ECAS 2013

As the African Union is attempting to become a stronger player in African politics, it is becoming increasingly imbedded in large continental initiatives. But programmes of continental size require a lot of institutional capacity and political leverage to turn their policy plans into practice. Yet these are exactly the weak points of the AU, as it struggles with political legitimacy and financial independence. The article examines two on-going programmes in which the African Union is attempting to take the lead role: the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the African Peace Facility (APF). Both programmes are labelled by the AU and its foreign donors as best practices in African regional integration. The APF, launched in 2007, has slowly reached a stage of maturity with its missions in Sudan and Somalia. The PIDA programme on the other hand is already seen as an example of best practice in African ownership by the AU and the AfDB, even though it was only accepted in January 2012 and is still in the very early phases of execution. Both programmes are however heavily financed by EU money, mainly through the EU-Africa partnership. With EU budgets under increasing pressure, the capacity of the AU and the commitment of its member states is being tested as they have to overcome a collective action problem and take up financial and institutional responsibility themselves or diversify funding. The paper combines theoretical insights about capacity building with information assembled through expert interviews with key informants.

After half a century of independence, in spite of its abundant natural resources, the continent of Africa represents less than 2% of the world economy, with more than 200 million people chronically hungry, with a very low level of African intratrade. The international patterns of trade are unchallenged, unchanged, and perpetuate the colonial design. This state of affairs suggests a paradigm shift. The integration model, in force, deeply rooted in the neoclassical economics, and which advocates the immersion of a fragmented Africa in the world economy does not meet the needs of Africans.

The Theory of Pan-African Authentic Development is an alternative and merges five discourses: the political economy of panafricanism (works of Cheikh Anta Diop and Kwame Nkrumah), the concept of authentic development anchored in the humanitarian paradigm, the theory of economic integration based on the simultaneous sectoral strategic integration, the Ubuntu philosophy (about sharing, complementarity, and interconnectedness, and the spirit and letter of the original understanding of economics based on the concept of citizenship and social justice.

The research critically examines major regional arrangements in Africa while using the very economic principles of the neo-liberal school to articulate a development model based on a needed African solidarity in line with the panafrican vision. It therefore outlines an amended version of the law of comparative advantage, the principle of rational action, and the cost-benefit analysis. The model puts emphasis on two productive sectors energy, namely renewable and agriculture as key to build self-sufficient and self-reliant communities.

In 2002, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) underwent an institutional reform that was supposed to transform its neo-colonial set-up into a more balanced process reflecting the transition in South Africa.

For decades, the organisation had been an instrument for Apartheid South Africa to prevent isolation and to control its neighbours. The main tool was to administrate the common customs revenues and finance a lion's share of the smaller members' public budgets.

Central bodies such as the secretariat in Namibia were created and staffed with technocrats. In addition, the decision-making processes should include all member states instead of being unilateral

Formally, SACU ceased to be a body administrated by the South African government. However, in order to understand how the organisation has actually transformed, its underlying logic and structure need to be addressed.

This paper will address the issue of trade negotiations with third parties. Before 2002, South Africa was engaging in individual agreements such as with the EU in 1999 despite the considerable effects on a grouping as a whole determined. After the reform all negotiations had to be conducted as a group.

The negotiations with MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South) had already been initiated before the reform and carried on under the new set-up on until a conclusion in 2009. An in-depth analysis will address the question of whether the hegemonic practices remained in place under the formally consensual umbrella.