including Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates in Northern Mali, and ISIS in southern Libya. As these movements recruited massively among poor disaffected Muslim youth in the region, many observers view the Sahel's large youth population as easy prey of Jihadist recruitment (Boukhars 2014; Onuoha 2014; Agbibos, E. 2013, Ojochenemi & al. 2015). Some studies draw a direct connection between youth, Islam, poverty, and terrorism, overlooking the overwhelming majority of youth who have resisted and rejected the call for Jihadism.

In Zinder—a poor city, Muslim by more than 95% of its population, and located at the confluence of multiple jihadists' zone of influence—youth have remained largely immune to the jihadist discourse. More striking is that even delinquents and disaffected youths tend to adopt a rather western-style urban violence as opposed to the ever proliferating jihadist mode of operation (Amadou 2014). This raises the question: Why have certain disaffected youth in the Sahel choose to inspire from Western gang culture to express dissent amidst a context dominated by the rise of Jihadist ideologies?

This paper attempts to answer this question by focusing on the specific case of "palais" phenomenon in Zinder. The "palais" refers to specific group of youths who have adopted a distinctive street culture that mimics the American gang culture in terms of names, clothing style, musical tests, drug consumption, sexual assault, and street violence.

Using the framing of 'everyday peace' and 'everyday politics' this paper outlines the multiple ways in which non-violent youth response to adversity. Based on qualitative case study research in the city of Jos (Nigeria) and rural Sierra Leone, this paper discusses the subtle ways in which young men and women seek to bridge social divisions and start community development, but also engage in more political activities like vigilantism. The paper pays specific attention to the gendered experience of insecurity in these contexts, and gendered responses. It furthermore analysis the factors that are conducive to young people's non-violent strategies to make lives liveable, and even progress.

This paper provides an example of a young Central African who avoids violence by escaping it physically. Euloge (27) grew up as the favourite son of a Central African civil servant. Inspired by his father, Euloge makes his first steps in grassroots politics when he enrolled at the University of Bangui where he becomes an active member of the National Students' Association (ANECA). When in 2013 the Seleka coup d'Etat plunged the Central African Republic (CAR) into a state of unprecedented chaos, some youngsters decided to take up arms, others decided to flee, yet others decided to stay. Feeling threatened, Euloge fled to Kinshasa (Congo). By focusing on Euloge's story, fleeing is analysed in this paper as a non-violent strategy to navigate precarious situations. The conflict in CAR pushed Euloge to abandon his country, but not his political engagement. In Kinshasa, Euloge has become the representative of the Central African community of refugees. Euloge has political aspirations and hopes his time in Kinshasa will help him attain a political position once he returns to CAR. By fleeing war and engaging actively in the community of refugees, Euloge has created an alternative political and social space in which he defends the wellbeing of Central African youth in Kinshasa, while staying in tune with the violent and non-violent evolvements in his country.

The Chipangano militia group emerged between 1999 and 2001 in Zimbabwe. The group used violence to govern space and resources in Mbare, a section of Harare. However, not all youths in the Mbare participated in the Chipangano militia movement. Many youths remained politically engaged without becoming members of the Chipangano militia group. This paper sets out to investigate how other organized youth groups navigated the charged political context of Mbare by using non-violent strategies. The paper is based on primary data from interviews with civil society actors and Mbare residents and secondary data from media reports.