ECAS 2013

This paper tries to analyze both theoretically and empirically the association between economic development and the construction of more stable institutions, considering African and South American Countries. In this sense, it will be observed the main political rules of some countries of our sample: political systems (presidentialism, parliamentarism), political forms of representation (proportional, majoritarian) and political party systems (multipartism, single party, and two parties). Finally, on the other direction of causality, it will be discussed whether more stable institutions - in its many levels - improve economic growth or not. In order to do this analysis it will be developed an econometric model taken into account the importance of some political variables like the number of the veto players and others already mentioned for the economic growth process of the countries chosen.

Post-1974 party systems have been labelled as fluid, instable or weakly institutionalized due to their higher levels of electoral volatility, fragile links with civil society, thin organizational resources inter alia. Although this has been one of the most important political questions since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization there is still little evidence on why these patterns emerge. Using an original pooled time-series cross-section dataset of 19 cases from Sub-Saharan Africa (election period ranges from 1966-2011) and building upon a new measure of institutionalization this paper proceeds as follows. It starts by measuring the level of party system institutionalization and then it seeks to explain its variation across countries and time. For this purpose a set of institutional (regime type, length of democratic regime, electoral system, authoritarian legacy), and contextual (economic performance, foreign aid, ethnic fragmentation, armed conflict) explanatory variables will be used. Finally the results will be discussed in two case studies - Mozambique and Zambia - where fieldwork was conducted.

The paper will be devoted to important but insufficiently researched issue of activities of the Socialist International in Africa and its relations with political parties on the continent. Its importance is underlined by the fact that the 24th Congress of Socialist International took place last September in Cape Town.

Its aim is to do comparative studies in several directions and to try to find answers to the following questions:

-To what extend do the Socialist International's ideology and political practice influence political forces in Sub-Saharan Africa?

- What is the difference between political systems of the countries where the SI African members are in power and the others?

- Why are African political parties joining Socialist International, as full members or as observers?

- To what extent does this membership promote human rights, democracy and economic development?

- How influential is Socialist International in Africa in comparison with other international political formations such as International Democratic Union and Liberal International?

- Is the policy of SI European member parties towards Africa common?

The paper will be based on the study of documents and publications as well as on field studies, primarily in Southern African countries.

Federalism is one of the most common solutions are offered to solve the problems in divided societies. Only a few countries have federal experiences conducted in Africa. Among them, Nigeria is the only one maintained in its Constitution federalism since its independence. These institutional arrangements are slowly extended to other countries from the mid 90s. Ethiopia and the Union of the Comoros. Ethiopia and the Union of Comoros introduced federalism in their constitutions as a way to end secessionist trends that had led these countries to situations of state collapse. Nigeria and Ethiopia are deeply divided societies religiously and ethnically. However, Comoros is a homogeneous society in ethnic and religious terms, but strongly divided for reasons of being an archipelagic State. In all three cases offer different institutional arrangements, ranging from the creation of ethnically homogeneous member states, as in Nigeria, to the rotation between the different member states of the presidency, as in Comoros, or opening the institutional channels for possible independence of any of the member states, such as Ethiopia. Nevertheless, none of these three African federal experiences seems to solve successfully all the problems of their divided societies on its configuration as nation states, not seem to put an end to the centrifugal tendencies of certain parts of their territories. Either way, his remarkable institutional differences, these countries seem to have channeled, with varying success, some of the problems that prevented them from living without the constant threat of rupture of the State.

The primary responsibility of the legislature in all democracies is to make laws for the good governance of their societies. The stages through which law-making passes to be promulgated are referred to as legislative process. In this process, there exists an interface between the political and administrative structures of the legislature. How this interface impacts on the legislative processes remains debatable. Using three federal systems; Brazil, Nigeria and the United Sates as case studies, this paper seeks to draw a comparative analysis of the legislative process of these systems. In this comparison, the similarities and differences inherent in the legislative procedures of the selected states will be highlighted and from the findings of this comparative analysis, some policy lessons will be drawn for Nigeria which will include, among others, the need for a constitutional amendment in Nigeria to restructure the unwieldy size of its legislature and to develop political systems that are indigenous to its historical and social development.