ECAS 2013

The idea of African Standby Force - formidable units able to take immediate actions in case of conflicts and crises - seems reasonable and promising from the East African point of view. Since independence, the countries of the region have witnessed numerous threats to their internal and international security. Prolonged crises in Sudan and Somalia have shown the reluctance of external actors, both states and international organizations, to respond to the atrocities in places such as Sudan and Somalia. But despite these needs, the creation of the Eastern African Standby Brigade meets many obstacles, most notably:

- internal tension between states and lack of regional cohesion,

- lack of regional lead nation that could set the pace for the project,

- the absence of one Regional Economic Community (REC) - the countries of the region are members of different organizations, most notably IGAD and EAC. Unable to find compromise within these organizations, the governments decided to create new structure - EASBRICOM - that is understaffed, underfinanced and poorly communicated with the AU and RECs,

- reluctance and ambivalence of some states, like Tanzania.

However, East African countries have shown devotion to peace processes in Sudan and Somalia. Current military involvement in the latter indicates that some regional players are willing and able - as for now only with external support - to conduct complex peace operations. What does it mean for the EASF? What conditions should be met in order to create such a unit in the near future?

The African Architecture of Peace and Security was born approximately one decade ago with as ambition the elaboration of the African regional organizations in peacekeeping operations (chapter 8 of the UN Charter). It resulted in the implementation of the concept of the African Stand-By Forces based on regional brigades supposed to be operational in 2015.

On the theater of the Horn of Africa, the greatest zone of instability of the continent, the influential States of the region, have been participating in peacekeeping operations. Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia are contributors of the AMISOM, the MINUAD, the MINUSS, the FISNUA, the Initiative of regional cooperation against the Lord's Resistance Army.

Beyond the involment in the missions of the African Union, the national armed forces have to ensure kingly missions in particular the national sovereignty (protection of the borders) and the defense of the vital interests. As underlined by the Kenyan operation "Linda Nchi" and both Ethiopian interventions in Somalia, the employment of the Armies remains subordinated to the political power and which mitigate the lack of reactivity of a regional structure or its blockings.

Risk of Duplication

IGAD, EAC and EASF are regional institutions that represent three different security perspectives. IGAD has a focus on human security, EAC mainly focuses on economic security and EASF is mainly concerned with political and military security. With such different security agendas is there a risk that donors might unintentionally cultivate parallel and competing security initiatives?

2. Institutions as instruments to pursue national interests and military capacity building

Institutions in East Africa might be used as 'tools' through which specific states pursue national security projects 'disguised' as regional security. This represents a risk to donors insofar as it implies that they (implicitly) support the national security agenda of a specific state, which is different from supporting a move toward regional security.

Risks of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs

The prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is a vital part of APSA. However, this leave us with the question of how to handle other "lower" conflicts as well as the question of whether there is a distinction as to whether intervention is more acceptable in a smaller state than in a bigger state.

Complex Relationships between states and institutions in the region

Here the paper will explore the implications of the fact that there is no unanimous hegemon in East Africa. IGAD and EAC can be accused of cultivating a north south understanding a over time divide the region into two. What are the prospects and where does this but EASF ambition of becoming a stronger political actor?

Since the African Union's decision, in 2003, to create an African Standby Force (ASF) at the continental level many questions have arisen. The creation of a force based on five regional standby forces is not without difficulties coming, on the one hand, from numerous heterogeneous security challenges and, on the other hand, from a two levels model of regional integration (African Union / Regional Economic Communities (RECs)). The progress of the ASF regional components is uneven and the results modest to the point that it is possible to ask whether the operationalization of the ASF will be reached by 2015. Because of the risks of spill-over of conflicts, ASF and its regional forces are perceived as a good framework. Yet, the nature of instability already shows the limits of cooperation between States.