ECAS 2013

Since the mid-2000s critics have repeatedly pointed out the lack of "local" ownership and inclusion in post-conflict peace- and statebuilding interventions. In response, many intervening actors have adopted approaches to build "positive peace" through emphasis on the inclusion of the "local". However, this stated commitment has often failed to materialize because the main interveners have tended to commit themselves rather exclusively to narrowly defined statebuilding for short-term stability based on partnerships with the perceivably dominant, or most legitimate, actor. This has often come in expense of extensive engagement in the more gradual, and potentially more inclusive, process of nationbuilding. Arguably, the focus on short-term stability in interventions has produced conditions geared towards the establishment of exclusive political and economic order.

This paper analyzes aspects of the external "peace through statebuilding" intervention in Southern Sudan during the period of Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation in 2005-2011. It shows that this intervention was largely oriented towards achieving short-term stability through the consolidation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army's (SPLM/A's) monopoly of violence and power over the Southern Sudanese political and economic system. However, betting on the limited capacity of the dominant "rebel movement turned government" failed to promote "state" legitimacy among a number of other local groups. It encouraged armed opposition perpetrated by splinter factions from within SPLM/A cadres as well as by other defiant groups, and resulted in a political and economic reality that may defy peace and development in the long-term.

In recent decades, natural resources, such as land, water and oil have either served as one of a multitude of factors fuelling a conflict, or have been harshly impacted by civil wars in Africa. Additionally, institutional factors, such as weak governance systems or the lack of effective institutions for the sustainable management of the environment, often exacerbate the harsh impacts of a civil war on a country's natural resource base. In crafting effective and sustainable peacebuilding strategies in these contexts, international and local actors have had to bring issues of natural resource management more frequently to the negotiating table. Addressing the incorporation of natural resources considerations into a post-conflict strategy brings explicitly to light the highly complex interrelationships between internal and external actors in post-conflict peace- and statebuilding.

Through case study analysis of the conflicts in Sudan/South Sudan, Sierra Leone and CAR, this paper will analyse the individual agendas, role of, and interplay between various sets of international and local actors as they engage with each other in order to devise strategies for the more effective management of natural resources. This study will reveal a key area in which we see the problematising of local ownership, as it come into conflict with the individual interests of international actors. This paper will elaborate the different agendas for the post-conflict management of natural resources brought to the negotiating table by international and local actors, and its impact on the resultant peace agreements and peacebuilding projects addressing the environment.

The Horn of Africa provides fertile ground for the analysis of agendas behind foreign politico-military engagements for peacebuilding in areas targeted by ongoing violent conflicts or undergoing postwar reconstruction. Drawing upon the comparative approach, the paper looks into multiple past and ongoing strategies used by external actors to affect and transform the most acute conflict situations in the Horn of Africa. Special attention is given to the cases of Somalia (from 1991 onwards), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1998-2008) and Djibouti (1992-2001), where a number of regional (OAU/AU), subregional (Ethiopia, Kenya) and global (the UN, the USA, France et al.) protagonists have been active in the last two decades. The analysis encompasses multiple elements of and agendas behind the interventions in question, ranging from 'peace enforcement' and the 'war on terror' to 'humanitarian intervention'.

By scrutinizing the step-by-step development and progress of the operations in question, the author finds many 'irreconcilable' discrepancies between their official targets and the nature of change they actually brought about. In particular, there is strong evidence 'from the ground' which shows that external stakeholders often use their military presence to pursue own political and economic agendas under the pretext of 'engagement for peace'. The contribution further assesses sustainability of 'stabilization' dependent on the presence of foreign military forces vs. alternative options, such as deployment of international police forces with strong local components.

Finally, the paper questions, based on its conclusions, the viability of some popular concepts from the theory of conflict resolution, i.e. that of 'privatized warfare'.

Local ownership has become one of the main mantras in post-conflict peacebuilding operations. Nevertheless, the absence of a normative definition of what the notion should be and how it should be implemented has led to multiple interpretations that include visions or conceptions from maximalist points of view (total control of the reforms by local actors) to the more minimalist views (local ownership is understood as a desired goal and ultimate horizon).

An analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia, two of the most recent post-conflict peacebuilding cases, shows that this flexibility highlights a variable degree of satisfaction among the different actors about what local ownership should be. While some see it as something desirable and transferable in the long term (especially for international actors), others claim more local control to implement this principle (local government actors, but especially civil society organizations).

Using patterns of analysis developed by authors such as Ole Jacob Sending and focusing in the implementation of certain post-conflict peacebuilding reforms (decentralization process, SSR and transitional justice), the paper tries to shed some light on a concept that shows both the "good will" of international actors and the intention of controlling the direction of the post-conflict peacebuilding reforms.

Based on comprehensive fieldwork data on security sector reforms (SSR) in Guinea-Conakry, this paper elaborates on four issues lying at the heart of actor and ownership analysis: To begin with, I show how borders between 'internal' and 'external' actors are inherently blurred in Guinea's SSR; not only does the external-internal divide lie in the eye of the beholder per se, actors may also feel the need to strategically shift 'sides' in the course of a reform process. Second, using dynamic actor network analysis, I aim to map interactions and influence as perceived by actors in Guinea's SSR arena, in order to empirically test the assumption of a dialectic inherent in these power relations. Third, the paper critically examines whether 'local ownership' in a non-post-conflict transition state with a government in place such as Guinea can go beyond 'government ownership' at all, i.e., include a broader range of national actors. As a fourth point, by looking at 'local ownership' as a discursive device, I explore in how far actors (with different self-perceived positions on a supposed internal-external continuum) strategically use the notion of 'ownership' in order to increase the legitimacy of their objectives. These insights are based on document analysis and, for the most part, participant observation and interviews. In a final section, I will reflect critically on in which ways and to what extent my analyses are shaped by the specific characteristics of SSR and the Guinean context, with the aim of checking whether some general conclusions may be drawn.

Whereas Nigeria is not a post-war country, it is worthwhile looking at the security sector reform in terms of - what has been termed from a "Global North" perspective -dysfunctionality of the state institutions' integrity. A fundamental restructuring of the Nigerian Police Force forms one part of the "Justice for all" (J4A) program that started in 2010. It is part of the government's agenda that aims at the improvement of the capacity, accountability and responsiveness of key organizations. In cooperation with local elites, national and international institutions and by means of broad based training programs, the government led police reform promotes an improvement of the rule of law and human security. In this way, a widespread discussion including the civil society about transformation processes is expected to be initiated. Based on data collected in Nigeria earlier this year, this case study shifts the focus on the articulation and practice of "local ownership", regarding the characteristics of different institutions that form part of the cooperation between the state and non-governmental organizations. The paper will compare the expected objectives of the reform with the results actually achieved. More specifically, the paper is dedicated to local stakeholders' and institution's emic perspective on the reform and how local visions and needs dialectically interplay with "global" security related values and concepts.

Can programmes for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants be made more effective by taking a more participatory approach? These programmes are increasing recognised as having a role play in peacebuilding. But they have often fail to live up to the expectations. Ex-combatants may fail to find work, and women and girls can be overlooked. The need for a more holistic, integrated approach to DDR has long been recognised, but rarely achieved.

This study uses the concept of "participation" from development discourse, to look at reintegration in Sierra Leone and Liberia. A participatory approach allows potential stakeholders to have a say in how interventions are designed and implemented. The study is based on original field work with ex-combatants in both countries (focus groups and a survey), and interviews with a wide range of stakeholders.

It finds that participation (which is only seen to a limited extent) is a useful framework for assessing reintegration programmes. Participatory approaches are associated with better programme outcomes for ex-combatants, in terms of employment, relations with the community, and living conditions. Detailed qualitative data also point to the underlying mechanism through which participation and ownership (or their absence) affect the overall task of peacebuilding.

Participation is seen as helping to rebuild social capital. The wider agenda of peacebuilding, which is ultimately what DDR is supposed to be part of, is supported by a participatory approach to reintegration, and undermined by one in which there is little ownership by those directly involved.

The US military is increasingly engaged in matters of governance and accentuates the needs of local populations. Africom has recently increased the number of "civil affairs" teams across Eastern Africa. Drawing on counterinsurgency doctrine, the US military furthermore makes cultural awareness central to their operations in Africa. Yet, this emphasis on the population and on governance issues is supplemented by an increase in drone attacks against terrorist suspects, the set-up of a surveillance network and the US' military's involvement in the LRA conflict. In other words, the use of coercion remains an important part of the US military's repertoire in its "peace time engagements" in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Conceptually, a Foucauldian understanding of police sheds light on these multiple practices mentioned above. Rather than denoting police as the modern institution for law enforcement, the notion pursued here rests on a concern with the production of order and welfare for the population through an expanding regulatory mandate and "reasonable" use of force. Yet, more importantly for this panel might be the question of how these external efforts of "social ordering", framed as stability operations in US military strategy, are met and responded to by local communities? The paper draws on field work at sites of US military civil affairs projects in Coastal Kenya and Northern Uganda. At the center of the empirical concern is the question of how benefitting communities perceive the practices of armed actors at the intersection of countering insurgency and countering poverty.

In the last twenty years, decentralization has become one of the most emphasized tools in the promotion of good governance and democracy. Although not always explicitly, it has been incorporated in the "liberal peace" agenda supported by international actors and donors as one of the aspects of state-building. In fact, decentralization would improve service delivery at a local level, increase local accountability, enhance public participation and help alleviating poverty ensuring peace and stability.

Vis-à-vis a highly theoretical and normative international organizations' related literature, little empirical evidence is available on the effects of the application of decentralization reforms at a micro-level in volatile post-conflict contexts, and how newly created local government structures interact, compete and/or overlap with pre-existing forms of local authorities.

This paper aims at analyzing the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the way power was exercised at a local level during the civil war, particularly since the creation of the SPLM civil administrative authority, and the post-conflict phase, when the legal documents shaping the current form of government were formulated. The hypothesis advanced in this paper is that substantial elements of continuity exist, both in discourses -very much decentralization-friendly, complying with donors expectations- and practices -much less keen to the real empowerment of downwardly accountable local institutions. In order to contribute with more specific evidence, the paper will focus mainly on the area of Bentiu (Unity State) and its surroundings, and will rely on field research carried out between January and March 2013.

In 2002, Sierra Leone ended its decade-long civil war, leaving the country and its people in a chaotic condition. Transitional justice was one of the various post-conflict measures implemented in order to ensure a smooth transition to peace. Three such mechanisms were introduced, namely the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the Truth Commission of Sierra Leone and Fambul Tok International. While academics have often discussed the relationships between the Special Court and Truth Commission, few have yet discussed local perceptions and impacts of Fambul Tok, a localized process working towards reconciliation and development. These findings are based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted during the summer of 2012. I will focus specifically on the work of Fambul Tok and argue that, while not a traditional method of international understandings of justice, this method may more appropriately reflects and incorporates local perceptions, potentially responding to more immediate needs and understandings of justice. I will further argue it is necessary to examine the goals of this transition, both internationally and nationally, so that they may be reconciled to better harness transition, utilizing examples from the Fambul Tok ideology. More broadly, I will discuss how transitional justice's expansion from the global to the local has positively contributed to a more malleable understanding of justice, and what this may mean for the future of understanding justice.