ECAS 2013

Ethiopia established formal liberal institutions and started to hold elections in 1991. This allowed for the formal intervention of an actor such as the European Union in the national sphere, mainly through election observation. But such an intervention has constantly been contested, redefined as much as wanted and required. Democratic dialogue has been gradually informed by conventions, institution building but necessarily took place in a specific context. In Ethiopia, both actors, the European Union and Ethiopia displayed different strategies, sometimes using the same tools but showing how the interpretation of democratic governance and human rights can be different and leaves room to maneuver. Following the violent aftermath of 2005 elections, the European Union, with other international actors, decided to modify their channels for aid. But in return, the Ethiopian governement also impsoed conditions on activities run by international actors, thus imposing its own limits. Far from based on an international consensus, it reveals interdependency of both actors and constant reinvention of political space and diplomatic relations, playing with fragmentation of power, political sensitivity and definition of political order

Over the years, Zimbabwe has experienced a severe foreign pressure, particularly from the EU and the U.S. Imposed economic constraints have played an important role in the aggravating of the crisis in Zimbabwe. However, the attempt to mandatory to sanctions failed because it has been blocked by China and Russia in the UN Security Council.

South Africa, Zimbabwe's traditional partner, plays a positive role in resolving Zimbabwean problems. South Africa has repeatedly acted as a mediator in the solution of internal conflicts in Zimbabwe.

Complicated relationships between the political regime of Zimbabwe and western countries have forced R. Mugabe to shift his foreign policy. Proclaimed by President R. Mugabe paradigm «Look East» has spoken of the need to establish closer relations with Asian countries. As a result of this policy, Asian countries and especially China have become major partners of Zimbabwe in economic, political and military spheres.

Today Zimbabwe began to overcome the crisis, it is showing a steady growth in GDP and a low inflation rate. However, economic growth and the achievement of political stability are hampered many internal and external problems.

Sanctions are a popular means of exerting pressure on non-democratic regimes. The European Union, for instance, increasingly makes use of the Article 96 under the Cotonou Agreement to confront severe human rights violations and, especially, coup d'états. A new global data set on EU, US and UN sanctions in the post-Cold War era suggests that these sanctioning entities, which disproportionally target regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, use specific means, in particular aid sanctions. In addition, in almost all cases where sanctions aim at democratization, the African Union and sub-regional organizations have also implemented sanctions. Sanctions research strongly suggests that sanctions imposed by states on their allies and neighbors are most successful. This raises the question whether complementary sanctions by regional organizations contribute to sanction's higher overall impact on democratization in Africa compared to elsewhere. We test this proposition with a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and, based on that, with case studies of four sanction episodes in Africa - two where sanctions led to improved democracy levels and two where they did not. We find that in addition to factors prominently discussed in the sanctions literature such as leverage vis-à-vis the target, regional engagement indeed plays a role. The other factors of crucial importance are the vulnerability of the targeted regime and linkage between sender and target.

Eritrea is a diasporic state with high dependence on remittances to increase its hard currency reserves. Eritrean communities in exile are split along various lines: Those who escaped the country during the liberation struggle (1961 -1991) as supporters of the now ruling EPLF/PFDJ form the core of regime supporters. Those who fled Eritrea as supporters of the ELF, a movement opposed to the EPLF, split into numerous political organisations that lack political cohesion. A third group of refugees consists of those who joined the mass exodus following the introduction of a timely unlimited military and national service in 2002. Some of them are engaged in civil society organisations involved in active campaigns against the regime.

The paper analyses the strategies developed by the regime and its supporters to instrumentalize the sanctions for fundraising purposes and diplomatic campaigns based on conspiracy theories against Eritrea. The major aim of the fractioned opposition has been to convince host governments to ban the regime's demand of a 2% tax payable by all exiled Eritreans for the reason that the revenue might be used to support armed groups in the Horn. There are also efforts to scrutinize foreign companies involved in mining operations in Eritrea and to stop human trafficking of Eritrean refugees, in which the regime is involved. The paper argues that the impact of the sanctions is narrowed by its restriction on Eritrea's foreign policy and its neglect of the human rights violations committed by the government.