ECAS 2013

The complicity between foreign aid and authoritarianism in Africa is a historic continuity that has recently experienced revival. This paper serves as an introduction to the panel. It identifies predominent trends in bilateral and multilateral aid given to auhoritarian African governments after 1991. It concentrates on recurrent patterns in how donors and dictators co-evolve and higlights a number of questions relevant for a comparative analysis of aid and authoritarianism in Africa today.

This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the argument that commitment problems of foreign aid donors are essential for understanding recent changes in donor-government relations and aid delivery mechanisms in the developing world. The existing literature on donor-government relations has predominantly focused on the uncertainty donors face when dealing with recipient governments, neglecting the uncertainty developing country governments face when dealing with donors. Using a simple model of aid policy bargaining, the paper illustrates that several puzzling facts about contemporary foreign aid practices, particularly the shift towards budget support by some foreign aid donors, can be explained as a consequence of donor commitment problems. Evidence from semi-structured interviews with policymakers and donor representatives in Rwanda and Tanzania supports the predictions of the model and sheds light on the sustainability of budget support over the long-term.

Authors have often highlighted the ability of rulers in Addis Ababa to undertake succesful strategies of extraversion for purposes of internal control. The manipulation of external assistance has historically been a crucial element in shaping patterns of accumulation and distribution of economic resources along ethnic, social and geographical lines.

In this paper, we would like to analyse the issue through a longue durée perspective, focusing on three case studies distributed along different periods of Ethiopian recent history: the FAO, UNDP and British-sponsored cotton plantations in the Awsa Sultanate in the 1960's and 1970's; the resettlement scheme in the Tana Beles area during the 1980's; the negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the Italian Cooperation over the development of the hydroelectric sector in the 2000's. Our purpose is to evaluate to what extent and in which terms foreign aid promoted or hampered political participation by ethnic constituencies and opposition groups. We will try, on one side, to de-compose the concept of African State as a monolithic subject, highlighting how different actors at times inserted themselves within the interstices of the developmental relationship in order to gain access to ideological and material resources for purposes of power consolidation. On the other side, we will apply the same analysis to the so-called "international community", highlighting the plurality of actors and the variety of their often competing and contradicting agendas.

Within this conceptual framework, foreign development projects are considered as the arena where local stakeholders experimented new forms of counterinsurgency, popular mobilisation and statehood.

DFID and the World Bank, more than any other donors, have increased funding to Ethiopia in the face of a dramatically deteriorating human rights picture in the country since 2005. They have done this despite mounting questions and evidence about the role of their own funding and programs in underwriting repression. Why? Firstly the paper will examine the pressures on both of these institutions to disburse regardless of their own human rights policies and regardless of the long term compatibility of authoritarianism with their own goals. Policy is medium term based (neither short term in its concern with political cycles, nor long term and concerned with stability over several elections), focused almost exclusively on socio-economic factors and structurally blind to basic human rights and democratic indicators. Secondly, the paper will look at this 'technical' approach and discourse which renders political context and experience into a technical challenge, whose solution is (seemingly apolitical) spending of more money. Thirdly, the paper will discuss the limited operational space in Ethiopia, the control of the discourse and data by the government which neuters criticism, and the delusions of the aid community.

Since the mid-1980s, Uganda's skilful manipulation of donor agendas has brought political advantages to the government of Yoweri Museveni. While being keen advocates of African 'ownership' and 'African solutions', Uganda has become a 'trusted' implementer of Western policies without cajolement or conditionality. In return, international actors have consistently funded the regime's annual budget. This expansive support has largely ignored the centrality of the military as a key pillar of the state in Uganda, and the failure to take significant steps toward to democratization of its politics. Having resisted pressure to reduce its armed forces in the 1990s, since 9/11 the Ugandan military has adopted an enhanced role in Africa security across the IGAD region - all with donor support for the 'donor darling'. This paper explores the implications of this enhancement of the security sector, examining the key role Uganda has played in the securitization of development throughout the IGAD region, willingly acting as a Western proxy wherever its own interests can be furthered. This has been evident in interventions in DRC, Somalia and Sudan, and has brought Uganda a significant role in the development of security policy within the AU. The politics behind the recent threat by the Ugandans to withdraw from AMISOM reflects the extent to which Museveni's government is now able to protect its authoritarian policies against the pressure of donors and other critics.

Note: This is a joint paper submission by Professor David M Anderson and Dr Jonathan Fisher

The proposed paper uses the case-study of Cameroon to examine how critical donors can use their economic aid to shield their authoritarian allies from pressure to pursue democratization. As the wave of democratic reform swept through Africa in the early 1990s, domestic opposition and pressure from the international community forced the ruling clique in Cameroon towards pluralism. However, in this case, instead of encouraging democracy, the key donor, France, helped Cameroonian President Paul Biya maintain his grip on power. As will be demonstrated, massive amounts of French economic aid helped the regime survive both internal and external pressure for change. Under a political conditionality approach other secondary donors tried to use their foreign assistance to help push for liberal-democratic reforms in Cameroon and support the pro-democratic domestic opposition. However, such efforts were undermined by what the key donor perceives as its self-interest. This research attempts to use the case of Cameroon and its close relationship with Paris to illustrate a wider, more general trend in which developed country donors are frequently willing to ignore the authoritarian nature of friendly regimes.

Since the 1992 contested multiparty elections, international donors and the Cameroonian government have been negotiating around electoral reforms - still considered unsatisfactory by donors, opposition parties and civil society actors. However, elections have been held regularly since then with the result of maintaining in power Paul Biya (president since 1982) and the CPDM (the former single party). This paper wishes, firstly, to understand why donors (mainly the EU and the UNDP) insist on pushing for unlikely reforms, and secondly, to observe the consequences of the reforms on a very low electoral participation. Donors' motives will be addressed from two main hypotheses. First, the UNDP and the EU could not set aside their electoral agenda because they tend to be recognised as "experts" in this field and would suffer from any failed project. Second, the whole community of donors is particularly cautious not to contradict directly the Cameroonian government - which does not rely on international funding for its ordinary budget. The second issue the paper will deal with are the political effects of these protracted reforms. Being progressively "inclusive", the reforms paradoxically produce a close "electoral field" where professionals (be they state agents of the Electoral commission or of the ministry of Administration, civil society experts, NGOs, or international experts) are competing about the reforms while excluding ordinary citizens and political parties. Focusing on international norms and electoral credibility, this new field of political experts aims at securing its know-how and institutions and avoiding any popular disruption.