ECAS 2013

This contribution explores the current local dynamics of the LRA in south-east CAR (Haut Mbomou Province) and north-east DRC (Haut Uele District). Rule-of-thumbs estimates report that there are close to 500 LRA forces in the two countries. Despite a noticed decrease in terms of volume and intensity of incidents since 2011, records of violent events attributed to the LRA continue to be compiled by a multiplicity of sources. If it remains difficult to assess the reliability of that information in such remote areas, the continuation of LRA presence in CAR and DRC had at series of effects: 1) it has triggered displacement and concentration into a few rural hubs; 2) it has been an impediment to work on agricultural plantations; 3) it has sustained a situation of entrenched fear at the local level, where local residents end up attributing all violent events to the LRA. In several cases, follow up verification with military forces have not confirmed the origin of the incident. Yet, it is evident that the perception of insecurity in the area is strong and continues to fuel the LRA myth. The contribution will describe the local dynamics and the responses put in place to address some of the security issues (local systems of 'early warning', self-defense groups, extent of military deployment…). It will then critically suggest ways forward in two contexts where the LRA concern clearly lags behind other priorities. After all, neither in CAR or in DRC, LRA has never posed any threat to national sovereignty.

After the Lord's Resistance Army moved to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict became part of very different security dynamics, giving the conflict a fundamentally different character - as opposed to its operation in its initial phase. Fundamentally, it became part of a broader security landscape in which a multitude of armed groups were present, all of which (certainly from 2010 onwards) constituted a security threat. This paper argues how a variety of actors are supposed to be involved in curbing the LRA threat, but how different perceptions and interest of the LRA problem lead to a range of problems. All of the actors involved - the respective national governments, Monusco, international humanitarian actors -take a fundamentally different approach to the LRA, something which is closely relate with the actors' interests. In the first phase of the conflict (2008-2010), this for eaxmple led to strong tensions between Ugandan and Congolese troops, reducing the effectiveness of the fight against the LRA. In the second phase of the conflict (2010 - today), different perceptions of the LRA have led to difficult and inefficient interventions. Moreover, a range of actors try to instrumentalise the LRA for particular agenda's.

The move of the LRA, as a typically Acholi-rooted mystic-military movement, from Uganda to the DRC, put it into a totally different context with very few attachments to its area of origin. It put the movement from a highly publicized Anglophone context into Francophone surroundings with little LRA media coverage and hence knowledge. The fracture between the two linguistic areas is pervasive and exists at the level of the governments as well as at the level of the local authorities and what one can call civil society. The gap was of course deepened by a decade of war. A very limited form of bridging this gap is offered by the Zande cultural links throughout the region. The paper tries to explore how the DRC authorities and the population dealt with the LRA, at the level of the local LRA attacks, at the level of the territorial and district authorities, and at the level of the national government. At the level of the latter, the political and military dynamics between the DRC and Uganda clearly are the most determining factor, the LRA being no more than an excuse for playing out the conflict. This evolution will be contrasted with efforts from the African Union to bring all sides together in a regional initiative that got stuck in the lack of prioritization of the LRA issue by all actors involved.