|
|
AEGIS European Conference on African Studies
11 - 14 July 2007
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands
Show panel list
The political economy of urban informal groups and the regulation of violence in Bwera (Kasese, Uganda).
| Panel |
11. Alternative policing - new initiatives or established patterns of self-help?
|
| Paper ID | 329 |
| Author(s) |
Titeca, Kristof
|
| Paper |
No paper submitted
|
| Abstract | This paper deals with the political economy of the regulation of violence in Bwera, which is a border town in Kasese-district, Uganda. Because of its strategic location, bordering the DRC, the town is famous for its transborder trade, which is an essential means of livelihood for most of the population. Because of this crossborder trade, but also as a consequence of the major influx of IDP’s after the ADF insurgency (combined with a general land shortage) the town has a thriving second economy. The most prominent and organised groups within this second economy are the fuel smugglers, the ‘boda boda’ drivers (motorcycle transporters) and the khat (‘mairungi’) sellers. The paper argues that in Bwera town, there is an ‘oligopoly of violence’ (Mehler 2004), in which security as a public good is being negotiated between these urban informal groups on the one hand, and local politicians and the different government agencies (police agencies, (para)military agencies, the Uganda Revenue Authorities) on the other hand. Both sides are engaged in a complex web of interactions, through which security and governance are being produced.
Important in understanding the importance of these urban informal groups (fuel smugglers, boda boda drivers and khat sellers) as a security provider is an analysis as to why they are allowed to conduct their illegal activities, both in the provision of security and in their ‘core’ activities of respectively fuel smuggling, unregistered transport activities, and drug abuse.
The first task of the paper therefore consists of explaining how this negotiation process between the government agencies and the urban informal groups is based on a number of informal agreements, through which these urban informal groups can continue their activities. A first informal agreement is very much based on ‘sharing the spoils’ between the government agencies and the informal groups (the groups have to pay ‘protection money’ to government agencies, while these government agencies are selling smuggled goods to the urban groups). A second informal agreement stipulates how politicians (to some extent) protect the illegal activities of the informal groups, while these groups act as campaigning agents for the politicians. A number of reasons make these urban informal groups influential opinion leaders in local politics: their central position in town combined with their general mobility; and the fact that they are respected for their services in the field of security, governance and economics (fuel, transport or khat). Politicians therefore have all importance in protecting their activities, in order to ensure their support.
The second task of the paper consists of analysing how these urban informal groups are established mechanisms for conflict resolution and security provision: the local population perceives these groups to be far more effective than the police, to some extent because of their immediate tactics of ‘jungle justice’. Paradoxically, much of their effectiveness in providing security and curbing crime lies in the fact that these groups (in particular the khat sellers) are involved in criminal affairs themselves, and have elaborated a code of conduct for their activities in the town.
|
|