ECAS 2013

Hawala is a unofficial method of transmitting financial assets, relying on personal and ethnical ties. It is a widespread system in many developing countries like India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, some Middle Eastern, North African and Sub-Saharan countries. The assets, which are transmitted through the agency of the hawaladars (transmitters) are usually received within the time of 24 hours from the transfer order. The Hawala system is popular among the immigrant communities who stay in developed countries and support their families in underdeveloped regions. The reason of its popularity is the lack of formal documentation requirements, low costs and element of trust within the same ethnic community. On the other side, such a system is practically undetectable and can be used for the purpose of money laundering and terrorism financing.

This paper is going to consider the possible use of the Hawala system in the process of terrorism financing in Somalia. It will explain the rules of Hawala transmissions and the problematic lack of a formal banking system in Somalia. It will bring a closer look on the topic of financial sources of the Al-Shabab movement and the pirates of Puntland. There will be as well explained the case of the Al-Barakat consortium in USA. The main aim of this paper is to answer such questions: Is the Hawala system harmful in a long-term economic perspective or is it able to substitute the traditional banking system for some time in a region like Somalia? Can Hawala be used to support the Somali terrorists?

Currently, literature pays more and more attention to farmland and agriculture real asset investment funds and their increasing integration in agricultural value-chains, but the opacity regarding their operations makes such analysis often difficult. Trying to contribute to a better understanding regarding these aspects, this paper will focus on South African farmland funds focusing on the agricultural sector.

It will firstly characterize broadly these investment funds as, indeed, this category groups a diversity of actors such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and private equity funds (McNellis, 2009) with different operations and strategies. Secondly, a more in-depth description of certain South African funds will be presented and will include their modus operandi and capital structure (as foreign funds are often outsourced to South Africans management asset companies). Thirdly, the role of Development Finance Institutions (SFI, OPIC, Proparco, IDC) will be assessed, either as direct investors or as financial service providers (OXFAM, 2012; Thomas, 2012). Finally, it will reflect on the implications for the country, as these investment fund are seen as a new vehicle for agricultural and agribusiness development (Daniel, 2012). Beyond the socio-economic consequences, it will analyze the strategic and political implications of this investment form diffusion (process of "financialization", expansion and development of capital, norm diffusion (equity associations - EMPEA, SAVCA), etc.).

Bank-, credit- and store-cards, as well as microloans both formal and illegal, have since 1994 been issued with abandon in South Africa. Seemingly oblivious of the complex interrelations which make debt inseparable from credit, the state passed the National Credit Act to restrict 'reckless lending'. It established various measures including arrangements for debt counselling, which proved problematic. Opportunistic and untrained individuals switched from their earlier roles as 'debt administrators' to set up small enterprises as 'debt counsellors'; some absconded with customers' money; those counselled often attended only a few sessions and later defaulted on their agreements. There was a lack of harmonisation between the provisions of the Act and those of earlier, apartheid-era legislation. And debt counsellors had insufficient clout, or financial muscle, to defend their clients in court in the case of non-agreement with their creditors.

This paper is based on a reading of the representations made to Parliament before the passing of the Act by various civil society bodies, notably the Black Sash (formerly a human rights organisation but now almost exclusively concerned with problems of indebtedness); on interviews with those responsible for setting up such services and arrangements and with a range of debt counsellors; and on case studies of indebted consumers who have sought help. It uses this ethnography to analyse the contradictory character of a society in which strong state intervention is required in order to keep it in alignment with a neoliberal-style market orientation.

Neuf conditions apparaissent nécessaires pour que le microcrédit ait un effet positif direct sur les revenus des plus pauvres.

1/ il faut que les clients des institutions offrant ces services appartiennent aux catégories dites « pauvres ».

2/ il faut est le prêt soit effectivement employé par les emprunteurs à accroître les capacités productives.

3/ si un investissement est réalisé, il faut qu'il le soit dans une activité pour laquelle il existe des débouchés.

4/ celui ou celle qui mène l'activité doit avoir les capacités managériales et techniques pour le faire.

5/ il faut qu'il elle ait la capacité à s'exposer à un niveau supérieur de risques.

6/ il faut que le rendement des micro-activités soit supérieur à celui d'activités plus capitalistiques.

7/ il faut que le coût du prêt, à travers le taux d'intérêt acquitté, soit inférieur au rendement de l'activité pour laquelle se fait l'investissement.

8/ il faut que l'investissement réalisé grâce aux micro prêts se traduise par une dépense endogène qui provoque une importation de biens.

9/ les intérêts acquittés par les emprunteurs ne doivent pas entraîner un drainage des ressources au seul bénéfice de prêteurs notamment extérieurs.

Il est exceptionnel que ces neuf conditions soient toutes et totalement réunies, l'impact du microcrédit est généralement faible en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté. La contribution dont l'armature théorique vient d'être présentée montrera par des exemples les spécificités des problèmes compte tenu des particularités tant des clientèles potentielles que des formes d'organisation prévalentes en Afrique sub saharienne dans les différents pays.

After one of the deepest crises of the banking sector in the African region, Cameroon's formal banking network has been slowly reconstituted and expanded since the mid-1990s. This has also been a period during which, enabled by a 1992 liberalising law, a fast-growing microfinance sector has emerged. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this paper analyses the trajectory of several microfinance institutions that have opened branches in Adamawa and East Regions during the last decade. What has been the impact of national and international programmes providing training, equipment, technical and financial support? How have the financial regulator for the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and the national authorities enforced the more strict requirements and controls adopted in the last decade? How was the establishment of new branches prepared for, negotiated and achieved in the contexts of locations that are far from the country's political and economic centres? What is the place of the services that these microfinance institutions provide within the broader repertoire of financial options? What is the relationship of these institutions with different public authorities, outside donors and partners, competitors and different kinds of clients? How have they changed their organisation, strategies, and public image since they opened their doors? These are some of the questions the paper grapples with.

Après plusieurs années de libéralisation financière au sein de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine d'une part et au regard de la place des banques commerciales dans les économies nationales d'autre part, il y a lieu de mesurer et d'analyser les niveaux de performances productives desdites banques. A partir de données désagrégées sur la période 1996-2007, la méthode de Data Envelopment Analysis nous a permis de mesurer les scores d'efficacité technique et les accroissements de la productivité totale des facteurs et de la technologie des banques commerciales de l'UEMOA. Les résultats indiquent que les banques commerciales au sein de l'Union affichent des scores d'efficacité technique de plus de 80%. De même, la productivité des banques a connu un accroissement moyen de l'ordre de 2,3%. Cet accroissement de la productivité des banques est essentiellement du à celui intervenu dans l'efficacité technique de 6,4% et dans une moindre mesure à celui de la technologie. Toutefois, ces performances ne sont pas identiques d'un pays à un autre.