ECAS 2013

The Rwandan Tutsi-Hutu relationships at the end of the colonial period have not been examined from the perspective of constructivism, thereby failing to shed light on the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity. This paper thus aims to examine the reasons why ethnic nationalism overwhelmed other nationalism during decolonisation.

There were two main contested nationalisms with different trajectories at the end of colonial period: the anti-Belgian Rwandan nationalism which was claimed by the Tutsi traditional leaders including the King Rudahigwa regarded all ethnic groups as a Rwandan nation. The other was the anti-Tutsi ethnic nationalism propagated by the Hutu leaders who perceived 'Rwandans' as only Hutu and Twa. Anti-Belgian Rwandan nationalism first appeared in the late 1950s, claiming that there had not been any problems among the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa in pre-colonial Rwanda and that all Rwandans should gain independence from European colonialism. What Hutu elites originally wanted was reforms of socio-political inequalities rather than revolution. Indeed, the political parties established in late 1959 (both Tutsi and Hutu parties) cooperated to discuss reform plans and establish a constitutional monarchy for independent Rwanda for a while. However, the rejection by the Tutsi leaders of Hutu demands calcified the attitudes of Hutu leaders, from which Hutu nationalism emerged. This nationalism claimed that the Tutsi were not authentic Rwandans and that the Hutu should gain dual independence from both Belgian and Tutsi colonial rules. With the electoral victories of Hutu party with local Belgian support, this anti-Tutsi Hutu ethnic nationalism prevailed in Rwanda.

The few educated Southerners which were co-opted after WWII to 'represent' the Southern Sudan started debating their position regarding the future status of their region in the years before independence. An idea of 'southernness' developed and in the late 1950s the request for a federation with the North left space to more radical stands, including self-determination and secession. As years of unrest and violence eventually led to civil war in the South, the end of Abboud's military regime on October 21st 1964 opened the way for direct contacts and negotiations between the Northern parties, the Southern Front, which represented the Southern leadership operating inside the country, and the Sudan African National Union (SANU), the party founded by exiled Southern politicians in 1962. The months of optimism were soon over, crushed by the decision of the government elected in 1965 to consider the Southern question first of all as a security and military problem, instead of a political one. As can be gathered from the secret correspondence between some of their members, the two Southern parties considered themselves as part of the same Southern "national movement" and coordinated their response to events in Khartoum and in the South. My paper aims at analysing and understanding these reactions and whether and how the events of the years 1964-1965 influenced the developing of a Southern Sudanese "national movement".

Ethiopia has never been colonized except for a short period of Italian occupation in 1930s. It would seem that the absence of European colonialism contributed to a rather different development of nationalism due to many different historical factors and experiences. However, since 1950s, and more openly from the 1960s we can see the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia which used the same "colonial" perspectives as their other African counterparts. When civil war broke out in 1962 and Eritrea began to struggle for independence, it had a direct impact on other nationalist movements in Ethiopia itself, namely the Oromo nationalism. Moreover, in the era of decolonization, Marxism played a role of an inspirational revolutionary ideology in many corners of Africa. The same can be said about the Oromo nationalism, as it was the main bearer of Marxism which then resulted in series of uprising leading to the deposition of Haile Sellassie. Suddenly, demands on democratization, self-determination, equality, and human rights began to be articulated with the same intensity as, for instance, in Rwanda. Later on, demands on "decolonization", i.e. dismantling of "traditional" Imperial regime formed a part of the "social revolution". Haile Sellassie's regime, once hailed as modernizing, began to be seen as backward and in many senses "colonizing" type of rule. It had also a direct impact on national identity and/or identities, because the nationalist movements redefined centuries long "map" of Ethiopia by giving accent to the diverse nature of Ethiopia's population.

Eritrea is a multi-lingual and multi-cultural state located in the Horn of Africa. This paper investigates the historical and socio-political background of Eritrean nationalism and evaluates the contradicting and competing identities among the Eritrean population groups.

Nationalism in the Horn first arose as a protest against Abyssinian regional hegemony and against external colonial domination. Eritrean nationalism developed after World War II following the demise of Italian rule, when the territory came under the British Military Administration (BMA) in 1941. Before that time, the concept of nationalism had been alien to large parts of Eritrean society. Contrary to the claims of many scholars that nationalism was a product of modernization and urbanization induced by the Italians, this process affected only limited segments of the society (highlanders), while the majority, especially the pastoral and agro-pastoral groups were marginalized and excluded. Only during the BMA, nationalism developed due to the liberal environment which allowed the establishment of political parties and the expansion of media. However, ethnic, religious and regional differences had produced competing and contradicting identities.

It became evident that Eritrean society was divided into two opposed groups. One group, mostly Tigrinya-speaking, under the leadership of the Unionist Party backed by Haile Selassie and the Orthodox Church demanded unconditional unification with Ethiopia due to religious and historical ties. The other ethnic groups under the leadership of the Muslim League favoured the independence of Eritrea. Their relations were, however, controversial and they failed to constitute a unique national vision towards Eritrean independence.

This paper uses the career of the Tanzanian politician Oscar Kambona to demonstrate how international clientelistic political networks created alternative modes and narratives of nationalism; in this case, by activating a Pan-Africanist network to challenge the power and legitimacy of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. After having constructed a robust cosmopolitan political network during his years as a student in London (1956-59), Oscar Kambona parlayed these connections to build up an international constituency among elite Pan-Africanists across the continent, which he activated to challenge Julius Nyerere after they fell out in 1967. In exile, Kambona re-assembled a revealing (if ultimately fruitless) network of elites, many also in exile, from his new home in London, in an attempt to return to power in Tanzania based on his retelling of the story of Tanzanian nationalism and Pan-Africanism.

Zimbabwean nationalism emerged prior to the 1960s but assumed mass character in the 1960s when the name Zimbabwe began to be used for the imagined postcolonial state. It emerged as an intellectual project drawing from pre-colonial and global ideological resources to contest Rhodesian settler colonialism. At the centre of the making of Zimbabwean nationalism was the synthesis of various identities cascading from pre-colonial and colonial periods to construct a Zimbabwean nationalism. This paper seeks to provide a historically grounded analysis of the mechanics of the construction of Zimbabwean nationalism and to critically reflect on the imagination of thye postcolonial state of Zimbabwe.

Studying the regional manifestations of nationalist thought and practice may enable researchers to avoid the teleological hazards of studying 'nationalism' through the rearview mirror of the successful nation-states that resulted from it. This paper examines nationalist discourses and practices in two inter-linked regions with ostensibly similar political economies, but which played very different roles in their countries' respective nationalist movements. It explores the ways in which mineral wealth, ethno-regional identities, migrant labour and expectations for independence interacted within and between the Northern Rhodesian and Katangese copperbelts. It seeks to explain why the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was in the vanguard of an incorporative nationalist project (which nevertheless contained within it the seeds of later discontentment with post-colonial government policies) whilst in Katanga, autochthonous tendencies not only resisted incorporative Congolese nationalism but generated a Katangese nationalism of its own. The paper also explores interactions between Zambian and Congolese/Katangese nationalisms and assesses to what extent they were constructed in relation to each other during this formative period. It briefly examines the legacy of these experiences for the independent nation-states of both Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

One of the strongest instruments to build African nationalism has been the nationalist party. In this field, Ghana played a major role during the African independence period. This paper describes how Nkrumah's Ghana contributed in the establishment and success of a number of African nationalist parties. Between 1957 and 1966, Ghana helped these parties in achieving independence and in strengthening their power inside the nations. Ghana granted them with financial aid and it provided political training to party members. Nkrumah wanted particularly to promote the Convention People's Party as a model for all the Nationalist parties he was supporting. Some institutions had been created in Ghana with the purpose of achieving these goals. The Winneba's Ideological Institute was established in 1961 to teach to both CPP members and other African nationalists how to work with the masses in the process of nation building. This paper illustrates the action of these institutions, such as the Winneba's Ideological Institute and the Bureau of African Affairs, by using mostly new and unpublished archival sources.

Neighbouring Guinea and Guinea-Bissau have experienced different de-colonisation processes and post-colonial histories and governance practices. Despite the obvious differences, the populations in both countries have developed similar popular memories of shared suffering at the hands of governments or states. The paper investigates how the (in-)official historicisation of suffering has been discursively constructed by the respective populations and has become a key factor to post-colonial national identity and integration "from below" in both countries.

Our comparative approach examines both similarities and differences in both cases and allows for the theorisation of nationalisms that manage to unite a heterogeneous population even in the face of contemporary governments that fail to provide new visions for a national project. Empirical data shows how everyday-practices of national identity or citizenship in these countries have lead to the memory and contemporary experience of suffering "in the name of the nation" or "under the nation" to be more important and more constructive for everyday purposes than the official versions produced in the post-colonial era - which otherwise carries many countries through (identity) struggle on the state- or governance-level.

The history of Sawaba as the nationalist movement of Niger in the 1950s is traced from a social history perspective, laying emphasis on the social backgrounds of its activists and its character as a self-styled revolutionary movement. In this respect its approach to violence in political agitation and the organisation of the guerrilla campaign with which it aimed to topple the French-backed regime after independence (1960-1966) are discussed, advancing the half-way character of its transformation from a social movement into a guerrilla force as one of the fundamental reasons for its ultimate defeat and destruction.

In this paper I like to suggest we should rethink nationalism in Africa outside the boundaries posed by the postcolonial African state, in order to reach a better understanding of political processes on the continent. When studying the period around independence, we should not express a distinction between nationalist sentiments expressed in support of political independence for the postcolonial states we now know, and nationalist sentiments expressed for forms of political independence other than the national states as they came to be. Doing so is making a post ante teleological interpretation of the past in the present. This obscures the political realities of both that past and the present. We obscure historical realities by calling separatist tendencies 'ethnic' a priori, especially when we label as such those 'separatist' demands formulated prior to independence and coming to light just after independence. I would like to argue for the existence of competing national identities in many African countries at the eve of national independence. I want to exemplify the argument with the case of present-day northern Mali from the late 1940s to the late 1960s, where two national identities competed over political independence: that of the Malian nation and state, and that of the Tuareg nation in an ill-defined larger Saharan political entity.