ECAS 2013

Middle classes in Africa are an elusive reality. On the one hand there are clear signs in a number of African countries of the rise of an increasing number of people mainly in urban areas that are now living beyond the poverty line. Those groups of population may not stand as a "middle class" as such. However they are involved in clear processes of social promotion, they manage to invest and reap some benefits from those investments allowing them to enter into a "limited prosperity" (xiao kang : they are no longer poor but are too close to poverty to feel secured ), they adopt new live styles and cherish new hopes of a better life. On the other hand this group is still very much theoretical and elusive and closer to a statistical object than to a social fact. "Middle class in Africa" is very much part of a naming and branding process through which a large range of actors contribute to materialized it. There is neither pure rationality, nor global plot, nor pure domination by "epistemic communities", international organisations or think tanks behind it. However a complex set of actors interacting actors contributes to reshape the understanding of poverty and its relation to development and development assistance. The middle class issue is thus part of a wider move to shape new perceptions of poverty and the means to fight it.

Much has been said in the past few years about the rise of the middle class across Africa - a trend that is often exemplified by the ubiquitous 'Africa Rising' adage. Recent reports by the AfDB and McKinsey have sought to define the middle class through attempts to enumerate this grouping through the metric of consumer-based categories.

Discretionary income is on the increase, consumers are increasingly market savvy - thanks in part to the rise of ICT - and according to McKinsey (2012) a "robust savings culture" exists in Africa. However, contemporary narratives endorsing the potential spending power of African consumers have raised questions about the (definitional) clarity and appropriateness of consumerism as class. The political neutrality with which these reports engage is similarly problematic, as it fails to account for other markers of social stratification such as education, life-style, self-perceptions, and ethnicity.

Taking Nairobi, Kenya, as a specific example, this paper seeks to elucidate and categorise these various markers of class, and account for the historic rise of the middle class consumer so seemingly central to today's understanding of class on the continent. As well as providing a much-needed contextual understanding of the growth of an urban 'middle class' in Africa, the paper will also question often-made (Western) assumptions about who constitutes the middle class; assert and explain the crucial difference between middle class and middle income in a specific and developing urban setting; and expand upon the popularised notion that domestic consumption will consolidate positive development on the continent.

The current debate on the emerging African the middle class is seen as an important economic and political factor that stabilizes economic growth through domestic demand and the quest for political accountability. This debate implies that aside from the socioeconomic structure (lower and upper strata) the middle class is more or less homogenous. However, we know from data about industrialized countries that the middle class is sociocultural differentiated. How is this in Africa? May we talk about THE middle class or are there different sociocultural groups? To identify traits and groups of middle classes in Africa we adapt a multidimensional framework which has been used for the analysis of classes/social milieus in the Brazilian city Recife (Stoll 2012). The focus of this analysis are (socio-)cultural differences among groups/milieus of urban middle classes. The framework modifies Bourdieu´s sociology by differing the dimensions social structure (education, income, symbolic position), division of labor (work/ activities), culture (habitus, life style, social origin) and historic socio-culture (traditions, ethnicity, recent developments). Additionally we will analyze regional influences like connections between urban and rural areas, forms of globalization either economic or social (e.g. role of diasporas and migration for studies). This will be exemplified by future visions of middle classes in urban Kenya. Finally we will look at necessary methodological adaptions of the framework and discuss if the European/North American notion "middle class" makes sense in Africa.

Elite and middle class are analytical categories, highlighting competing models of social differentiation, while also representing categories important to actors' own self-understandings. African groups and individuals that were studied as "elites" in the 1960s and 1970s are now often studied as the "middle classes". This shift reflects socioeconomic developments in Africa, namely the growth of middle-income groups, which despite their heterogeneity in terms of profession and source of income evince similarities with respect to life style and an orientation towards individual upward mobility. Furthermore, the term middle class allows African trends to be linked to international policy discourses. Finally, it offers those who see themselves in this category a socially more acceptable self-interpretation than elite concepts that emphasise social distance. At the same time, many both in and outside the academy still prefer the term elite over "upper middle class" because it focuses on educational achievement (rather than wealth or consumption) as a motor of upward social mobility, puts more emphasis on agency, and reflects the ethos of hard work and leadership prominent in many educated elite's self-understanding of their societal role.

Based on the study of four generations of highly educated Northern Ghanaians and on a close reading of past studies of African elites, this paper discusses the theoretical implications and the empirical predicaments of the terms "elite" vs. "middle class" in the study of social differentiation and inequality in Africa.

Since, Ghana's return to constitutional rule on the 1992, it has established itself, as the beacon of democracy in the sub region and serves as an example to be emulated by other African countries. This stability is according to Svanikier, said to be a result of highly educated lower and upper middle classes of the society who understand the need to maintain the status quo.

Ghana's economy grew by 14 percent in 2011, which makes it one of the fastest growing economy in the sub-region and second to Qatar. This growth has, however, in past year attracted more foreign investors and people from the diaspora into the country, as a result living standard in Ghana, particularly in Accra has risen high and which in turn, makes it one of the most expensive capitals to live in the sub-region.

The aim of our case study in Ghana was to find out who these stakeholders (the lower and upper middle class) are? Are they locally bred, or are they from the diaspora? What classify them as lower or upper middle class? And how does their interest, be it economic or political, relate to maintaining Ghana's democratic credentials? This paper will also make vital reference to the role the Ghanaian diaspora play or not in relation to social mobility and political interest?

In order to ascertain these hypotheses, we to carry out a field research,between March to September 2012, where we interviewed a sample of 50 people living in Accra .

A popular strand of thought has it that the prevalence of a large middle class is crucial to the emergence and consolidation of democratic rule, functioning as a bulwark against authoritarianism and extremism. Looking at the modern history of Ethiopia, it is here argued that such a characterisation of a 'middle class' as a unified democratic and progressive force is highly problematic. Since the mass protests that initiated the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, the middle classes have in each major political struggle been split between a conservative propertied upper stratum and a radical propertyless lower stratum centred around the intelligentsia. The upper stratum has consistently rallied behind status quoist forces be they represented by the Imperial, the Dergist or the current Federal states, while the lower stratum has provided leadership to each major challenger to those states, be they the student movement, the EPRP, the once rebel EPRDF and the electoral fronts that emerged around the 2005 elections. In this paper, it is argued that it would be premature to assume that the emergence of a larger 'middle class' would automatically lead to the democratization of Ethiopian state and society. On the contrary, it is argued that the precondition for democratization is the emergence of hegemonic rule, which would require a degree of accommodation of the lower classes and the marginalised nationalities. As long as the Ethiopian state fails to enjoy ideological hegemony over large swaths of its population, it is difficult to imagine the upper stratums supporting the gamble that far-going democratization would entail, threatening its precarious position.

The idea of an Ethiopian "middle class" is deriving from external configurations. This presentation will be tracing the history of the Ethiopian "middle class" as a statement : what produces the "class", who is naming what, which terminology is used, since then and for which purposes?

It aimed at analyzing the external processes of categorization of the "African middle classes" (see WB, ADB, IMF) as well as the internal categorization process occurring within the Ethiopian society (with a particular attention to semantic changes in social categorization in Ethiopian history). It will be shown that what connects these external and internal categorizations is primarily the way they relate to the future (envisioned as a desirable future) and their connection to the same vision of development.

My fieldwork (100 interviews with potential members of an Ethiopian "middle class") will give an input in the way this category has not been appropriated by its theoretical members. In this context, the "middle class" is a typical "classe objet" (Bourdieu, 1977), in the sense that it is qualified from the outside but is not performed by its members.

Finally, this presentation will discuss whether the use of the "classe objet" as a category for analysis is legitimate, relevant and what it involves. To what extent is it possible to study the African middle class without naturalizing or reifying this category?

Many commentators have recently argued that a rising 'middle class' in Africa will be crucial for development, democratization and stability. Despite the normative value attached to this social group, its definition and sociological composition remain extremely vague. In this presentation I argue that it is mistaken to view it as an existing social group, but instead as a process that develops through relationships between members, the state and wider social groups. I trace the on-going formation of a 'middle class' in Maputo, Mozambique, and how this has been affected by wider social/political transformations. By focusing on a specific case I ask if, under current conditions, are the middle classes still seen as a bulwark of 'civil society' keeping the state in check and creating the foundations of a 'liberal' political system, or has increasing uncertainty created a desire amongst its members for a resurgent moral authoritarianism.

During the long independence and civil war in Angola that raged from 1961-2002, the top and bottom social rungs of society were clearly defined, but the 'in between' was almost non-existent. Post-conflict, of tremendous importance to both future and present is the gradual emergence of a middle class that is bringing with it both new demands of the state, and some of the skills to meet them. Preliminary research has demonstrated that this is taking place largely through high-scale temporary westward migration to Brazil, following migration pathways established over 500 years of Portuguese colonialism in both countries. In preparation for an 18-month ethnographic study to be conducted in Benguela, Angola and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil beginning in July 2013, this paper seeks to understand the ways in which an emergent Angolan middle class is being formed in a trans-Atlantic South-South circuit, and how the group is recognized and defined. It also considers the implications of middle-class formation on Angolan democratic practice, exploring the notion that solid middle classes are prerequisites of strong democracies. Finally, it reads South-South inter-Lusophone migration as an important marker of contemporary shifts in the global economy and changing aspirational centers. These no longer necessitate movement from the global South to North, nor, necessarily, the mastery of English, but in this case speaks to the continuing influence of the echoes of empire in the projects of nation-building, despite a much-changed world.

This paper examines the construction of new houses in contemporary Tanzania as a window on Africa's 'new middle classes', a group about which we know very little. The paper begins to address this lacuna through a discussion of the distinctive houses now being built by the middle class in Tanzania. Through an examination of architecture, interior décor and compound space in urban Dar es Salaam and rural Kilimanjaro, the paper explores the different ways in which houses are constructed through old and new circuits of mobile people, capital, ideas and materials. The aesthetics of new houses demonstrate continuities and discontinuities with the ujamaa period. There are houses that conform to the aesthetic politics of ujamaa (modesty, equality, functionality) while others indicate a shift from function to consumption, patched together from a globalised shopping mall of materials, decorations and furnishings. Such houses are a response to economic, political, and socio-cultural changes since at least the first half of the twentieth century, when young educated people began to leave Kilimanjaro to take up posts in colonial government. Change has taken new shape in the post-socialist period which has seen the minority prosper. The building of new styles of houses is an attempt to fix value and values, and to protect wealth and status in uncertain times. Yet, the very materiality of the house can destabilise claims to inclusion in the middle class: houses can stand empty, unfinished, or crumbling for years. Houses do not simply make their builders middle class.

The proposed communication aims to contribute to the recent analysis of rising middle classes in developing countries particularly in sub-Saharan countries by focusing essentially on the rural area through the case of the Malagasy region of Itasy.

First, we borrow the concept of "small prosperity" proposed by Darbon and Toulabor (2011) to discuss the relevance and necessity of a middle classes analysis in African countries if we adapt the notion to their specificity. We argue that, despite their vulnerability, there is a middle category of persons in Africa that deserve special attention. Indeed, they could be a development lever and an effective support for poverty reduction and political stability as what expects the literature for emerging countries (Easterly, 2001). Next, we choose to apply the concept on a specific rural area in order to counteract the accepted idea of a systematic urban middle class and to emphasize the importance of the rural potential in Madagascar, as in most African countries. In fact, the majority of population lives in this space and the agriculture is still the key of the economic development in Madagascar (Bockel, 2005). We then attempt to an empirical and microeconomic analysis of the small prosperity category of households in the region of Itasy by using data from the ROR (the rural observatories network of Madagascar) on the period of 2005-2011. We complement the income criteria with food security, access to some commodities and land issues that are all relevant conditions in the region context.

The African Development Bank in an important paper assessing the middle class in Africa presents data that show Benin to have relatively small middle class of approximately 10 percent of the population. This paper argues that these data fail to capture a large and prosperous group that operates in the informal sector. It proposes that the middle class in Benin is much larger than captured in the data. It is evident, that actors who would be included in the middle class have been to stability for a state that operates in an environment of clientelism, informality, and semi-authoritarian rule. This middle class is an outcome of historic arrangements and contemporary changes in the regional political economy.