

AEGIS
2nd European Conference on African Studies
'African Alternatives: Initiative and Creativity beyond Current Constraints'
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands 11-14 July 2007

PANEL
Theorizing African State Trajectories

Chair: Dr. Sara Dorman

Title:
War and State formation: Outcomes of an interstate war in the post- Cold War era:
Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000)

Alexandra M. Dias¹
Member of CAS- Lisbon
PhD Candidate
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics and Political Science
A.M.Dias@lse.ac.uk

Panel 10
Friday, 13 July
9:30- 11:00

¹ Member of *Centro de Estudos Africanos*- ISCTE, Lisbon, Portugal (CAS- Lisbon)
I would like to pay tribute to my supervisor Dr. Dominique Jacquin- Berdal (1966-2006) who guided me through all the stages of the thesis and prepared me to reach the completion stage with a solid background. Her scholarly writings and teachings remain a source of continuous inspiration. Without her guidance and feedback on an earlier version of this paper I would not have completed it. This paper is part of my Doctoral dissertation on 'An interstate war in the post- Cold War era: Ethiopia- Eritrea (1998- 2000)', currently under completion under the supervision of Professor James Mayall. I would also like to thank Steve Adler for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. All the questionable interpretations and other faults are, of course, entirely my own. All comments and suggestions will be greatly appreciated.

Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES..... 3

WAR AND STATE FORMATION: OUTCOMES OF AN INTERSTATE WAR IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (1998-2000)..... 4

INTRODUCTION 4

I) CONCEPTIONS AND TRAJECTORIES OF STATE AND NATION BUILDING: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FEATURES 7

a) The trajectories of state and nation building projects in Ethiopia and Eritrea..... 7

b) Monopoly of Education: language, history and national identity formation..... 15

 Education in Eritrea 16

 Education in Ethiopia..... 20

II) WAR MAKING AND MAKING/ REMAKING STATE AND NATION IN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA 22

a) Taxation..... 24

 Taxation in Eritrea 24

 Taxation in Ethiopia..... 27

b) Monopoly of coercive violence: conscription (and patriotic education)..... 28

c) Extension of the state's institutions: state and nation building international features 41

III) OUTCOMES OF THE 1998- 2000 WAR: STATE CONSOLIDATION OR STATE DISINTEGRATION?..... 47

CONCLUSION 51

BIBLIOGRAPHY 55

List of Figures

FIGURE 1: REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ERITREA	35
FIGURE 2: REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ERITREA: COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM	36
FIGURE 3: REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ETHIOPIA	36
FIGURE 4: REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ETHIOPIA: COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM	38

War and State formation: Outcomes of an interstate war in the Post- Cold War era: Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000)

Introduction

‘War making is once again fundamental to state making in late twentieth century Africa, though rarely by way of overt interstate war².’

The opening quotation implies the application to sub - Saharan Africa, at face value, of Charles Tilly’s axiom that ‘war makes the state and the state makes war³’. This claim highlights the unique theoretical value of the case study to test the central claim that war in Africa, as earlier in Europe, leads to state making. Has the 1998-2000 war induced state making or re-making either in Eritrea or in Ethiopia, respectively?

This paper will argue that the relationship between war and the process of state formation is central to the understanding of contemporary projects of state and nation building. However this premise does not imply that Tilly’s axiom that ‘war makes states and states make war’ will inevitably apply to the African context, or to other cases of state and nation building in the contemporary developing world. It should be noted that when it comes to establishing a positive relationship between war and the process of state formation, nowhere does Charles Tilly mention that the process will lead to similar outcomes. Although the process of state formation is universal, indeed, as Tescke rightly argues ‘(...) There is no single world historical pattern⁴. This in turn leads us to locate the trajectory of the process of state formation of the two countries within the broader patterns of state consolidation in Africa⁵.

As the evidence collected will show there are no short-cut answers. What we can see in the short term is the simultaneity of both tendencies in the same case, i.e., we can identify components of the three central activities identified by Tilly which led

² Joseph, R. 1999. 'State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa': Lynne Rienner Publishers. (P.76)

³ Tilly, C. 1985. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime' in Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer and T.Skocpol (ed.) *Bringing the State Back in*. New York: CUP. (P.170). It should be noted however that Tilly argues that even in Europe power holders did not undertake the three central activities of war making, extraction and accumulation with the purposeful intention of creating national states. Power holders did not foresee that national states would emerge from war making. Idem. P.172.

⁴ Teschke, B. 2003. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the making of Modern International Relations*. London and New York: Verso. p.272.

⁵ The case study allows testing some of the central theoretical propositions advanced by Herbst on his scholarly work on the process of state formation in Africa. Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

to state consolidation in some areas and to state fragmentation in other areas. Indeed, the case study seems to challenge the positive relationship between war making and state making.

The analysis is based on the premise that nation-building and state-building are co-determined⁶ and are central in understanding the process of state formation and consolidation or inversely fragmentation and ultimately disintegration. The state and nation building projects are part of the multidimensional processes of state formation and national identity formation. We cannot fully apprehend one without considering the other. The chapter is based on the premise that the relationship between war making, state making and, finally, nationalism are central to understanding state trajectories towards consolidation or, in the other extreme, towards state disintegration. Although the argument places the sources of state and nation building activities in the domestic realm, the international implications⁷ of the two projects should not be overlooked⁸.

The theoretical value of the case- study is further enhanced by its unique applicability to test the relationship between interstate war and state formation in Africa. The case study will test J. Herbst's thesis that the state in Africa is weak because of the relatively low incidence of interstate war. The analysis of the 1998-2000 war will allow testing this theoretical proposition. The case- study will enable us to test if this earlier pattern which characterised the formation and consolidation of state power in Europe is likely to be reproduced in Africa.

The first part of the paper will consider domestic and international features of the state and nation building projects in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The relationship between war and the state needs to be considered separately in the two cases because of three fundamental differences between these states' trajectories.

⁶ Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2002. *Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa: A Critique of the Ethnic Interpretation*. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press. p. 42.

Mary Callahan bases her approach on the analytical distinction between state building and nation building Callahan, M. P. 2003. *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

p. 13. In contrast to Callahan, Jacquin- Berdal while acknowledging with some modernists that nation and state may be two distinct phenomena, claims that nation building and state building are, nevertheless, co-determined and hence we cannot fully understand one without looking at the other. idem, p.42.

⁷ The regional implications of state building are the main focus of the final chapter of thesis: chapter seven.

⁸ This is the subject of the final chapter of the thesis.

1) the different historical circumstances of the emergence of the state (the Ethiopian process which successfully resisted colonialism- except for the 1936-1941 Italian occupation- and the legacy of both Italian colonialism and British administration in the case of Eritrea);

2) the differential longevity of the process of state formation in Ethiopia and its newness in Eritrea with clear implications with regard to the legacies of previous conceptions and trajectories of statehood and, finally;

3) The divergent conceptions of statehood and nationhood and the trajectories of the two states after the overthrow of the *Derg* and Eritrea's independence.

Finally, the second part will analyse the three state- making activities induced by war: taxation, conscription and extension of the state institutions to the entire territory under the jurisdiction of the state. Herbst claims that the three activities identified by Tilly (with regard to the process of state formation in Europe) serve as indicators of the consolidation of state power⁹. This will lead the paper into the examination of the central question whether the 1998- 2000 war has reinforced the trajectories of the states towards consolidation or disintegration.

⁹ Herbst 2000, op.cit., p.23

D) Conceptions and trajectories of State and Nation building: domestic and international features

The first part of the paper looks specifically at the trajectories of the nation-state in the two countries and aims to understand how the aims of achieving and defending domestic and international sovereignty, i.e., independence were pursued.

Jacquin- Berdal's contention that the state needs to achieve coercive monopoly and monopoly of education (language and history) to 'achieve domestic sovereignty'¹⁰, will inform the analysis of these two domains of statecraft within the specific trajectories of the state and nation building projects in the two countries.

The confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea needs to be understood in the context of structural differences in terms of how each state was conceptualized, after 1991, as a nation- state. Both governments were confronted with the immense challenges posed by internal displacement of populations and refugees, coupled with the challenge of demobilization and reintegration of ex- combatants and, in Ethiopia's case- of the armed forces of the previous regime. These challenges were far more meaningful for the process of state formation in Eritrea, as a new state, than for Ethiopia with its long tradition of statehood.

a) The trajectories of state and nation building projects in Ethiopia and Eritrea

The creation of Ethiopia as a nation- state during the nineteenth century (and early twentieth century) was characterised by an inherently expansionist dynamic and through subordination and incorporation of the periphery into the northern highlands historic core¹¹. This territorial expansion coincided with the rise into eminence of the

¹⁰ Jacquin- Berdal 2002, op.cit., p.71

¹¹ Clapham, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia' in Clapham, C., Herbst, J., and, Greg Mills, (ed.) *Big African States*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. p. 19; Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Aida Mengistu, 2006. 'Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Building Multiethnic States' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. (p. 84)

Shoan core¹². The peripheral groups from contiguous southern and western regions, which had few links with the core, tended to resist the centralizing pressures for state building. In this regard, Bradburd relied on Tilly's model to highlight that local resistance also shaped the trajectory of state formation in areas outside Europe¹³. The process of contention between the centralizing forces and the peripheral *loci* of power (centrifugal forces)¹⁴ is central to understanding state formation in the developing world. Clapham in the 1970s already emphasised the tension which permeated the Ethiopian state between the centripetal pull of Ethiopian nationalism, assimilation and administrative control, and the centrifugal pull of neighbouring countries over the Ethiopian state's periphery¹⁵. Clapham concluded that the outcome was determined by the strategies followed by the groups in the midway between the periphery and the core¹⁶.

Herbst contended that wars of territorial conquest were central to the formation of particular types of states in Europe because they created ' (...) a life and death imperative to raise taxes, enlist men as soldiers, and develop the necessary infrastructure to fight and win battles against rapacious neighbours¹⁷'. Lewis claimed that the Ethiopian political unit was based on conquest, however ' (...) power of the centre over the periphery waxed and waned over the centuries¹⁸.' Indeed, Ethiopia was faced both by external threats to its territorial integrity and by insurgencies of varying strengths which challenged not only the state's monopoly of the means of coercion but also managed to control territory far from the capital.

¹² Clapham, C. 1972. 'Ethiopia and Somalia'. *Adelphi Paper : Special Issue on African Conflicts* 364: 1-19.(p.2). The Shoan core refers to the former central Ethiopian province. The political system was dominated by representatives of this province, which contributed with 60 per cent to 70 per cent of high- ranking central government officials, the imperial family and the seat of government in the capital. *ibid.* p.3.

¹³ Bradburd, D. 1996. 'Towards an understanding of the fate of modern pastoralists: Starting with the state'. *Nomadic Peoples* 38: 37- 48. (p.42)

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.43.

¹⁵ Clapham 1972, *op.cit.*, (p.3)

¹⁶ *ibid.*, pp.3-4. With hindsight, this analysis already identified the contours of the post- 1991 context and is still applicable. Indeed, the Ethiopian groups in the midway between the core and the periphery played a crucial role in the secession of Eritrea after the overthrow of the Derg in 1991. The alliance between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was crucial for Eritrea's prompt international recognition as a sovereign state. Pool, D. 1998. 'The Eritrean People's Liberation Front' in Clapham, C. (ed.) *African Guerrillas*. Fountain & Indiana: James Currey. (p.19). This contention, however, does not diminish the legitimacy of Eritrea's claim for self- determination and/or the significance of the victorious outcome of the war for independence.

¹⁷ Herbst 2000, *op.cit.*, pp.13-14.

¹⁸ Lewis, I. M. 1980. *A modern history of the Somali : nation and state in the Horn of Africa* London & N.Y.: Longman. p.249

The recognition of Ethiopia's modern sovereign boundaries by the colonial powers came in the aftermath of Ethiopia's successful victory at *Adwa* (1896) over the invading army of Italy. The Ethiopian state withstood the test of successfully resisting the Italian external threat to its territorial integrity. This victory was revived at key junctures to mobilise the citizens around the nationalist appeal to defend the state's sovereignty.

According to Herbst 'the consequential role that war played in European state development was not replicated in Africa'¹⁹ particularly because the legacy of the colonial state meant that the establishment of capital cities was subordinated to the Metropolis' needs rather than to the imperative to link the capital and cities in the colonies to the hinterland. In this regard, Ethiopia's particular state-building trajectory has an added value to understanding the diversity of state creation trajectories in Africa as the territory was not under the control of any colonial power, with the exception of the five-year occupation by Italy (1936- 1941). The rise to eminence of the Shoan core firmly ended an era of 'roving capitals' and Addis Ababa became the imperial capital in 1889 upon Menelik's accession to the throne²⁰. Indeed, as McClellan contended 'by the 1950s Addis Ababa had become the political, as well as the economic, social and cultural centre of the country'²¹.

The tension between the centripetal pull and the centrifugal pull was played out when the Italian colonial power invaded Ethiopia in 1935 at a key juncture when the centre was perceived as weak and vulnerable²². Until this crisis the unity of the nation was assumed and largely unquestioned; McClellan contended that this key juncture exposed the fragility of the loyalty of various groups at the periphery to the Empire. As a consequence, McClellan contended that the myth of *Adwa* was shattered²³. As the author highlighted:

'Although only six years in duration, the Italo- Ethiopian War of 1935- 1941 was one of the defining events in the history of Ethiopia. It was an event that swept away old myths and created opportunities for Ethiopia to re-examine the nature and meaning of their state'²⁴.

¹⁹ Herbst 2000, op.cit., p.21.

²⁰ McClellan, C. 1990. 'Articulating Economic Modernization and National Integration at the Periphery: Addis Ababa and Sidamo's Provincial Centers'. *African Studies Review* 33: 29- 54. (p.30).

²¹ Ibid. p.33

²² --- 1996. 'Observations on the Ethiopian Nation, Its Nationalism, and the Italo- Ethiopian War'. *Northeast African Studies* 3: 57- 86. (p.63).

²³ Ibid. (p.57)

²⁴ Ibid. (p.57)

Ethiopia's defeat in 1935, the subsequent Italian administration and the 'Patriots' resistance to foreign occupation led Emperor Haile Selassie subsequently to devise policies to consolidate Ethiopia's national identity. McClellan claimed that during the war Ethiopians did what was necessary to survive and this strategy forced difficult choices, leading many to shift sides depending upon their particular circumstances²⁵. The war divided the country, and in its aftermath it was paramount to control factionalism²⁶. With the restoration of the imperial regime, after the Italians were ousted in 1941, the national question occupied centre stage in Ethiopia. The Emperor promulgated two national holidays in a tribute to the Patriots and to mark the restoration of the state: 19 February was established as Martyrs Day and 5 May as Liberation Day²⁷. In addition Public Monuments were built to commemorate key episodes of the resistance war against foreign occupation and national heroes²⁸. McClellan's interpretation of the war runs counter to the official interpretation and to the nationalist narrative to be found in Ethiopian textbooks from this period. The patriotic indoctrination of the future generations implied highlighting the war as a great national effort to end the drama of foreign occupation. The shifting allegiances of many Ethiopians during the war and the peripheral groups' different conceptions and practices during the Italian occupation were silenced from the nationalist narrative²⁹. Indeed, as Barnes claimed the regime was 'tinged with an amnesiac and aggressive chauvinism that did not admit the complexity of this recent history'³⁰. As an outcome of the defeat against the Italian troops, Emperor Haile Selassie concentrated efforts on the implementation and reinforcement of the nationalist project³¹. Building a centralized modern government to pursue 'Greater Ethiopia's' national interests (domestic and international) was central to this project³². Within this process 'amharization' of the society occupied centre- stage and access to education,

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.62.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p.65.

²⁷ *ibid.* p.85 Martyrs Day paid a tribute to the slaughter of thousands in the capital after a failed attempt of assassination of the Italian Governor Grazziani in 1937. The Liberation Day was the day of the Emperor's return to the country.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p.66 These Monuments included the statue to Abuna Petros, Sidist Kilo and Arat kilo.

²⁹ McClellan 1996, *op.cit.*, p.61. & p.66.

³⁰ Barnes, C. 2003. 'Sovereignty, Identity and Modernity: Understanding Ethiopia'. *African Affairs* 102: 507-514. (p.513).

³¹ Barnes, C., and, Thomas Osmond, Octobre 2005. 'L' Après État- Nation en Éthiopie: Changement de forme plus que d'habitudes?' *Politique Africaine* 99. (p.9).

³² *Ibid.* (p.9).

work and power were dependent upon assimilation into the core's dominant ethos³³. The restoration of the imperial prestige was pursued by 'firming up external sovereignty' especially with regard to the status of the former Italian colony: Eritrea; which was first incorporated as part of the Federation and, then, as one of Ethiopia's Provinces. Barnes highlighted that the long due and unfinished modern project of domestic sovereignty was fatally neglected; the revolutionary regime would exploit this weakness and upon take-over of power defined domestic sovereignty as one of the central features of its state building project³⁴. One of the key initial concerns of the revolutionary regime was the 'nationalities question'. The debate around the nationalities question had emerged within the Students' movement in the 1960s and flared up divisions both within the movement and the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) or *Derg*. Gilkes claimed that the splits arose among Ethiopian student exiles in Europe and in North America but their divisions were only played out domestically when they returned to Ethiopia in the 1970s³⁵. The debate over the national question, indeed, mirrored the conflicting nature of the centre-periphery relations in a multi- ethnic centralised state³⁶. The PMAC in its April 1976 National Democratic Revolution Programme (NDRP) formally accorded each nationality full- right to self- government, regional autonomy in internal affairs, and recognized the multi- linguistic character of the Ethiopian polity³⁷. This was a significant departure from the imperial regime's Amharic only- policy and led to recognition of language rights to other ethno-linguistic groups (termed nationalities)³⁸. Indeed, both the PMAC and Ethiopia Revolutionary Information Centre (ERIC) used Stalin's definition of a nation³⁹. The degree of autonomy and the question whether secession would be permissible, or not, provoked a heated debate; which ultimately resulted in the view from the Political Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA) (the body in charge of political education in 1976- 1979) prevailing. The POMOA firmly opposed secession and, instead, favoured regional

³³ Ibid.(p.9).

³⁴ Barnes 2003, op.cit., (p.513)

³⁵ Gilkes, P. 1983. 'Centralism and the Ethiopian PMAC' in Lewis, I.M. (ed.) *Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa*. London: Ithaca Press. (footnote 1 p. 209)

³⁶ Triulzi, A. Ibid.'Competing views of national identity in Ethiopia'. p.115

³⁷ Education, as the next section will discuss in further detail, played a central role in these processes. Gilkes 1983, op.cit., p. 196.

³⁸ McNab, C. December 1990. 'Language Policy and Language Practice: Implementing Multilingual Literacy Education in Ethiopia'. *African Studies Review* 33: 65- 82. (p.66).

³⁹ ibid, p.199.

autonomy⁴⁰. The idea of the Institute for Ethiopian Nationalities (IFEN) emerged from this debate. In addition, the *Derg* pledged for the cultural emancipation of ethnic groups and implemented a mass literacy campaign in local languages⁴¹. In the 1980s, the IFEN conducted a study on the territorial distribution of languages in Ethiopia. The study concluded that out of the 580 *woreda* (districts) only 30 *woreda* were mono-linguistic, only 5 per cent of the districts were homogenous with regard to language⁴². Most of the districts were multi-linguistic and multi-ethnic. As a consequence, the project of using language as the key criteria for administrative divisions was postponed indefinitely because of the concerns over this measure's potential to fuel conflicts⁴³.

The *Derg*'s approach to the national question confirmed that although not ignored, the policies to address it were not implemented; in the end, sub-nationalities were placed under the umbrella of 'reactionary narrow nationalism', which was portrayed as a key threat to the Ethiopian progressive party⁴⁴. Indeed, the *Derg*, despite its rhetoric of recognizing regional self-government, in continuity with the legacy from the imperial regime pursued not only the process of nationalisation, but also that of centralisation of government⁴⁵.

The strategy that followed post-1991 to address the tension between national and sub-national identities should be understood against the backdrop of these earlier projects. The ethnic-based Federal model implemented by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was inspired by the Soviet Constitution and purported a unique conception of the Ethiopian state. However, the significant legacy from previous regimes on the nationalities question in Ethiopia should not be overlooked. The TGE did not embark upon state and nation building from scratch; indeed, the trajectory of state and nation building in post-1991 Ethiopia should be understood as part of the TGE project of remaking the Ethiopian state⁴⁶.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p.200.

⁴¹ Vaughan, S. 2007. 'Le fédéralisme ethnique et la démocratisation depuis 1991' in Prunier, G. (ed.) *L'Éthiopie contemporaine*. Addis Ababa & Paris: CFEE/ Karthala. (p.373). The mass literacy campaign was implemented in the context of the National Work Campaign (*zemacha*) wherein students from schools and institutes of higher education were sent to the countryside to participate in the campaign against illiteracy. McNab 1990, *op.cit.*, p.68.

⁴² *ibid.*, p.375.

⁴³ *ibid.*, p.376.

⁴⁴ Gilkes 1983, *op.cit.*, p.208.

⁴⁵ Barnes and Osmond 2005, *op.cit.*, (p.9).

⁴⁶ Keller, E. J. 2005. 'Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia' in Larémont, R.R. (ed.) *Borders, nationalism, and the African state*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

The post- 1991 Ethiopian constitutional model led to the redrawing of the administrative territorial subdivisions of the country on an explicitly ethnic principle. However, as the section on Education will show, the linguistic criteria were, indeed, paramount within this project. Ultimately, the Constitution recognized the right to self- determination, including a right to secession. Paradoxically, this model led to a softening of the frontiers. Clapham argued that this process occurred at two levels. On one level, it affected the relations between groups across frontiers, with clear implications for Ethiopia's northern, eastern and western borderland communities⁴⁷. Concurrently, on another level, the model of Ethnic Federalism favoured the state's engagement in cross- border politics⁴⁸, namely in hot pursuit missions of insurgent movements across the northern and south-eastern border. This tactic had implications for its relations with its contiguous northern neighbour. In the build-up to the major confrontation the Ethiopian leadership failed to induce a sufficient sense of security in the new neighbour, thereby aggravating a sense of permanent rivalry.

Post-1991 Ethiopia's ethnic federalism and Eritrea's national unity demonstrated the divergent conceptions of statehood defined by the two governments. The EPRDF/ TPLF's conception was based on the central pillar of ethnic heterogeneity and the recognition of sub-national identities as cornerstone to the edifice of Federalism. The PFDJ/ EPLF conception rested on forging homogeneity through the consolidation of a sense of 'Eritreaness' that would embrace and supplant all other sub-national identities.

In addition, along with the Eritrean definition of nationalism in terms of colonial territoriality⁴⁹, the PFDJ also implemented its own conception of Eritrean statehood which led to a redrawing of the administrative units. However, in contradistinction to the EPRDF's ethnic- based Federal model (which ascribed saliency to sub- national identities and led to the redrawing of the domestic boundaries between regions along ethnic lines), the PFDJ restructuring of the administrative units was aimed at diffusing sub-national identities and at subordinating these to the national one. The regional boundaries were redrawn to form the new administrative units (*zobas*) which cut across old regional units. As

⁴⁷ The communities located at the borderlands with Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan respectively.

⁴⁸ Clapham, C. 2001. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn' in May, R., and Furley, Oliver (ed.) *African Interventionist States*. Aldershot: Ashgate. p.126

⁴⁹ Clapham 2006, op.cit., (p.235).

Conrad highlighted, the PFDJ state- building project was aimed at ‘(...) erasing regional identities, i.e. loyalty to one’s region (*awraja*) and the village (*adi*)’⁵⁰.

The creation of multi- ethnic administrative regions was pursued in order to prevent the emergence of territorially based ethnic opposition⁵¹. However, as Conrad claimed, this purposeful attempt to erase regional identities created resentment and seems to have ‘(...) contributed to a growing disengagement from the national project and reinforced deep- seated local and regional affiliations⁵²’. However, in order to understand the potential divisive role of regionalism for domestic politics since Eritrea’s independence, the legacy of the 1973 crisis should not be overlooked. After the merger of two of the splintering factions of the ELF, the People’s Party 1 & 2 were brought together and Issaias Afewerki assumed command. In 1973 the new leadership was faced with opposition from within its ranks: from the *menqa* faction (ultra- leftist former university students) and *yamin* (right wing). During the crisis within the ranks of the future EPLF (which was allegedly only officially formed at the First Congress in 1977), one of the dissenting factions led by Solomon Woldemariam claimed to represent the fighters from the Akele Guzai province and was aimed at overcoming the lack of representation of this province within the new leadership (which was dominated by fighters originally from Hamasien)⁵³. This regionally- based grievance was on a clear collision route with the leadership’s focus on the need to overcome any ethnic and/or regional- based divisions. The current President, Issaias Afewerki, was originally from Hamasien region. Issaias Afewerki, among others, had fiercely opposed ethnic, regional and/or religious based affiliations and, instead, focused on the subordination of all sub- nationalities to the overarching cause of Eritrea’s plight for self- determination and independence. The decision to eliminate by force the opposition factions during the 1973 crisis is still a controversial

⁵⁰ Conrad, B. 2006. 'Out of the 'memory hole': Alternative narratives of the Eritrean revolution in the diaspora'. *Afrika Spectrum* 41: 249- 271. (footnote 23 p.261).

⁵¹ Fouad Makki 1996. 'Nationalism, State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991- 96'. *Review of African Political Economy* 23: 475- 497. (p.484).

⁵² *ibid*, p.261. Historically some regions within Eritrea, such as Akele Guzai, had closer links to Tigray, than with other *kebesa* within Eritrea, such as the districts of Seraye and Hamasien. According to Alemseged Abbay the trans- Mereb ties (i.e. across the river which separates Eritrea from Tigray) were still alluded to after Eritrea’s independence. Alemseged Abbay 1997. 'The Trans- Mereb Past in the Present'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35: 321- 334. (pp.324- 325).

⁵³ Pool, D. 2001. *From guerrillas to government : the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front*. Oxford & Athens: J. Currey & Ohio University Press. (footnote 24 p. 76).

matter which resonates when understanding Eritrean politics since Independence⁵⁴. Perhaps the disappearance of the Akele Guzai province with the creation of the new administrative units (*zoba*) was not the outcome of a mere coincidence.

These contradictory conceptions of statehood divided the leaderships of both states and their intransigence coupled with their divergent orientations influenced their foreign policies. Asmara exchanged accusations with Addis Ababa stating that the Ethiopian ruling party was determined to undermine its survival as a sovereign state. For Eritrea the legitimacy of the thirty-year war for independence was based on the colonial treaties signed between Ethiopia and Italy. Affirming that ideological basis remained important for the Eritrean leadership and, in the absence of democracy, nationalism became the major defence against ethnic, language and/or region-based sub-nationalism. In addition, prior to the war with Ethiopia, Ruth Iyob noted that:

‘In effect, what will be needed is a new covenant between the Eritrean people and the state based on the reciprocities of civic obligation and not on the need to survive in the face of a common enemy’⁵⁵.

Although the post-1991 Ethiopian and Eritrean conceptions of statehood had domestic sources, their implementation had significant international implications and were pursued in the regional arena⁵⁶.

b) Monopoly of Education: language, history and national identity formation

The divergent trajectories of the two states’ nation building projects becomes even more salient when we turn to the analysis of the educational systems in relation to the states’ aim of achieving domestic sovereignty. This section looks first at the

⁵⁴ Although the information on the 1973 crisis is sparse all Eritrea scholars allude to its significance both to understanding the formation of the EPLF and domestic politics since Eritrea’s independence. Iyob, R. 1995. *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism 1941-1993*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp.116- 117); Pool 2001, op.cit., (p.76 & p.86). Connell, D. 2001. ‘Inside the EPLF: The Origins of the ‘People’s Party’ & its Role in the Liberation of Eritrea’. *Review of African Political Economy* 89: 345-364. (pp.352-53). Connell, D. 2005. ‘A Conversation with Petros Solomon and Berhane Gebreghzabhier, August 2, 2001’ in Connell, D. (ed.) *Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press. (pp.85- 90).

⁵⁵ Iyob 1995, op.cit., (p.146)

⁵⁶ Chapter seven (of the thesis) analyses in further detail, the divergent conceptions of statehood and their implications not only on the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also on the pattern of relations between the two and with other regional actors (both state and non state actors).

legacies from the colonial period in the Eritrean educational system and, finally, at the PFDJ's policy with regard to Education and, specifically, to language. In addition, the analysis of the educational systems sheds light onto the divergent nationalist projects of the two governments. Finally, this section will reflect upon the key transformation wrought about by the EPRDF ethnic- based Federal model with regard to the politicisation of language.

Education in Eritrea

In the Eritrean case, according to Jacquin-Berdal, whilst the Italian colonial authorities left a minimal form of education, the numerous missions of various Christian denominations may have contributed to the creation of a sense of 'Eritrean-ness'. The learning of history played an important role in this respect. The textbooks used by Catholic missions in Eritrea depicted it as a cohesive entity. The textbooks described the main features of the Italian colony of Eritrea. According to Jacquin-Berdal those were probably the first written texts to lay down a comprehensive account of Eritrean history. Moreover, Eritreans educated in the missions acquired a unitary conception of Eritrea and of its particular history, distinct from other countries in the region. These textbooks contained maps of Eritrea which provided the necessary visual support to the formation of an imagined community⁵⁷.

The period of British Administration (1941 - 1952) triggered the politicisation of Eritreans around a nationalist project. According to the same author the British Administration enhanced the educational system and established political parties. Paradoxically, it was the British project to partition Eritrea that unified the new political elite in the preservation of Eritrea's territorial integrity.⁵⁸

The importance of the educational legacy from this period was raised during an interview, in August 2004, while conducting fieldwork in Asmara. The British Administration left an important legacy in the educational system. Under the British Administration, at the primary school level, all the course books were in Tigrinya. From this period remains a great wealth of literature in Tigrinya. Most of the books

⁵⁷Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2000. 'State and War in the Formation of Eritrean National Identity' in Vandersluis, S.O. (ed.) *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations*. London: MacMillan Press. P.59

⁵⁸ *ibid.* p. 63.

were subsequently burnt but some remain as part of private collections⁵⁹. Alongside Tigrinya, Arabic text- books were obtained from Egypt and the Sudan. However, Arabic was never so widespread as to substantiate claims that it was a second official language⁶⁰.

With the incorporation of Eritrea as the Fourteenth Governorate of the Empire of Ethiopia, Amharic became the dominant medium of instruction in Eritrea⁶¹.

Throughout the civil war with Ethiopia the EPLF developed an underground primary level education system which transmitted to the fighters and local communities in the newly liberated territories the idea of an Eritrean nation⁶². In independent Eritrea, education at the primary level is provided in the mother-language of the student and is replaced by English at the secondary level.

Eritrea's motto for its education policy is to promote unity within cultural diversity. The national educational policy is based on the use of mother languages as the medium of instruction in all public schools. Tekle M. Woldemikael carried a study of the government policy in this area from 1991 to 1996. This study is even more important, as to date there has been no census with precise percentages of speakers for each of the 9 languages. The mother-tongue policy has been a form of social engineering that emphasizes:

'(...) one state, one nation, and many languages'⁶³.

In addition to the mother language, all elementary school students are required to take Tigrinya and/ or Arabic. Beyond the primary school level the main medium of instruction in all Eritrean schools is English. These additional requirements show that in practice three languages tend to dominate: Arabic, Tigrinya and English.

According to Tekle Woldemikael, when the government chose Tigrinya and Arabic as the working languages for the state's institutions and agents, and declared that all schoolchildren were thereafter to take Tigrinya and/or Arabic and English as subjects in primary- level education, it was contradicting its own stated commitment

⁵⁹ Interview in Asmara, 2/08/04. This is a field in need of further research but it remains beyond the scope of the dissertation.

⁶⁰ Jacquin- Berdal 2000, op.cit., P. 61

⁶¹ Interestingly enough, during fieldwork in August 2004 in Asmara, several people anecdotally mentioned that if caught listening to Amharic music they had to pay a fine of 5 *Nakfa*. This measure, quite significantly, had been implemented in the aftermath of the 1998- 2000 war to create a further marker between Ethiopians and Eritreans, reviving earlier resistance to the 'Amharization' project implemented by the Emperor Haile Selassie.

⁶² Jacquin- Berdal 2000, op.cit., P.65

⁶³ Tekle M. Woldemikael 2003 (April). 'Language, Education, and Public Policy in Eritrea'. *African Studies Review* 46: 117- 136. P.122

to the equality of all Eritrean languages⁶⁴. According to the author the figures released for 1995- 1996 showed that out of a total of 240 737 students enrolled at the primary level, only 3 per cent were being instructed in Tigre, 12 per cent in Arabic and 82 per cent in Tigrinya⁶⁵.

The government-controlled newspapers fully reproduce this policy orientation. *Haddas Eritra* is published in Tigrinya, *Eritrea al- Haditha* is published in Arabic and *Eritrea Profile* is published in English. However, at the level of government-controlled radio programmes the PFDJ seems to be committed to the policy of one Eritrea, many languages. Indeed, minority ethnic groups have a number of programmes in their native languages⁶⁶. The extent to which this is an Eritrean self-designed aim or a counter- reaction to the effects of Ethiopia's own focus on 'nationalities', on Eritrea's minority ethnic communities, especially on those located at the borderlands, is difficult to determine at the time of writing⁶⁷.

Tekle Woldemikael claims that in many cases there is grass-roots resistance to the policy of use of the mother tongue in Eritrean schools. This has to do with the direct economic and political rewards and benefits wrought by the knowledge of regional and international languages such as Arabic and English⁶⁸. Since English, Tigrinya and Arabic are widely used in official communication, a person knowing all or a combination of these languages has an advantage in gaining economic and political opportunities and rewards in the modern sector of Eritrean society. Interestingly enough one can function effectively in the lower official circles of the Eritrean government knowing only Tigrinya. The same might not happen if an Eritrean speaks only Arabic and/ or English. Indeed, Tigrinya is the language of military training and communication.

The analysis of the language policy also reflects a central tension that permeates both Eritrea's social formation and domestic politics. According to Tekle Woldmikael the two dominant languages (Arabic and Tigrinya) tend to be more rewarding to Eritrean citizens than the other languages. The various mother tongues

⁶⁴ *ibid*, p.123.

⁶⁵ *ibid*, p.127.

⁶⁶ Interviews in Asmara, July- August 2004.

⁶⁷ Ethiopia's ethnic- based Federal model led to the creation of radio programmes in local languages. This was particularly significant for Afar and Kunama split between the two countries. This is another area for future research with borderland communities, which, however, lies beyond the scope of the present dissertation.

⁶⁸ Tekle M. Woldemikael 2003, *op.cit.*, p.135

are not likely to disappear, however those who command languages spoken only by minority ethnic groups are unlikely to have equal access to the state's institutions.

According to the author, the government is fully aware that Arabic, as an international language and as the language of neighbouring countries, may eclipse Tigrinya, which is only a regional language⁶⁹. In 2003 new curricula and course books were produced reflecting the new orientation. In the Eritrean lowlands up to the 4th grade the students are taught in Arabic. In the 4th grade they start to be exposed to Tigrinya. The rest of the education is pursued in English when all the different ethnic groups are brought together. This is a major transformation in comparison to what happened during the Federation period and during the subsequent period of Eritrea's incorporation into Ethiopia⁷⁰.

The centrality of history in the process of state building in Eritrea is highlighted by Richard Greenfield. In Eritrea the work of the Eritrean Research and Documentation Centre is fundamental to educational and historical development. A major effort is devoted to this task. The goal is to develop the sources to create a national archive and further support it in the future with the creation of a national library. Richard Greenfield claimed that: '(...) without these tools proper interpretation of history and politics will be difficult⁷¹'. The Research and Documentation Centre in Asmara holds a valuable collection of documents from the period of the war for independence. The Eritrean Research and Documentation Centre is closely linked to the ruling party. This in turn, further confirms Jacquin- Berdal contention that the EPLF, after its victory in 1991, imposed its own definition of Eritrean national identity '(...) one in which the war for independence had become the founding myth⁷²'. Indeed, both the teaching and learning of languages and history seem to confirm the state's monopoly of the educational system.

The PFDJ has also attempted to maintain monopoly of Education among the diaspora. According to Conrad, the teaching of history, culture and mother- tongue to children in the diaspora tends to reproduce the domestic pattern, i.e., it mirrors the

⁶⁹ *ibid*, p.134

⁷⁰ Interview in Asmara, 2/08/04

⁷¹ Shaebia Interview by Yoseph Takle (Asmara University) with Professor Richard Greenfield. ' Eritrea is in a Strong position on the Border ruling'. Voice of Eritrea. 25/01/05.

http://www.hornofafrica.de/english/1_jan2005_eng/jan25-1_eri.htm

⁷² Jacquin- Berdal 2000, *op.cit.* p. 67.

government's policy of inculcating through the educational system its own version of the nationalist narrative⁷³.

During the border war any divergence from the PJDF narrative of the war for independence and the historical obligation to defend this hard-won achievement was viewed as an act of treason; Bettina Conrad suggested that this perception was shared both domestically and among the diaspora communities⁷⁴. This should be understood against the backdrop of the government's trend to conflate 'the identity of the nationalist movement and its political manifestation, the PFDJ' to a point that they 'are near indistinguishable from that of the state'⁷⁵.

The PFDJ regime interpretation of the war for independence was already contested prior to the 1998-2000 war. While the PFDJ had defined the 20th June as a public holiday to pay tribute to the Martyrs of the state of Eritrea, the former ELF (RC) celebrate Martyr's Day on the 1st December⁷⁶.

The defeat in the war led to the public voicing of discontent with regard to the PFDJ military and diplomatic conduct of the war. Quite significantly, the aftermath of the war led many to question the regime's legitimacy and 'opened a Pandora's box of interpretations of the past'⁷⁷.

Education in Ethiopia

As the section on the trajectory of state building projects in Ethiopia has shown, Language and History occupied centre-stage in the different regimes policy for Education. The first Population Census was conducted in May 1984, under the auspices of the *Derg*, and the second in 1994 under the auspices of the TGE. The third Population Census for most of the country reportedly started in May 2007, while that of the Somali and Afar regional states will take place in November 2007⁷⁸. The 1984

⁷³ Conrad 2006, op.cit. footnote 18 p. 257. The PFDJ narrative of the liberation war is purported as the official one and excludes any dissenting narrative or diverse interpretations of the war for independence.

⁷⁴ Conrad 2006, op.cit., (footnote 5 p.251).

⁷⁵ Dorman, S. R. 2005. 'Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism'. *Nations and Nationalism* 11: 203-222. (p.207).

⁷⁶ Conrad 2006, op.cit., (footnote 22 p.260).

⁷⁷ *ibid*, p.251.

⁷⁸ Fekadu Beshah 22 May 2007. 'Ethiopia: Commission to Purchase Satellite Equipment for Upcoming Census' *Addis Fortune*. Addis Ababa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705220692.html>.

Population Census was the first effort to collect data on language affiliation in Ethiopia.

The *Derg*'s departure from the imperial regime Amharic only- policy, was marked with the launching of the literacy campaign in 15 languages in 1979⁷⁹. English was maintained as a second language of government, for external communications, and for secondary and higher education. The National Literacy Campaign was conducted in the three major languages, i.e., Amharic- Oromo and Tigrinya and in 12 other minor languages. During the preparation stage of the literacy campaign the languages which qualified were all transcribed to the *Geez* script (the basis of Amharic and Tigrinya). The significant post- revolutionary change in language policy was curtailed by several problems and did not foster a radical change in teaching methodologies⁸⁰. Indeed, Amharic remained the undisputable national *lingua franca* during the imperial and socialist regimes.

In April 1994, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia proclaimed its Education and Training Policy (EETP) with regard to languages:

‘Cognisant of the pedagogical advantage of the child in learning in mother tongue and the rights of nationalities to promote the use of their languages, primary education will be given in nationality languages’⁸¹.

As a result, at present primary education is offered in twelve languages⁸². This policy was fiercely criticised on the grounds that it would erode unity and contribute to the dismemberment of the country. In addition, as Tekeste Negash noted, ambiguities on the divisions between the central and the regional departments dealing with Education were pronounced and undermined the implementation of the policy by local authorities⁸³. The saliency of language became relevant for domestic politics. The TGE restructured the provincial boundaries of the state according to ethnic and linguistic criteria⁸⁴. Indeed, language became the predominant criteria because ethnic geography is not consolidated territorially. The EPRDF re- drawing of domestic boundaries was based on the broad distribution of languages, rather than on

⁷⁹ McNab 1990, op.cit., (p.66)

⁸⁰ *ibid*, pp.67- 73.

⁸¹ Tekeste Negash 1996. *Rethinking Education in Ethiopia*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.p.97.

⁸² *Ibid*. p.82

⁸³ *Ibid*. p.85.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*. p.16

ethnicity⁸⁵. This led to the establishment of language- based geopolitical borders. This policy posed problems to citizens who identified with a certain ethnic group but who neither spoke the mother- language associated with that ethnic group, nor lived in the region where the ethnic group with whom they identified was concentrated. Cohen contended that in Ethiopia language and ethnicity are unreliable markers of identity⁸⁶ because of the overlapping borders, the mingling between ethnic groups and the linguistic diversity of the country. In addition, in Ethiopia people of various origins have adopted Amharic, as their own language, regardless of their ethnic background⁸⁷.

The new borders claiming to represent ethnicity, were, in fact, based on the broad distribution of languages. (...) Federalism in Ethiopia, therefore, might well be termed 'linguistic' rather than 'ethnic'⁸⁸.

According to Assefa Fisseha the second phase of the EPRDF project for state and nation building began with the outbreak of hostilities and led to a shift from diversity into unity and from decentralization into a more centralized federal system⁸⁹. The combined unexpected outburst of nationalism (and patriotism) and '(...) the need to run an efficient military campaign led to the re- channelling of resources and manpower to the centre⁹⁰'. As a consequence, the motto of earlier regimes of Ethiopia's unity in face of external aggression re- emerged from the chains of the ethnic- based Federal model.

The motto of emphasising Ethiopia's diversity was abandoned during the course of the 1998- 2000 war and a significant rhetoric shift occurred. In contrast to the positive attributes associated with ethnicity prior to the war, in its aftermath the government has criticised those who recur to the 'manipulation of ethnic identity for parochial purposes' or who lean towards 'narrow nationalism'⁹¹.

II) War making and making/ remaking State and Nation in Eritrea and Ethiopia

⁸⁵ Cohen, G. 2006. 'The Development of Regional and Local Languages in Ethiopia's Federal System' in Turton, D. (ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: James Currey. p.171

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 171

⁸⁷ Cohen 2006, op.cit., p.172.

⁸⁸ Cohen 2006, op.cit., p. 172

⁸⁹ Assefa Fisseha 2006. 'Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism' in Turton, D. (ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: James Currey. p.147

⁹⁰ ibid, p.147.

⁹¹ ibid, p.147.

‘ (...) Contemporary state building takes place in a globalised context which alters the effects of the central processes which Tilly and others argued placed war- making and state- making in a positive relationship.^{92,}

This section will look into the three key activities of the state associated with war highlighted by Tilly: taxation, conscription and extension of the state institutions – administration to the entire territory. The section will reflect upon how the war related to these activities, and whether in its aftermath the war- induced effects relapsed to the ante bellum situation or, on the contrary, contributed to the consolidation of state power. In addition, Herbst suggested that nationalism is central to the understanding of the state- building ramifications of conflict. Indeed, the author highlighted that:

‘African countries since independence have been unable to rely on the shared experience of war in order to force symbols of national unity that would bind their disparate populations together^{93.}’

The Eritreo- Ethiopian war reinforced nationalist feelings; Jacquin- Berdal, suggested this was one of the few unambiguous contributions of the war to the consolidation of statehood^{94.}

This section argues that there is a strong relationship between war and the formative period of statehood. The data seems to suggest that for Eritrea the war was the second act of the process of national identity formation. The three-decade civil war served as a catalyst for nation-building and the two-and-a-half-year inter-state war was caused by Eritrea’s profound territorial conception of nationalism.

However, as the data will show, it is not possible to determine, at least in the short term, whether the war has contributed decisively in making or breaking the Eritrean and Ethiopian states. The data collected show that the interstate war in some sectors contributed to state consolidation and in others contributed to state fragmentation. Despite the simultaneity of two contradictory outcomes the data

⁹²Leander, A. 2004. 'Wars and the un- making of states: Taking Tilly seriously in the contemporary world' in Guzzini, S., and, Jung, Dietrich, (ed.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. P.69

⁹³ Herbst, J. 2003. 'State and War in Africa' in Paul, T.V., Ikenberry, G. John, Hall, John A. (ed.) *The Nation- State in question*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.176

⁹⁴ Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, 2005. 'Introduction: The Eritreo- Ethiopian war' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press. (p. xix).

reveal the importance of considering the relationship between war and the state. Whether this is a positive or negative relationship needs to be considered in the *longue durée* hence the importance of the continuous effort to collect data on the activities identified by Tilly.

a) Taxation

War making by the state tends to increase its capacity to extract taxes from its citizens. With the increasing migration supported by globalization, one of the central processes described by Tilly – taxation- should be understood not only at the domestic level but also at the global level, through the inclusion in our analysis of the role played by transnational non- state actors, such as the diaspora in the homeland state’s politics. Indeed, the relations between a state and its citizenry need to be understood in the domestic and global realms. In Africa, the role of the diaspora is a key element to understanding domestic politics. The same is true when it comes to addressing the state building projects of current governments with regard to taxation. The role played by diaspora in the homeland’s politics is a significant transformation within current world politics and this section will analyse how the mobilisation of this key constituency was critical for the Eritrean state extraction activities.

Taxation in Eritrea

In the initial period of the war, the available evidence confirms one of the central processes identified by Tilly, i.e., the war increased the ability of the Eritrean state to extract funds from this transnational constituency: the diaspora⁹⁵.

The diaspora already contributed with 2 per cent of their annual income for the EPLF during the war for independence⁹⁶. As Bernal noted, this strategy was actively continued after independence by the EPLF/PFDJ⁹⁷. According to several studies, the contributions were voluntary and Eritreans did not resent the state’s demand, but also perceived its fulfilment as a sign of their own national commitment to the Eritrean

⁹⁵ Koser, K. 2003. 'Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study' in Koser, K. (ed.) *New African Diasporas*. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

⁹⁶ Bernal, V. February 2004. 'Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era'. *Cultural Anthropology* 19: 3-25. (p.11)

⁹⁷ *ibid*, p.18.

state⁹⁸. Indeed, the diaspora remittances represented an annual movement of US\$250-350 millions⁹⁹.

When the war broke out in 1998, the state promptly and efficiently mobilised the Eritrean diaspora. The Eritrean state intensified its effort to raise funds from the diaspora via taxation and via the issuing of bonds and grants. There is not an overall estimate of the total revenues raised among the different diaspora communities and even the size of the Eritrean diaspora is likely to be underestimated¹⁰⁰. However, scholarship on different Eritrean diaspora communities lends credence to the claims that the diaspora contributions were critical to financing the 1998-2000 war. Plaut claimed that the Eritrean government was able to raise an estimated US\$150 millions from Eritreans living abroad in defence of the nation¹⁰¹. In addition, scholarship on the Eritrean diaspora confirmed the capacity of the state to increase revenue sharply while the nation was at war.

Bernal's study findings are illuminating of both the government's capacity to mobilise the diaspora and the diaspora's readiness to contribute financially to the defence of the nation. In June 1998, Eritreans in Denmark (Copenhagen) pledged a one-off payment of US\$ 1,000 per household. In Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) the pledge comprised one month's salary. In Canada (Edmonton) at a single meeting the Eritrean diaspora community raised US\$2,600. In the US the St. Louis community pledged US\$ 55,000 at a meeting on 14th June. According to Bernal, the Eritrean government set up a national defence bank account and the donations 'flowed in'¹⁰².

Koser reached similar conclusions with regard to the diaspora's critical role in financing the war. Eritreans in the UK were asked to contribute additionally with an extra £1GBP per day (US\$2) plus with a one-off payment of £500GBP (US\$ 1000) in 1999. In Berlin, Eritreans were asked for an amount of 30 DEM (US\$ 21) per month and a one-off payment of 1000DEM (US\$688)¹⁰³.

During the war, the collection of funds within the diaspora was conducted publicly. Evidence from a Community Centre in Berlin showed how the mechanism of social pressure functioned; in this case a list with the names of those who had

⁹⁸ *ibid.* p. Koser 2003, *op.cit.*, p.114.

⁹⁹ Bernal 2004, *op.cit.*, p.19.

¹⁰⁰ Koser 2003, *op.cit.*, p.113.

¹⁰¹ Plaut, M. 2005. 'The Conflict and its aftermath' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press. p.109

¹⁰² Bernal 2004, *op.cit.* .p.3

¹⁰³ Koser 2003, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

fulfilled the state's demand for extra financial contributions (the one-off payments) was displayed on a notice board, along with the amount each person had contributed¹⁰⁴. Another indicator of the efficiency of social pressure was the issuing of certificates to praise members for their economic contributions during the 1998-2000 war, which were distributed at a meeting of the Centre followed by a round of applause for each individual who had contributed¹⁰⁵. However, disillusionment increased as the war unfolded and as the toll on the troops in two years reached a similar level to that of the three-decade war for independence. The government's substantial requests for money were not developed in conjunction with a policy of granting the diaspora an opportunity to participate in domestic politics. Despite having paid the extra contributions demanded by the state, as Koser noted they had '(...) absolutely no say in any decisions about the conflict¹⁰⁶'.

Hepner's study showed how in the US, the Chicago community raised nearly US\$1 million for the Eritrean government's Defence budget¹⁰⁷. From Hepner's study it also emerged that although formally voluntary, failure to contribute to the state's demands tended to create obstacles for participation in Eritrea's domestic economy, such as buying or selling property¹⁰⁸.

Social pressure both from the state and family members in the 'homeland' also seems to function as an efficient means of guaranteeing that the diaspora continues to meet the demands of the state and remains loyal to its country of origin. This loyalty becomes tangible in terms of payment of taxes to the state and of regular remittances to family members. Furthermore, Hepner suggested that the diaspora's contribution to the state served as an indicator of national commitment¹⁰⁹.

According to Styan, the level of bonds issued to the diaspora reached 3.1 per cent of GDP in 1999 and grants amounted to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2000¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁴ Koser 2003, op.cit., p.121

¹⁰⁵ ibid, p.121. Koser, K. 2007. *International migration : a very short introduction*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. p.47.

¹⁰⁶ Koser 2003, op.cit., 120.

¹⁰⁷ Hepner, T. R. 2003. 'Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean diaspora'. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 10: 269- 293. (footnote 14 p. 290).

¹⁰⁸ ibid, p.290.

¹⁰⁹ ibid, p.290.

¹¹⁰ Styan, D. 2005. 'Twisting Ethio- Eritrean Economic Ties: Misperceptions of War and the Mismatched priorities of Peace, 1997- 2002' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press. p.186. According to Koser, the Eritrean diaspora communities in North America, Europe and the Middle East by July 1999 had purchased an estimated US\$ 55 million worth of bonds. Koser 2003, op.cit. p. 115.

This pattern was in continuity with the diaspora's previous contribution to financing the separatist insurgency against the Derg regime¹¹¹. However, as the 1998-2000 war increased in intensity, the willingness of this key political constituency to contribute to the Eritrean state's war effort decreased¹¹² and criticism of the ruling party emerged. In the Eritrean case, the war with Ethiopia undermined the legitimacy of the state's leadership, especially with regard to the diaspora¹¹³.

Despite rising criticism of the PFDJ, the state nationalist appeal achieved its aim and the diaspora mobilised to protect Eritrea's hard-won independence. The readiness of this constituency to meet the demands of the state clearly indicates the complex relationship between globalization, transnationalism and nationalism. Criticism of the regime sharply increased but loyalty to the state seems to be preserved by the majority. Although the projects of permanent return have been compromised by the increasingly authoritarian tone of the government, loyalty to the state does not seem to have waned¹¹⁴.

The Eritrean state policy on recognizing dual nationality contributes, in part, to the continued attractiveness of holding onto Eritrean citizenship for those who have never lived in Eritrea and who may never do so¹¹⁵. However, as the next section on conscription will show, the situation for those living in Eritrea has undergone a significant transformation exacerbated by the 1998- 2000 war. To the domestic citizens, the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship is subordinate to a different set of demands and constraints; which the government is not in a position to impose upon Eritrean citizens living in other countries and who have acquired other nationalities.

Taxation in Ethiopia

¹¹¹Jacquin- Berdal 2002, op.cit., p. 119.

¹¹² Indeed, according to IMF estimates, private remittances totalled 2500 million Nakfa in 1997, decreasing to 1820 million Nakfa in 1998 and with a slight increase to 1960 million Nakfa in 1999. The decrease was registered despite the Eritrean state external agents' effort to mobilise contributions from this key constituency during the war. Styan 2005, op.cit., (footnote 15, p.199).

¹¹³ Koser 2003, op.cit. p.121.

¹¹⁴ Interviews in London, May 2007.

¹¹⁵ With Independence it was common for those who had spent most of their adult lives or who been brought up in the diaspora to make plans of going back and (re-) starting their life in Eritrea. However, the government requirements of completion of the national military service to set up businesses(or for any other dealing with the state administration) and other constraints to any entrepreneurial undertakings in the private sector discouraged many from effectively settling back and forced them to return to the countries where they had been brought up. Interviews in London, May 2007.

On the Ethiopian side, the financing of the war was met via domestic taxation and borrowing from domestic banks¹¹⁶. On the Ethiopian side, the links between the state and the diaspora followed a different trajectory. The criteria of exclusive Ethiopian citizenship created a different legal framework for those citizens of Ethiopian origin and/or whose descent could be traced from Ethiopian nationals. Those who acquired the nationality of other countries had to relinquish Ethiopian nationality. When the crisis escalated into full-scale war, the government met the demand of increasing revenues to finance the war with an intensification of the pressure to raise revenue domestically. The state exerted pressure on its citizens at the level of conscription and taxation. The patriotic contributions, as they were named, evolved along the rally to all ‘nationalities’/ ethnic groups to contribute to the defence of the state’s territorial integrity in the face of external aggression.

In the rural areas, the communities were called upon to contribute with men to the Ethiopian National Defence Force, and with goods. The regional governments, on behalf of the Federal government, solicited funds from the public.

In Ethiopia’s Region 5 (Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State), the regional authorities required each rural community to contribute with a specified number of livestock, mainly sheep¹¹⁷. This campaign was conducted at a time when the region was burdened by a severe and prolonged drought, which had devastating consequences for the livestock economy¹¹⁸.

In the urban areas all employees, especially those working for the state, were subordinated to a new tax, which was nominally voluntary, called ‘Patriotic Contribution’¹¹⁹. Although the patriotic contributions were allegedly voluntary, both urban and rural communities had little space to resist the authorities’ request.

b) Monopoly of coercive violence: conscription (and patriotic education)

The justification for the 1998-2000 war was to guarantee the defence of national sovereignty.

¹¹⁶ Styan 2005, op.cit., (p.185).

¹¹⁷ Samatar, A. I. 2004. 'Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region'. *Third World Quarterly* 25: 1131-1154. (p.1147).

¹¹⁸ *ibid*, p.1147

¹¹⁹ Styan 2005, op.cit., (footnote 14, p.199).

In post-1993 Eritrea, allegations of threats from neighbouring countries have tended to dominate the official discourse. First, the threat of Sudan, and then the threat of Ethiopia provided the required justification to reorganize a national military, capable of defending national sovereignty. This led to a gradual expansion of military- building activities into the realm of state building. The offensive foreign policy in post- 1993 Eritrea may well be understood as the transformation of the EPLF insurgents/ guerrilla fighters into state builders. This process is not unique to Eritrea. As Callahan argued in the case of Burma:

‘ (...) The process of building this modern army was a highly political one , and was entangled with the postcolonial project of creating a durable national state in the territory that the British had mapped into Burma a century earlier.’

‘ (...) Army- building and state- building processes were characterized by ongoing struggles among civilian politicians, military field commanders, and staff officers over what the state should look like , who could claim legitimacy at its helm, and who its enemies were’¹²⁰.

Callahan showed the importance of intra- elite struggles over different visions of national defence in understanding this feature of state building. In Eritrea the state builders’ dominant concern was to remake the citizenry. Conscription and Education were defined as two complementary means to achieve this end. Indeed, the compulsory military service and patriotic education were two central features of the project.

As Jacquin- Berdal brings to our attention, in Europe national identity was forged not only through the spread of a common standardised written language, but also by opposition to an ‘enemy’:

‘Each state responded to the other by perfecting the ‘nation in arms’. In order to achieve this goal new developments were introduced; short service conscription gave way to obligatory military service while military training increasingly included patriotic education. The army, through mass conscription, became the cauldron of the nation¹²¹.’

In Ethiopia during the *Derg* regime compulsory military service was introduced in 1983 by Proclamation no. 236. All men and women aged 18 to 30 were liable for a six months' military training and a two year period of compulsory military service, with the obligation to remain in the reserves until the age of 50¹²². Eritrea’s system after independence reproduced this measure.

¹²⁰ Callahan 2003, op.cit., P.173

¹²¹ Jacquin- Berdal 2002, op.cit., pp.40- 41

¹²² <http://wri-irg.org/co/rtba/ethiopia.htm>

In 1994 the government of Eritrea promulgated a national service proclamation¹²³, which was mandatory (and still is at the time of writing) on all citizens between the ages 18 and 40. The national service proclamation mandates an eighteen month period of service. Six months of service consist of military training in a training camp in Eritrea's western lowland: in Sawa. After military training, the National Service trainees are dispatched to different parts of the country and serve for 12 months. In Eritrea compulsory military service remains central to the organisation of society. The period although legally defined for eighteen months can be extended. In the aftermath of the war with Ethiopia, the compulsory military service was tightened. Indeed, national service has become full military service and has been extended indefinitely. Those who have completed national service, along with ex-combatants during the liberation struggle, are subject to recall and reserve duties. There is no exemption for conscientious objectors. So far it is estimated that more than 200,000 Eritreans have gone through the national service, and conscription continues unabated¹²⁴.

The state's continuous demand for extended conscription has contributed to the widening of the generational divide between those ex-combatants from the war for independence and those who fought in the 1998- 2000 war¹²⁵. At the time of writing, those who fought in the border war are either still serving in the military or at civilian jobs on a pecuniary wage¹²⁶. The national services conscripts tend to be engaged in development work within the *warsay- yikealo* initiative¹²⁷. This initiative aims to bring together the *warsay* (those recruited to the new Eritrean army after Independence¹²⁸) and *Yikealo* (the ex-combatants from the liberation war¹²⁹) according to the PFDJ's conception of national development. In addition, those undergoing the compulsory military service were used in PFDJ-linked corporations; this practice brought undeniable benefits to the party-owned corporations through the

¹²³ National Service Proclamation No. 82/95, October 23, 1995, Articles 8, 9, as cited in Global Report 2001.

¹²⁴ Eritrean Anti-Militarism Initiative

http://www.connection-ev.de/eritrea/HS_rechts.html#EAI_English

¹²⁵ Reid, R. 2005. 'Caught in the headlights of history: Eritrea, the EPLF and the postwar nation state'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43: 467-488. (p.474) ;

¹²⁶ Dorman 2005, op.cit., (p.211).

¹²⁷ *ibid*, p.214

¹²⁸ Conrad 2006, op. cit. (footnote 21 p. 260).

¹²⁹ *ibid*, (footnote 32 p.267).

use of 'conscript workers' as cheap labour¹³⁰. However, contrary to the PFDJ's expectations both this initiative and the open-ended military service have generated much political discontent among youth¹³¹.

During field work in Asmara, in July 2004, the interviews conducted with those in the age-group targeted for compulsory military service, suggested that frustration at the open-ended military service predominates. The diverging perceptions towards the military component of National service reflect the tension between the youth and the leadership (mainly composed by ex-combatants from the liberation war close to the President) with regard to both the recent war and, in particular, with regard to the indefinite compulsory military service, which has been reinforced thereafter. In addition, the generational divide between the youth and the ex-combatants seems to be widening. This should come as no surprise to those who had experienced the effects of the *Derg's* approach to conscription. In effect, as Luckman and Bekelle noted 'the compulsory conscription law introduced in 1983 in Ethiopia drove many young men into exile as refugees or into the guerrilla movements'¹³². Perhaps it is not too surprising that the indefinite compulsory military service is diminishing the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship. Indeed, the many reported attempts, both failed and successful, of Eritreans to escape the country to avoid military service attest to increasing resistance towards the militarised state and the less appealing nature of Eritrean citizenship¹³³. Eritreans who fled the country were forcibly returned by Malta in 2002 and by Libya in July 2004¹³⁴. According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) Malta forcibly deported over 220 Eritreans and the Libyan authorities were reported to have forcibly returned over 110 people¹³⁵. Those fleeing Eritrea were handled as 'illegal' migrants by Malta and were treated as part of the growing problem that Malta faced (and at the time of writing still does)

¹³⁰ Dorman, S. R. 'Born Powerful? Post-Liberation Politics in Eritrea and Zimbabwe': University of Edinburgh, unpublished work. p.14

¹³¹ Dorman 2005, op.cit., p.214.

¹³² Cited in D. Jacquin-Berdal. 2002, op.cit., footnote 155, p. 126.

¹³³ This contention is based upon the empirical evidence provided by UNHCR with regard to the trends in the period 1996- 2005 on Refugees and Asylum seekers from Eritrea. Refer to Tables 1 & 2 in the next section for the substantiation of this claim.

¹³⁴ From Malta: <http://www.timesofmalta.com/>

From Libya: Eritrea: Refugees Involuntarily Repatriated from Libya, Letter to President Issayas Afewerki, Human Rights Watch, August 3 2004.

<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/03/eritre9178.htm>

¹³⁵ Hobson, A. 8 December 2004. 'Written evidence submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (+ Annex 1) to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, House of Commons, UK': Christian Solidarity Worldwide, www.parliament.uk.

with irregular migration. This group of Eritrean citizens was eligible to apply for asylum status as they were escaping political persecution in their original country; their inalienable right was denied without due process. According to CSW upon arrival in Eritrea they were detained in Adi Abeito prison, tortured and subsequently moved to the maximum-security prison in the Red Sea island of Nakhura¹³⁶. Malta as one of the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was obligated by the ECHR and additional protocols to act in conformity with international standard procedures for granting asylum and conferring refugee status on this group of Eritrean citizens. Malta was not in position to deny them their right to apply for asylum when these Eritreans were either trying to evade the open-ended compulsory military training service and/or flee political and/or religious persecution. The decision to proceed with extradition set a grave precedent. Malta, more so than Libya, was expected to comply with the set of norms enshrined in the ECHR and in the additional Protocols. On other occasions, EU states have reportedly questioned Malta over its failure to apply international conventions and rules in its dealings with refugees and asylum seekers¹³⁷. The creation of Frontex, the EU border security agency¹³⁸, *per se*, is unlikely to overcome the disagreements between EU member states on how to handle irregular migration and/or on how to share the burden of refugees and asylum seekers from Africa and other parts of the world. The political situation in Eritrea further enhances the need to discriminate on a case-by-case basis between irregular migrants, rather than treating all as part of illegal migration and depriving an ever-widening share of citizens originating from the 'South' of rights which are enshrined in international conventions and rules.

Libya's decision to deny asylum to a group of 80 Eritrean draft dodgers coincided with the author's field research in Eritrea in July- August 2004. At the time all were deported back to Eritrea. Tension was high and a local informant could not avoid letting slip one of the few critical comments on the present government that I was able to collect while in Asmara: 'I only wish that all the young people could escape the country'.

¹³⁶ *ibid.*

¹³⁷ Bilefsky, D. June 12, 2007. 'EU nations refuse to split up refugee burden' *International Herald Tribune*, www.ihf.com. ; Kubosova, L. 6 July 2007. 'Malta turning into 'detention centre', warns minister' *EU Observer*. Malta, <http://euobserver.com>.

¹³⁸ FRONTEX is a recently created agency which has a legal mandate to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security and to proceed with the implementation of integrated border management at the EU borders. <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/>

Another Eritrean drew my attention to the youth situation:

‘ (...) I do know that with this government... (...) look at the youth, because they do not have a future ...always fighting.¹³⁹ ‘

This increasing generational divide seems to confirm that the war delegitimised the dominance of army builders at the helm of the state.

Several incidents point to a continued draft-dodging strategy. According to Amnesty International on 4 November 2004 thousands of people arrested on suspicion of evading military conscription and held at Adi Abeto army prison were thought to be at serious risk of torture and ill-treatment. Prisoners have reportedly been shot dead and many more were wounded following a disturbance at the prison¹⁴⁰. In November 2004 Yemeni security forces arrested 10 Eritrean army deserters after they illegally entered Yemen from the Red Sea¹⁴¹. In February 2005 in Manda, in the eastern sector, 20 km inside Ethiopian territory (on the road from the port of Assab to Ethiopia) the Ethiopian armed forces killed two Eritreans and imprisoned five. The Ethiopians alleged they belonged to the Eritrean armed forces. Bearing in mind the current tendency in Eritrea to escape from the compulsory military service the scenario tends to suggest that these were Eritrean citizens evading military service, rather than an Eritrean breach of the peace settlement disposition. This situation was reported to the UNMEE leading to an increase in tension near the border. However, with the pervasive animosity between the parties and deterioration of the relations between Eritrean and UNMEE by mid- December 2005 an estimated 130,000 Ethiopian troops faced 250,000 Eritrean troops¹⁴². More recently, tension along Ethiopia's northern border with Eritrea has increased. The last report of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council portrayed worrying trends, with the build up of troops and military equipment and armaments inside the Temporary

¹³⁹ Interview in Asmara, August 2004.

¹⁴⁰ Amnesty International Urgent Action, ‘ Eritrea: Fear of torture / Incommunicado detention/Arbitrary killings: Thousands of people held at Adi Abeto army prison’ , AI Index: AFR 64/008/2004, 9 November 2004, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR640082004?open&of=ENG-2AF>; **see also:** Eritrea: Army rounds up draft evaders / Connection e.V. releases booklet on Eritrea <http://www.wri-irg.org/pubs/upd-0412.htm#Eritrea: Army rounds up draft evaders .>

¹⁴¹ Sanaa, Yemen, Nov. 13 (UPI) . ‘ Eritrea army deserters seized in Yemen’ , Washington Times, November 13, 2004

¹⁴² Barnes, C. 2006. 'Ethiopia: A Sociopolitical Assessment': Writenet/ UNHCR. (p.19).

Security Zone in Eritrea and along the frontier on the Ethiopian side¹⁴³. Any clash or incident along the border could have the potential to trigger a major confrontation.

The aftermath of the war and the continuous focus on militarization of the society have contributed to the state's ability to pursue conscription, however this orientation has significantly undermined the Eritrean government's legitimacy. While it may well be argued that the civil war had a positive impact in the consolidation of a sense of 'Eritreaness', the cost of the 1998- 2000 war and the continuous militarism of the ruling party has undermined, and continues to undermine, the legitimacy of the regime and perhaps decreases the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship, especially for those within the age group of compulsory military service. The available data on the number of refugees and asylum seekers both from Ethiopia and Eritrea further confirm the findings of scholarly studies and tends to highlight that as the governments have embarked upon a more authoritarian path, their legitimacy has decreased and their citizens have been forced to seek asylum abroad.


The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) study on global trends with regard to new individual asylum applications during 2005-2006 lends credence to the claim that an ever widening range of Eritreans are fleeing the country. Quite significantly, the UNHCR reported that by nationality Eritreans ranked fourth among countries with the highest number of new filled individual asylum claims during the referred period, with a total of 19,400 new claims¹⁴⁴. Table 1, below, further substantiates research findings on Eritrea, based on qualitative methodology, which have claimed that the PFDJ legitimacy has substantially been eroded since the 1998- 2000 war¹⁴⁵ and the 2001 political crisis.

¹⁴³United Nations Security Council 30 April 2007. 'Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea: S/2007/250': UN Security Council, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm>.

¹⁴⁴ Somalia ranked first with 45, 600; Iraq ranked second with 34,200; followed by Zimbabwe with 22, 200; then Eritrea (19,400) ; immediately followed by China with 19,300 new claims and in the 6th position came Rwanda with 19, 200 new individual claims. UNHCR 2006. '2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum- Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons': UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>. (p.10)

¹⁴⁵Bascom, J. June 2005. 'The long, ' Last Step' ? Reintegration of Repatriates in Eritrea'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18: 165-180.; Conrad 2006; Dorman 2005; Hepner 2003; Jacquin- Berdal & Aida Mengistu 2006; Koser 2003; Reid 2005. Connell 2005. However, it should be noted that Iyob prior to the war already warned of the dangers of the PFDJ domestic and foreign policies. Iyob claimed that the government needed to establish a new covenant with its citizens based on domestic legitimacy rather than on the need to survive united in face of the continuous threat from neighbouring countries. Iyob 1995, op.cit. p.146.

Figure 1: Refugees and Asylum seekers from Eritrea¹⁴⁶



The table shows an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers during the 1998- 2000 war with Ethiopia (in 1999). The following two years (2000 and 2001) were characterised by a decrease despite the human toll of the war with regard to combat related fatalities and to the numbers of those internally displaced during the war. Up to the 1998- 2000 war the majority of Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers were concentrated in Sudan (as an outcome of the thirty- year war for independence) and just a minority in other countries. In addition, since the border war ended in 2000 only 29,000 of the Eritrean refugees from the thirty- year war have returned to Eritrea from Sudan; the remaining 270,000 decided not to return when the main repatriation was conducted in the 1990s¹⁴⁷. Bascom suggested that:

‘This inaction cannot be ignored; both examples suggest that Eritreans in exile believe the risks and vulnerabilities associated with reintegration outweigh the perceived benefits of returning ‘ home¹⁴⁸’.

As the table below will show (table 2) since 2000 the number of Eritreans who have been conferred refugee status and/or who have applied for asylum in Ethiopia


¹⁴⁶ The tables are based on a selection of data by the author from UNHCR statistics. For the original source refer to: UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea'. *UNHCR* 324-325, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>.

¹⁴⁷ Bascom 2005, op.cit., (p.179)

¹⁴⁸ Bascom, J. June 2005. 'The long, ' Last Step' ? Reintegration of Repatriates in Eritrea'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18: 165-180. (p.179).

has been steadily increasing. Indeed, the number of Eritrean refugees and/or asylum seekers in Ethiopia increased from 3, 276 in 2000 to 10,700 in 2005¹⁴⁹.

Figure 2: Refugees and Asylum seekers from Eritrea: Countries of Asylum¹⁵⁰



From June 2005 until June 2006, 2,500 Eritreans lodged individual asylum applications in the UK. Indeed, Eritrea is among the top ten asylum producing countries for the UK¹⁵¹. According to the UNHCR during 2005- 2006 the majority of Eritrean asylum applications were lodged in Sudan (8,700), in the UK (2,700), in Ethiopia (2,700) and in Switzerland (1,200)¹⁵².

Figure 3: Refugees and Asylum seekers from Ethiopia¹⁵³


¹⁴⁹ For the year in the interval the numbers were as follows: 4, 212 in 2001; 5, 126 in 2002; 6, 754 in 2003 and 8, 719 in 2004. *ibid*, pp.324- 325.

¹⁵⁰ UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea'. *UNHCR* 324-325, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>. pp.324- 325.

¹⁵¹ The UK Refugees Council places the total number of Refugees and asylum seekers originating from Eritrea at 147, 628. <http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/supportourwork/whereonearth/topTen/eritrea.htm>

¹⁵² UNHCR 2006, *op.cit.*, p.10.

¹⁵³ UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Ethiopia'. *UNHCR* 328-329, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>.



In contrast to the trend of slow decrease of refugees and new asylum seekers from Eritrea, Table 3 shows a decrease in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia since the overthrow of the *Derg* in 1991. The table compares the total share of refugees since 1996 up to 2005. It will be extremely important to compare the current trend, which shows a progressive decline, with the data for the year 2005 once the data are publicly released¹⁵⁴. Indeed, additional data suggest that the May 2005 elections may have partially reversed this trend. Quite significantly, in 2005, a significant shift occurred with regard to asylum applicants of Ethiopian origin in Eritrea. In 2002, only 5 asylum applicants from Ethiopia lodged their claims in Eritrea; in 2004 Ethiopian asylum applicants in Eritrea totalled 248 and in 2005 the number increased sharply to a total of 1, 218 new claims¹⁵⁵. The increase was sharp and the number lends credence to the claim that the reason behind this shift was related to the increasingly authoritarian path pursued by the EPRDF in the run-up to and in the aftermath of the May 2005 elections. Table 4 further confirms this partial reversal of the earlier trend since 2005.

¹⁵⁴ The UNHCR will release the 2006 Statistical Yearbook on 11 July, 2007. www.unhcr.org/statistics/.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 325.

Figure 4: Refugees and Asylum seekers from Ethiopia: Countries of Asylum¹⁵⁶




Table 4 shows a decrease of the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia. Some interesting developments are worth noting. The number of refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia in the southern contiguous neighbouring country has been steadily increasing since 1996(4,053) up to 2002 (11,202); furthermore, in 2005 the increase was sharp reaching 14,862. Again, in May 2005 the authoritarian measures taken by the government during the election campaign and in the aftermath of the 2005 elections are likely to have been the major driving force behind this shift. And again only once the 2006 Statistics Yearbook is released will it be possible to determine whether the increase will continue or if it was just associated with the increasing in political persecution and arbitrary detentions associated with the May 2005 elections.

The tables for Eritrea and Ethiopia although with significant differences seem to lead to a similar conclusion, applicable in both cases: as the PFDJ and the EPRDF increased authoritarian measures the proportion of refugees and asylum seekers originating from these two countries increased. In Eritrea the return of refugees from the thirty- year war proceeded at a slower pace than in Ethiopia. The two- year border war with Ethiopia further undermined the prospects of return for many and, in addition, led to an ever- widening number of Eritreans fleeing the country. The numbers more than anything else confirm the claim that as the PFDJ has tended to increase authoritarian measures its legitimacy has eroded and Eritreans are forcefully

¹⁵⁶ UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Ethiopia'. *UNHCR* 328-329, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>. pp.328- 29.

led to seek alternative strategies of survival in asylum countries because the current government, the PFDJ, through the set of specific obligations imposed upon its citizenry has deprived Eritreans of any rights. The current ethos of Independent Eritrea as envisaged by the PFDJ is more life denying than life affirming and the only appealing option for those caught up in the authoritarian demands of the PFDJ is the exit option. In this sense, the state making activities induced by the war have been undermined by the open-ended military service and by the climate of political repression. Indeed, the numbers show that the two-year war has eroded significantly the wealth of legitimacy inherited from the war for independence.

With regard to Ethiopia, the more promising indicators of political liberalization since the EPRDF had assumed power related positively with the proportion of those refugees (from the civil war against the Derg) willing to return to Ethiopia. However, the authoritarian turn of the EPRDF since the May 2005 elections seems to have eroded its legitimacy more so than the two-year border war. This seems to stand in contrast to Eritrea. The data further confirm a contrasting outcome for both countries: while in Eritrea the two-year border war and the 2001 political crisis led to an erosion of the regime's legitimacy, in Ethiopia the two-year border war did not erode the EPRDF's legitimacy. However, the data suggest that the authoritarian path since the May 2005 elections has significantly eroded the ruling party's legitimacy and has created further loci of contention and insurgency to the EPRDF.

Finally, with regard to both taxation and conscription it may well be argued that the 1998-2000 war has undermined the legitimacy capital of the PFDJ regime, which was rich at the time of Independence. The increasing blurred line between the party and the state poses a further danger to state consolidation.

The national service has effectively led to the extension of the state's institutions and agents to the entire territory. The limited gains in this area, however, were (and at the time of writing still are) undermined by the stalemated peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the closure of the border in the aftermath of the war. Any attempts by the state to extend its military presence beyond the outer limits of the Temporary Security Zone are in breach of the dispositions agreed by the parties in Algiers. The envisaged dividends of National Service for the extension of the state's institutions within its entire territorial jurisdiction are thus neutralized by the

aftermath of the war and the persistence of the stalemate on the border delimitation and demarcation. Indeed, in addition to the war, the aftermath of the war has been further disruptive of state building activities as defined and implemented by the PFDJ/EPLF. In this sense, the Eritrean state's purposeful call to arms in 1998-2000 in order to foster the sense of Eritreanness, forged during the thirty-year civil war, seems to have led to the inverse outcome.

Finally, Sawa should be understood as the military training centre *par excellence* and also as the 'national finishing school'¹⁵⁷. The national military centre has contributed to the construction of a new myth of the Sawa Tigers, in distinction to the draft- dodgers portrayed as the 'Coca- Cola generation' for their lack of willingness to sacrifice for the nation and for their poor display of patriotism¹⁵⁸. Indeed, in Eritrea, as Bascom noted 'sacrifice is considered normative in times of peace or war'¹⁵⁹. In addition, the national military centre's role was critical to the passing on of the core values of the nation to the post- liberation war generation¹⁶⁰. Others, on a more critical note, suggested that the focus on the military training of the generation with no direct experience of the liberation war was part and parcel of the President's attempt to silence any dissenting voices (both from within the Front and from without) and to create his own personal army¹⁶¹.

The widening of the generational divide seems to suggest that the PFDJ'S appeal to the ethos of the liberation war in order to advance its state- building project is likely to fade as the government enhances authoritarian measures and insists on the open- ended military service. As Coker noted, in relation to past attempts to re-invent the nation elsewhere, resistance was likely to increase to: '(...) a manufactured national history when it failed to inspire those who had inherited it, when it was more life denying than life affirming',¹⁶².

¹⁵⁷ Reid 2005, op.cit., (p.479)

¹⁵⁸ This label is the one used by President Issaias Afewerky to characterise the lack of patriotism displayed by those who have either evaded compulsory conscription and/or who have fled the country without fulfilling their military service obligations. Conrad 2006, op. cit., footnote 32 p.267.

¹⁵⁹ Bascom 2005, op.cit., (p.177).

¹⁶⁰ Reid 2005, op.cit., p.479.

¹⁶¹ Interview in London, May 2007.

¹⁶² Coker, C. 1997. *Twilight of the West*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. p.136.

c) Extension of the state's institutions: state and nation building international features

The state and nation building international features should be understood as part of one of the central activities of state making highlighted by Tilly: the extension of the state's institutions over its territory. The state's attempt to mediate political pressures from the international system and to maximize authority over territory shows how state and nation building (although arguably two separate processes) are inevitably co- determined. As Herbst argued, the mediation of pressures from the internal system by state structures through the use of buffer mechanisms to maximize their authority over territory is an important component in analysing the extension of authority¹⁶³. Indeed, the creation of a set of buffer institutions should be understood as an integral part of boundary politics. As the section shows Herbst's model, indeed, poignantly captures the trajectories of state and nation building and serves as a critical indicator to the dynamics of state consolidation in Africa. The three critical buffer institutions identified by Herbst are: 1) the territorial boundary; 2) the currency exchange mechanisms and 3) the citizenship rules.

As the chapters on the causes, conduct and outcome of the war have shown, the attempt to delimit and demarcate the territorial boundary triggered the crisis, led to the escalation of the crisis, raised its saliency as the war was waged and, finally, lie at the heart of the persisting stalemate. The persisting stalemate over the territorial boundary arguably has undermined the extension of the state's institutions to the entire territory; this has been particularly the case in Eritrea. As an outcome of the war, Eritrea had to abide by the creation of the Temporary Security Zone within its territory monitored by the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) until demarcation of the borders had been completed. The government's attempt to settle by force the border dispute back in May 1998 backfired as the war and its aftermath have been further disruptive to the state's attempt to extend its authority over its territory. In this sense, in the Eritrean case, war making was disruptive of state making. The legal dispositions agreed by the parties, as an outcome of the war, in the Algiers Peace Agreement undermined the state's attempts to maximize authority over territory. In addition, customary international law has outlawed forceful attempts to

¹⁶³ Herbst 2000, op.cit., p.24.

settle border disputes and/or acquire territory¹⁶⁴. Indeed, this is a significant difference in contemporary international society which was absent during the process of state formation in Europe. As a consequence on 19 November 2005 the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission (EECA) delivered its ruling with regard to *jus ad bellum* recognizing that Ethiopia resorted to armed force in self-defence. In this sense, war and state making from Eritrean were negatively related and this ruling further lends credence to the domestic critics of the government's and of the President's military and diplomatic conduct of the war. With regard to the currency exchange mechanisms the chapter on the causes of the war has shown how failure to agree on the exchange modality and rates after Eritrea's introduction of its own currency increased rivalry and heightened tensions between the two executives. Furthermore, the introduction of the new currency led Ethiopia to redefine the terms of trade. These mechanisms should be understood both as integral components of boundary politics¹⁶⁵ and as a form of boundary maintenance¹⁶⁶.

This section will focus mainly on citizenship rules and is built around Herbst's proposition that citizenship needs to be understood as a boundary mechanism. Indeed, as the author claimed:

'Citizenship rules are especially important as boundary mechanisms: they determine who is and who is not a citizen and therefore attempt to give meaning at the level of the individual and the community to the cadastral boundary lines originally created by the Europeans¹⁶⁷.'

In Ethiopia prior to the implementation of the ethnic-based Federal model the rules governing the acquisition of citizenship dated from 1930 and were based on a combination of the *ius solis* principle (law of the soil) and on the *ius sanguinis* principle (law of the blood). According to the *ius solis* principle citizenship is derived from birth in the territory of the country¹⁶⁸. The *ius sanguinis* principle is based upon descent from a national of the country in question. The interpretation of the two

¹⁶⁴ As a result of the prevailing customary practice in international society the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission delivered its ruling with regards to *jus ad bellum* recognizing that Ethiopia resorted to armed force in self-defence.

¹⁶⁵ Herbst 2000, p.25.

¹⁶⁶ Clapham, C. 1999. 'Boundaries and States in the New African Order' in Bach, D.C. (ed.) *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Desintegration*. Oxford: James Currey. p.55

¹⁶⁷ Herbst 2000, op.cit., p.231.

¹⁶⁸ Koser 2007, op.cit., p.22

principles meant that Ethiopian law regarding citizenship granted both *jus solis* — those born in Ethiopia were Ethiopian — and *ius sanguinis* — those born to two Ethiopian parents were Ethiopian¹⁶⁹.

The state did not allow dual nationality. It should be noted that Ethiopia considered Eritrea as a ‘lost Province’ during Italian colonialism (1890-1941) and British Administration (1941- 1952); as a result, any Eritrean entering Ethiopia and wishing to acquire Ethiopian citizenship was entitled to do so. With the Federation (1952- 1962) and, especially, with its dissolution Eritrean nationality was relinquished. All citizens in Eritrea or those of Eritrean origin residing in Ethiopia acquired Ethiopian citizenship. Indeed, Eritrean nationality ceased to exist. Eritreans who fled during the war for independence (1961-1991) were registered upon arrival in host countries as Ethiopians¹⁷⁰.

With Eritrea’s independence and the EPRDF’s own conception of Ethiopian statehood and nationhood the situation changed significantly with serious international and domestic implications.

The EPRDF conceptions of statehood and nationhood had ill- considered implications for the international and ‘domestic’ nationalities of those ethnic groups who straddle state borders.

At the level of the criteria for Ethiopian nationality, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) continued the earlier practice of not recognising claimants to dual ‘international’ nationality. Ethiopian nationality was mutually exclusive of other ‘international’ nationalities. At the level of the domestic criteria for Ethiopian citizenship, the state defined citizenship according to the ethnic identity. This conception, in practice, created a dual identity: an international Ethiopian national identity and a domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity subordinated to the ambiguous definition of ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ promulgated in Article 39 of the 1995 Constitution. The domestic Ethiopian ‘national’ identity was defined through the ethnic identity, which was also mutually exclusive. The TGE rendered the definition of the Ethiopian citizens’ ethnic identity obligatory. This rule, again, had serious implications for various groups within Ethiopia. For children of mixed parentage it was compulsory to choose between ethnic identities and to keep only the

¹⁶⁹ Terrazas, A. M. 2007. 'Beyond Regional Circularity: The Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora'. Washington, DC: Migration Information Source, <http://www.migrationinformation.org>.

¹⁷⁰ Koser 2003, op.cit., p. 112

identification with the ethnic group of one of the parents¹⁷¹. For those urban residents who related to a Pan- Ethiopian identity, it forced upon them an externally imposed identification with an ethnic group. Abbink suggested that:

‘ (...) people were forced to make an often impossible choice as to their ethnic identity and mother-tongue in the educational system¹⁷²’.

However, for those Ethiopians of Eritrean origins the rules governing the acquisition of Eritrean or maintenance of Ethiopian citizenship were not clearly defined. The rules for acquiring citizenship and, especially, the rules governing the citizenship of Ethiopians of mixed parentage (Ethiopian and Eritrean) and/or of those who chose to vote in the 1993 Eritrean referendum for independence remained ambiguous. At the level of the criteria for acquiring citizenship, in practice, this group of citizens enjoyed dual nationality, i.e., Ethiopian and Eritrean¹⁷³. During this period, those Ethiopian citizens who qualified to acquire Eritrean citizenship and who decided to keep their residence in Ethiopia (rather than going back to Eritrea) registered to vote in the referendum and were awarded Eritrean identity cards. Until the outbreak of hostilities, this group could leave and enter Ethiopia without bureaucratic requisites of visa applications or foreign currency payment upon departure¹⁷⁴. In addition, according to Iyob many of those who voted in the 1993 UN- referendum for Eritrea’s independence also voted in all Ethiopian elections¹⁷⁵. The Ethiopian law had only clearly stated that those who decided to take on the citizenship of the successor state had to relinquish Ethiopian nationality¹⁷⁶. In addition, it should be noted that when they voted in 1993, Eritrea’s status as a sovereign state was still dependent upon the outcome of the referendum. By voting, this group of Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin did not formally relinquish Ethiopian citizenship. The Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) citizenship rules

¹⁷¹ Abbink, J. 1998. 'New Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge of the South, To the memory of Jacques Bureau 1947- 1998'. *Northeast African Studies* 5: 59-81. (p.63)

¹⁷² *ibid*, p.65.

¹⁷³ Iyob, R. 2000. 'The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38: 659-682. (p.664).

¹⁷⁴ *ibid*, p.671.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*, footnote 18 p.680.

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch January 2003. 'The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 1998- April 2002)'. vol.15, No.3 (A): HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ethioerit0103/ethioerit0103.pdf>. (p.7)

further contributed to the ambiguity of the nationality of those who had voted in the referendum.

The citizenship rules defined in the first Proclamation of citizenship by the PGE in 1992 aimed to embrace a population dispersed territorially, attributing Eritrean nationality via matrilineal and / or patriarchal descent (*ius sanguinis*) or naturalisation. Those who registered to vote for the Referendum (both within Eritrea and abroad) were issued with identity cards, which ascribed them the right to vote for or against independence¹⁷⁷. The criteria for acquiring Eritrean citizenship were birth, naturalisation and/or adoption. Indeed, ‘any person born to a father or mother of Eritrean origin in Eritrea or abroad’ was entitled to become an Eritrean citizen and to acquire voting rights, regardless of the country of residence¹⁷⁸. This conception of nationhood granted equal rights to those living in Eritrea and outside. If the host country allowed dual nationality, the Eritrean conception of nationhood posed no problems. However, this definition had the potential to create an ambiguous status for those who qualified to acquire Eritrean citizenship but who had acquired the citizenship of states in which only a single nationality was permitted. The PGE’s conception created a Pan- Eritrean identity with a transnational component. However, as Iyob highlighted:

‘ After Independence, Eritrea failed to establish legal terms of reference to legitimise transnational citizenry and protect them under international law¹⁷⁹.’

The outbreak of hostilities in 1998 led to the expulsion of 60,000- 75,000 Ethiopians of Eritrean origin and Eritreans from Ethiopia¹⁸⁰. The Ethiopian government’s expulsions of Eritreans and/or Ethiopians of Eritrean origins were not unprecedented. In 1991 the Provisional Government of Eritrea expelled 50,000 Ethiopians residing in Eritrea encompassing traders, workers in the port of Assab,

¹⁷⁷ *ibid*, p.663.

¹⁷⁸ Iyob 2000, *op.cit.*, p. 671.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid*. p.664.

¹⁸⁰ Koser 2003, *op.cit.*, p.112.

industry and services workers and Ethiopian state's agents, such as army personnel and administrators¹⁸¹.

However, the Ethiopian government's largely arbitrary expulsions had major implications both with regards to the state's new defined criteria for acquiring Ethiopian citizenship and for the group of citizens who was unduly caught up in the process¹⁸². The Ethiopian state unilaterally outlawed the earlier practice of accepting the dual nationality of those Ethiopians of Eritrean origins on the basis that the decision to vote in the referendum had been an affirmation of Eritrean nationality. For those citizens expelled from Ethiopia on the basis of this claim their legitimate right to choose was denied. The mutually exclusive Ethiopian and Eritrean nationalities were imposed upon this group of Ethiopian citizens regardless of their preferences and, more significantly, of their rights and without due process of law.

In the aftermath of the war, Ethiopia had to redefine the rules governing the acquisition of citizenship which applied to its diaspora. Although dual nationality is not permitted, since 2002 the government has attributed Ethiopian Origin Identity cards to Ethiopians who hold another citizenship¹⁸³. In 2003, the government's revision of the earlier rules governing citizenship resulted in Proclamation No.378/2003 on Ethiopian Nationality. The previous proclamation on Ethiopian nationality dated from 1930 and had been amended in 1933¹⁸⁴. The 2003 proclamation aimed to address and update the rules governing the acquisition of Ethiopian citizenship. This much needed revisionist stance, however, neither implied a rectification of the situation of those expelled during the war, nor was it retroactive. One year after the new proclamation on nationality had come to effect, the Security Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority issued the Directive on Residence for Eritrean Nationals in Ethiopia¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸¹ Abbink, J. 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute'. *African Affairs* 97: pp.551-565. (p.560)

¹⁸² Amnesty International 21 May 1999. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights issues in a year of armed conflict'. AI Index: AFR 04/03/99. ; Human Rights Watch 2003, op.cit.

¹⁸³ Terrazas 2007, op.cit. In practice, the cards entitle the holder to the same rights as Ethiopians with exclusive nationality and residence in Ethiopia, except for the right to vote.

¹⁸⁴ Barnes 2006, op.cit. Since the EPRDF had come to power the official position although introducing slight changes to the 1930 Proclamation was not binding. The official position with regard to Ethiopian Nationality enshrined in the 1995 Federal Constitution permitted those born of both or either national parents to acquire citizenship (*ius sanguinis*). This position also permitted foreign nationals to acquire citizenship.

¹⁸⁵ Barnes 2006, op.cit., p.39.

III) Outcomes of the 1998- 2000 war: state consolidation or state disintegration?

The war undermined the legitimacy of the two governments. In addition, for those citizens living in Eritrea the loyalty to the state was undermined by the PFDJ trend to conflate the nationalist movement and the Front with the state. The 1998-2000 war, the increasingly authoritarian stance of the government and its emphasis on extended compulsory military service eroded the national legitimacy of the PFDJ as the embodiment of Eritrea's hard won independence. Perseverance on this path is likely to render Eritrean citizenship less, rather than more attractive.

In Ethiopia it was not a case of state building because state survival was not at stake. The state in Ethiopia was not in doubt. After the ousting of the *Derg* the challenge was to re-make the state. Although Ethiopia's definition after Eritrea's secession was not at the forefront of the EPRDF's concerns, the war forced the redefinition of Ethiopia as a country (its landlocked status was finally realised) and of its citizens, particularly of those located at the borderlands. The solidarity between the Tigrinya- speaking communities North and South of the Mereb faltered in the aftermath of Eritrea's independence. The centrality of the alliance between the Tigrinya speaking leaderships after the *Derg*'s fall tends to be overlooked. Perhaps the Somaliland case comes as a portent reminder that international society tends to resist unilateral declarations of independence. It should be noted that part of the EPFL success was based on its ability to build an alliance with a counterpart in Addis Ababa favourable to its independence. Perhaps if the TPLF upon accession to the state had resisted or created constraints to Eritrea's secession it is likely that its immediate recognition as a sovereign state would have been delayed.

Finally, the war impacted upon the state-building project of the EPRDF. In this sense, the proposition to address is how the war affected the EPRDF project of remaking the state along ethnic lines?

The emphasis on sub- nationalities subsided while the war lasted. The EPRDF's earlier emphasis on sub- nationalities was revised and its saliency diminished.

In contradistinction Eritrea had to put to the test its nationalist credential and bring into implementation its long withheld claims that Eritrea was a viable political and economic independent unit. The PFDJ perceived ethnic and/or regional solidarity as a hindrance to state and nation building. The Eritrean government followed the

opposite path, diminishing the saliency of all solidarities at the sub- state level and subordinating them to the overarching national identity.

In Ethiopia the soviet inspired model on nationalities was implemented to address and countervail the trend towards the multiplication of loci of contention and insurgency at the periphery of the state. The Federal model based on ethnicity, however, failed to meet its stated aim of solving the ‘nationalities questions’. In the end the model sub- elevated sub- nationalities over the national identity. This trend was disrupted by the 1998- 2000 war and in its aftermath the emphasis on diversity and decentralization (which in any case had not substantially left the fore of policy design to the fore of implementation) was increasingly substituted by the focus on unity and on a revived and more salient centralizing trend.

Ethiopia’s federal model led to a redrawing of domestic borders between regions based on the criteria of ethnicity and language. This attempt to ascribe a particular ethnic group and language to a region encountered manifold problems and led to a proliferation of domestic border disputes between the new administrative units. The outbreak of the war allowed the citizens to voice resentment towards the ruling party’s own conception of statehood. In addition, the EPRDF was forced to abandon its emphasis on diversity and revive the motto of ‘One Ethiopia’ to mobilise support for the defence of the country against external aggression. The focus on the need to defend the territorial integrity of the state was key in raising revenues from peripheral areas, such as the Somali region and the Afar regions. Whereas the Afar trajectory showed that they tend to escape the state’s control, the fact that their land had been divided by Eritrea’s independence and that they had lost the port of Assab meant that their support to the EPRDF was more likely than ever. With regard to Ethiopia’s Somali region the communities contributed both with men for the battlefield and with goods for the troops, such as sheep; at a particularly difficult moment when the drought in the region had already depleted the livestock economy. In this regard, the 1998- 2000 war led the peripheral regions to display their loyalty towards the state. As a consequence, the EPRDF acquired its nationalist credentials through victory in the battlefield. In the aftermath of the war, the Ethiopian government toned down the saliency of ethnic politics and criticised those who

manipulated ethnicity for parochial purposes or used nationalism in a narrow way¹⁸⁶. This rhetoric shift marked the turn towards a more centralized Federal system.

The final questions to consider are related to the proposition of the relationship between war and state making and remaking.

With regard to the relationship between war and nationalism, both the PFDJ and the EPRDF skilfully mobilised support from their citizens and diaspora (particularly the PFDJ) around the need to protect the country. The PFDJ rallied support around the need to protect the country's hard-won independence and the EPRDF rallied support around the revival of the need to unite all Ethiopians against an external threat to the state's territorial integrity. While the PFDJ revived the founding myth of the war for independence, the EPRDF revived the myth of the unity of Ethiopia in the face of external threats to the state's sovereignty. In this regard both leaderships were successful while the war lasted. However, as the war was brought to an end the increasingly authoritarian stance of the two governments eroded the support which the war had momentarily raised. In Ethiopia the end of the war was accompanied by a resurgence of sub-nationalist conflict. In Eritrea the aftermath of the war and the political crisis¹⁸⁷ that ensued 'generated antagonism to the state-led national project among those who have borne its brunt'¹⁸⁸. Quite significantly, Dorman highlighted that the 1998- 2000 war generated increasing political opposition to the government and led to a re-evaluation of the nationalist legacy¹⁸⁹.

With regard to the three activities induced by the war and which serve as indicators of the consolidation of the state the conclusions are outlined below.

In the Eritrean case the war allowed the PFDJ to raise its revenues sharply. In this sense the collection of funds was not conducted domestically but at the transnational level. This case highlights how globalisation and transnationalism have altered the stage within which the relationship between war making and state making should be analysed. Indeed, globalization in this respect seems to have widened the constituencies of the sovereign state. However, as the war unfolded and as the

¹⁸⁶ Assefa Fisseha 2006, op.cit., p. 147.

¹⁸⁷ The political crisis in the aftermath of the war led to the imprisonment of a group of 15 PFDJ's members who wrote an open-letter criticising the President for the diplomatic and military conduct of the war and calling upon the President to implement the Constitution and hold long due elections. Not only were most of the signatories of the letter immediately imprisoned, but also various journalists. The private media were banned and cases of imprisonment, disappearances and arbitrary arrest of those perceived as dissenters abound. Conrad 2006, op.cit., (footnote 7 pp. 251- 252).

¹⁸⁸ Dorman 2005, op.cit., (p.217)

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*, p.204.

diaspora communities had no say in the diplomatic and military conduct of the war and/or in the political debate which followed Eritrea's defeat, the diaspora's contributions decreased to ante bellum levels and in some cases diminished significantly. Before the war even opposition members perceived their 2 per cent contribution to the state as important and as a sign of national commitment. The war eroded the legitimacy of the PFDJ as the sole bearer of the legacy of the war for independence. In addition, the state's accrued needs to raise revenues to finance the war depleted the government of its fiscal resources¹⁹⁰. In the Ethiopian case, the war allowed the state to raise revenues from peripheral groups both at the borderlands with Eritrea and far removed from it, as was the case with the Afar and Somali respectively. However, other peripheral groups seized the opportunity of the fall out between the two governments to benefit from support from their own insurgencies, such as the OLF. This was the exception rather than the rule, as most opposition groups to the EPRDF temporarily suspended their operations and rallied behind the call to defend the territorial integrity of the state.

The war allowed both states to mobilise troops to the war fronts. However, in Eritrea's case the undetermined period of conscription has depleted the country of its working force, compromised the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship for those at an age of military service and has undermined the legitimacy of the PFDJ. In addition, the government trend to conflate the nationalist movement with the EPLF/ PFDJ and with the state has contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the state, as many of those who participated in the war for independence voice their resentment and their disagreement over the government's path after independence. The ex-combatants' criticism of the government should not remain unheeded at the peril of compromising not only the government's hold on power but also the survival of the state. Indeed, as several ex-combatants and those from the diaspora who committed time, financial resources and their skills to the war for independence tend to repeat: ' We didn't fight for this¹⁹¹, or they simply share one ex-combatant's sense of frustration and disillusionment : ' I fought so that my children wouldn't have to¹⁹² '.

Finally, in contradistinction to what Herbst seems to suggest, the weakness of the state in Africa cannot be solely explained on the basis of the absence of interstate

¹⁹⁰ Forrest, J. 2004. *Subnationalism in Africa : ethnicity, alliances, and politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p.139

¹⁹¹ Group Interview in London, May 2007.

¹⁹² Dorman 2005, op.cit., (p.218)

war¹⁹³. In this case we are faced with this type of war. The main contention of this paper is that as the war unfolded it allowed both governments to sharply raise the revenues and rally support around the nationalist appeal. However, the aftermath of the war showed that the war- induced elements of state consolidation were only epiphenomenal and ceased as the war was brought to an end. The 1998- 2000 war has been further disruptive to the process of state consolidation. In the short term the war has led to the opposite¹⁹⁴ outcome. In its aftermath internal opposition to the governments increased¹⁹⁵ and in Ethiopia's case was maintained fuelling, indirectly, further *loci* and support for opposition groups to the EPRDF- TPLF.

CONCLUSION

The first part of the paper showed on the one hand how the war reinforced the state's determination in achieving domestic sovereignty, and on the other hand showed how the limited gains in state and nation building activities were undermined as the war unfolded and, especially, in its aftermath. The intensity of the activities of taxation and conscription during and after the war clearly contributed to a decrease in the vast amount of legitimacy the regime had enjoyed at Independence.

The paper argued that at least in the short term there are no straightforward answers to the claim that war induces state making.

The evidence collected corroborates the claim that war both makes and breaks the state. Indeed, in Ethiopia and Eritrea the 1998- 2000 war had contradictory impacts on state and nation building. The analysis of the war and its impact in both states reveals contradictory outcomes. On the one hand it could be argued that the war induced state consolidation only to the extent that it had an impact on nation building. On the other hand the various outcomes of the war reveal that this war was disruptive to the process of state building. Particularly in Eritrea, the 1998- 2000 war against Ethiopia meant a relapse in nation building and fundamentally undermined the regime's capital of legitimacy inherited from the war for independence.

¹⁹³ The author based on Tilly's work claims that wars of territorial conquest were central to the formation of particular types of states in Europe. According to Herbst ' the consequential role that war played in European state development was not replicated in Africa. Herbst 2000, op.cit., P.21

¹⁹⁴ Clapham and Jacquin- Berdal's analysis of the war suggests that the outcome has been quite the reverse or, at the best, ambiguous in face of the erosion of the legitimacy of both leaderships. Clapham, C. 2003. 'Guerre et construction de l'État dans la Corne de L'Afrique' in Hassner, P., et, Roland Marchal, (ed.) *Guerres et sociétés : États et violence après la Guerre Froide*. Paris: Éditions Karthala. Jacquin- Berdal 2005, op.cit., p.xix.

¹⁹⁵ This is the subject of chapter five of the thesis on the outcomes of the war.

With regard to taxation, although the war caused an increase in revenue it did not produce a ratchet effect¹⁹⁶ and the war undermined the diaspora's willingness to contribute to the PFDJ state- building project for Eritrea's sovereign state. Indeed, the contributions from the diaspora have decreased in the aftermath not only of the war but, especially, after the PFDJ implementation of increasingly authoritarian measures in 2001.

Ironically, the 1998- 2000 war provided the ruling party in Eritrea with the justification to pursue its state building activities based on mass conscription and patriotic education. For how long the state will be able to pursue this military orientation remains to be seen. The evidence produced by this study tends to confirm that the increasing generational tension inside Eritrea and the growing external opposition from the diaspora fundamentally de-legitimise the ruling party's militarised orientation both to domestic politics and to foreign policy making.

The compulsory military service has had a pervasive effect on the attractiveness of Eritrean citizenship and on the development of a private space for economic activities. Not only is the majority of the working force of the population serving in the military, but is also used for party- controlled business activities.

As Bascom contended:

'In face of an increasingly repressive and authoritarian state, both the remarkable solidarity that characterised those mobilised in the war for independence and the euphoric optimism of achieving it¹⁹⁷ are gradually fading from collective memory'¹⁹⁸.

As a consequence, Eritrean citizenship is lacking in attractiveness, especially to those who have either resisted or who were forced to undergo the military service for an extended period beyond the official one ascribed by law¹⁹⁹.

The regime is increasingly authoritarian and is run as a de facto one-party state. Indeed, the PFDJ equals the state. In this context, opposition to the regime has

¹⁹⁶ The ratchet effect caused by wars refers to a situation 'whereby revenue increases sharply when a nation is fighting but does not decline to the ante bellum level when hostilities have ceased.' Herbst 2003, op.cit., p. 170.

¹⁹⁷ For an earlier and already cautious interpretation of the potential and constraints of the PFDJ in leading state and society toward the democratization path refer to. Iyob, R. 1997. 'The Eritrean Experiment: a Cautious Pragmatism?' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35: 647- 673.

¹⁹⁸ Bascom 2005, op.cit., (p.178).

¹⁹⁹ Dorman 2005, op.cit., (p.211).

led to a resurgence of sub-national identities along ethnic, religious and, most importantly, regional cleavages²⁰⁰.

The symbiosis between party and state suggests that loyalty to the state has waned as opposition to the regime is on the rise, particularly among the diaspora.

In Ethiopia, the war further compromised the state's ability to guarantee the monopoly of coercive violence.

Interestingly enough the explanatory power of this case- study challenges one of the central tenets of Herbst's argument. In this case, we witnessed an inter-state war where the external rivalry led to the escalation of the crisis into a conventional war. In line with what is defended by different authors, in the short term the war has not substantively induced state building activities that contribute to state consolidation, rather the opposite²⁰¹. In its aftermath internal opposition to the governments, in Eritrea's case has increased and in Ethiopia's case has maintained fuelling, indirectly, further loci and support to non state actors engaged in insurgency against the EPRDF- TPLF. The aftermath of the war showed that the widespread support to the ruling party during the war with Eritrea was epiphenomenal. As Jacquin- Berdal reminds us:

‘ (...)as history reveals, war is only one of the factors , and not always a necessary one for that matter, that facilitate the process of state making. More important is the extent to which the state and its representatives are perceived as legitimate by the people concerned’²⁰² .

While the relationship between war and state formation is central, the evidence on contemporary armed conflicts in Africa tends to emphasize two contradictory outcomes: war induces state building activities in the short term but the legitimacy of the leaderships at the helm of the state is clearly undermined and in the long term war making is likely to exacerbate fragmentation and state disintegration. But this relationship needs to be considered on a case-by- case basis and regardless of the type of war. The attempts to draw historical parallels between the central role played by war in the European experience of state formation and the ongoing simultaneous processes of state formation and state disintegration in Africa suggest that war has led to more cases of state fragmentation and ultimately state breakdown than state

²⁰⁰ Conrad 2006, op.cit., (p.252)

²⁰¹ Clapham 2003; Jacquin- Berdal 2005.

²⁰² Jacquin- Berdal 2005, op.cit., P.xix

building or ultimately consolidation. 'Maybe it is not too surprising that war both makes and breaks states'²⁰³

²⁰³ Sørensen, G. 2001. 'War and State Making: Why doesn't it work in the Third World?' *Security Dialogue* 32: 341-354. (P.352).

Bibliography

- Abbink, J. 1998. 'Briefing: The Eritrean- Ethiopian Border Dispute'. *African Affairs* 97: pp.551-565.
- 1998. 'New Configurations of Ethiopian Ethnicity: The Challenge of the South, To the memory of Jacques Bureau 1947- 1998'. *Northeast African Studies* 5: 59-81.
- Alemseged Abbay 1997. 'The Trans- Mereb Past in the Present'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35: 321- 334.
- Amnesty International 21 May 1999. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights issues in a year of armed conflict'. AI Index: AFR 04/03/99.
- Assefa Fisseha 2006. 'Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism' in Turton, D. (ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Barnes, C. 2003. 'Sovereignty, Identity and Modernity: Understanding Ethiopia'. *African Affairs* 102: 507-514.
- 2006. 'Ethiopia: A Sociopolitical Assessment': Writenet/ UNHCR.
- Barnes, C., and, Thomas Osmond, Octobre 2005. 'L' Après État- Nation en Éthiopie: Changement de forme plus que d'habitudes?' *Politique Africaine* 99.
- Bascom, J. June 2005. 'The long, ' Last Step' ? Reintegration of Repatriates in Eritrea'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18: 165-180.
- Bernal, V. February 2004. 'Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era'. *Cultural Anthropology* 19: 3-25.
- Bilefsky, D. June 12, 2007. 'EU nations refuse to split up refugee burden' *International Herald Tribune*, www.ihf.com.
- Bradburd, D. 1996. 'Towards an understanding of the fate of modern pastoralists: Starting with the state'. *Nomadic Peoples* 38: 37- 48.
- Callahan, M. P. 2003. *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Clapham, C. 1972. 'Ethiopia and Somalia'. *Adelphi Paper : Special Issue on African Conflicts* 364: 1-19.
- 1999. 'Boundaries and States in the New African Order' in Bach, D.C. (ed.) *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Desintegration*. Oxford: James Currey.
- 2001. 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn' in May, R., and Furley, Oliver (ed.) *African Interventionist States*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- 2003. 'Guerre et construction de l'État dans la Corne de L'Afrique' in Hassner, P., et Roland Marchal, (ed.) *Guerres et sociétés : États et violence après la Guerre Froide*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.
- 2006. 'Ethiopia' in Clapham, C., Herbst, J., and, Greg Mills, (ed.) *Big African States*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Cohen, G. 2006. 'The Development of Regional and Local Languages in Ethiopia's Federal System' in Turton, D. (ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Coker, C. 1997. *Twilight of the West*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Connell, D. 2001. 'Inside the EPLF: The Origins of the 'People's Party' & its Role in the Liberation of Eritrea'. *Review of African Political Economy* 89: 345-364.
- 2005. 'A Conversation with Petros Solomon and Berhane Gebreghzabhier, August 2, 2001' in Connell, D. (ed.) *Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press.
- Conrad, B. 2006. 'Out of the 'memory hole': Alternative narratives of the Eritrean revolution in the diaspora'. *Afrika Spectrum* 41: 249- 271.
- Dorman, S. R. 'Born Powerful? Post- Liberation Politics in Eritrea and Zimbabwe': University of Edinburgh, unpublished work.
- 2005. 'Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism'. *Nations and Nationalism* 11: 203-222.
- Fekadu Beshah 22 May 2007. 'Ethiopia: Commission to Purchase Satellite Equipment for Upcoming Census' *Addis Fortune*. Addis Ababa, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705220692.html>.
- Forrest, J. 2004. *Subnationalism in Africa : ethnicity, alliances, and politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Fouad Makki 1996. 'Nationalism, State Formation and the Public Sphere: Eritrea 1991- 96'. *Review of African Political Economy* 23: 475- 497.
- Gilkes, P. 1983. 'Centralism and the Ethiopian PMAC' in Lewis, I.M. (ed.) *Nationalism and Self- Determination in the Horn of Africa*. London: Ithaca Press.
- Hepner, T. R. 2003. 'Religion, Nationalism, and Transnational Civil Society in the Eritrean diaspora'. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 10: 269- 293.
- Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

- 2003. 'State and War in Africa' in Paul, T.V., Ikenberry, G. John, Hall, John A. (ed.) *The Nation- State in question*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hobson, A. 8 December 2004. 'Written evidence submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide (+ Annex 1) to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, House of Commons, UK': Christian Solidarity Worldwide, www.parliament.uk.
- Human Rights Watch January 2003. 'The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 1998- April 2002)'. vol.15, No.3 (A): HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ethioerit0103/ethioerit0103.pdf>.
- Iyob, R. 1995. *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism 1941- 1993*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1997. 'The Eritrean Experiment: a Cautious Pragmatism?' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35: 647- 673.
- 2000. 'The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38: 659-682.
- Jacquin- Berdal, D. 2000. 'State and War in the Formation of Eritrean National Identity' in Vandersluis, S.O. (ed.) *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations*. London: MacMillan Press.
- 2002. *Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa: A Critique of the Ethnic Interpretation*. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Aida Mengistu, 2006. 'Nationalism and Identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Building Multiethnic States' in Bekoe, D.A. (ed.) *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, 2005. 'Introduction: The Eritreo- Ethiopian war' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press.
- Joseph, R. 1999. 'State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa': Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Keller, E. J. 2005. 'Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia' in Larémont, R.R. (ed.) *Borders, nationalism, and the African state*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Koser, K. 2003. 'Mobilizing New African Diasporas: An Eritrean Case Study' in Koser, K. (ed.) *New African Diasporas*. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
- 2007. *International migration : a very short introduction*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

- Kubosova, L. 6 July 2007. 'Malta turning into 'detention centre', warns minister' *EU Observer*. Malta, <http://euobserver.com>.
- Leander, A. 2004. 'Wars and the un- making of states: Taking Tilly seriously in the contemporary world' in Guzzini, S., and, Jung, Dietrich, (ed.) *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*. London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
- Lewis, I. M. 1980. *A modern history of the Somali : nation and state in the Horn of Africa* London & N.Y.: Longman.
- McClellan, C. 1990. 'Articulating Economic Modernization and National Integration at the Periphery: Addis Ababa and Sidamo's Provincial Centers'. *African Studies Review* 33: 29- 54.
- 1996. 'Observations on the Ethiopian Nation, Its Nationalism, and the Italo- Ethiopian War'. *Northeast African Studies* 3: 57- 86.
- McNab, C. December 1990. 'Language Policy and Language Practice: Implementing Multilingual Literacy Education in Ethiopia'. *African Studies Review* 33: 65- 82.
- Plaut, M. 2005. 'The Conflict and its aftermath' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press.
- Pool, D. 1998. 'The Eritrean People's Liberation Front' in Clapham, C. (ed.) *African Guerrillas*. Fountain & Indiana: James Currey.
- 2001. *From guerrillas to government : the Eritrean People's Liberation Front*. Oxford & Athens: J. Currey & Ohio University Press.
- Reid, R. 2005. 'Caught in the headlights of history: Eritrea, the EPLF and the postwar nation state'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 43: 467-488.
- Samatar, A. I. 2004. 'Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region'. *Third World Quarterly* 25: 1131-1154.
- Sørensen, G. 2001. 'War and State Making: Why doesn't it work in the Third World?' *Security Dialogue* 32: 341-354.
- Styan, D. 2005. 'Twisting Ethio- Eritrean Economic Ties: Misperceptions of War and the Misplaced priorities of Peace, 1997- 2002' in Jacquin- Berdal, D., and, Martin Plaut, (ed.) *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Unfinished Business*. Trenton and Asmara: Red Sea Press.
- Tekeste Negash 1996. *Rethinking Education in Ethiopia*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Tekle M. Woldemikael 2003 (April). 'Language, Education, and Public Policy in Eritrea'. *African Studies Review* 46: 117- 136.

- Terrazas, A. M. 2007. 'Beyond Regional Circularity: The Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora'. Washington, DC: Migration Information Source, <http://www.migrationinformation.org>.
- Teschke, B. 2003. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the making of Modern International Relations*. London and New York: Verso.
- Tilly, C. 1985. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime' in Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (ed.) *Bringing the State Back in*. New York: CUP.
- Triulzi, A. 1983. 'Competing views of national identity in Ethiopia' in Lewis, I.M. (ed.) *Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa*. London: Ithaca Press.
- UNHCR 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Eritrea'. *UNHCR* 324-325, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>.
- 2005. '2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook: Ethiopia'. *UNHCR* 328-329, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>.
- 2006. '2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum- Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons': UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/>.
- United Nations Security Council 30 April 2007. 'Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea: S/2007/250': UN Security Council, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm>.
- Vaughan, S. 2007. 'Le fédéralisme ethnique et la démocratisation depuis 1991' in Prunier, G. (ed.) *L'Éthiopie contemporaine*. Addis Ababa & Paris: CFEE/ Karthala.