Since the 1990s, regional organizations have increasingly turned into central actors in dealing with various crises on the African continent. While this development is reflected in a continuously growing body of literature, much more and deeper analysis is required to understand complex dynamics in different local contexts and between different actors involved, especially when it comes to financing operations. Therefore, taking an example that so far has received only scant attention, this paper focuses on the processes around the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) in 2012. Based on field research in Addis Ababa, Abuja, Bissau, and Dakar, the paper empirically reconstructs how ECOMIB has been decided, planned, and implemented. Interestingly, ECOWAS initially deployed without any international mandate other than its own, and thus also had to fund the operation by itself. Until today, attempts to secure financial support from international partners/donors have been largely unsuccessful. Consequently, the paper argues that, through ECOMIB, ECOWAS has tried both to take responsibility for regional conflicts (also financially) and to assert primacy in its "own" regional space. However, it also demonstrates how positions adopted and actions taken by ECOWAS relate to other actors (e.g. AU, EU, and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries) as well as previous interactions and engagements. Moreover, these positions and actions also reflect particular spatial imaginations that guide them. Thus, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics between different regional organizations in Africa and their role in security affairs.

Why and with which consequences are external actors involved in African regionalism? The African Union (AU) today could not run its programmes without external financial and other support from external actors. This provides for a puzzling contradiction: Are AU member states, AU bureaucrats or external donors in the driving seat? Unravelling the dynamics of external actor involvement requires a sociological framework that anchors the AU as an organization amidst the broader ideational and material resources of African regionalism, by weighing in on the practices between actors. Empirically, the paper focuses on the role of EU, the USA and China at the AU in infrastructure development policy; it combines participant observation at the AU headquarters with quantitative data. In charting the social mechanisms of external actor involvement at the AU, this contribution speaks to several debates. First, its analytic focus sheds light on a theoretical blind spot of EU-centric regionalism studies. External actor involvement therefore suggests itself as a novel form of regional governance that goes beyond the power of the purse. Second, it shows how the AU Commission attempts to coordinate the external relations of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), thereby carving out a new role of orchestrator for itself. Third, this is a contribution to the study of the politics of donor coordination within regional organizations.

Regional organizations (ROs) have become crucial actors in addressing issues of peace and security, in particular in Africa but also in several other parts of the world. They enjoy internal and external legitimacy, they contribute to mediation and peacekeeping, and they harbour new institutions such as early warning mechanisms. Among the usual fields of activity of ROs, such as trade and migration, peace and security stands out as a very costly endeavour. Despite the high costs associated with the growing relevance of ROs in issues of peace and security, comparative insights on their political economy with respect to finances remain rare.

Drawing on data on ca. 12 ROs from Asia, Africa and Latin America this paper deals with central questions of how, by whom and for what purpose ROs are financed. What impact do the different financial constellations have on the nature of regionalism in Africa and elsewhere? This comparative approach will help to conceptualise the self-understanding, the logics and the practices of ROs in their region and beyond. External donors, who often play a crucial role in the set-up and even survival of ROs, will explicitly be included into the picture, as in Africa their financial contributions surpass those of member states. Seven continental and sub-continental African ROs will be compared to ROs from Asia and Latin America.

This study investigates the handling and transformation of "borders" in West Africa, through the "New Regionalism" discourse from a political economic perspective. It argues that the concept of borders, deployed by various actors, regional and global, aims to facilitate the integration of African markets into the global economy through Regional Economic Communities. The paper takes cross-border cooperations, developmental corridors and spatial development initiatives as its launching points. These efforts, being the main targets of "new regionalism" discourse, rest heavily upon international borders of Africa. Thus, the paper is mainly concerned with the theoretical debate on the "New Regionalism" by focusing on "borders" and aims to place this debate within its historical context. The paper aims to discern the actors taking part in both bottom-up and top-down dynamics. Such that, it investigates the role of the state in institutional regional experiences as ECOWAS and UEMOA, the role of public-private partnerships, the private actors within development corridors and questions the aims and interests of these actors.

Field offices are an increasingly important reality in the architecture of African peacemaking. Yet despite their importance in practice, little attention has to far been paid to their work in academic debates on peacebuilding and mediation. This paper analyses the role of the African Union (AU) Liaison Office in the international efforts to reestablish constitutional order after the 2009 political crisis. The paper scrutinizes the mandate, set-up and institutional capacities of the Liaison Office and reconstructs how and to what extent it has contributed to peacemaking and conflict prevention in Madagascar. It thereby particularly highlights the often ad hoc way the Liaison Office reacted to unprecedented and rapidly changing events on the ground and stresses the important role individual staff play in translating the Liaison Office’s mandate into practice.