AEGIS ECAS 2007 - View abstract

Panel	63. Nigeria under Obasanjo
Paper ID	227
Author(s)	Bureo Gonzalez, Arturo
Paper	No paper submitted
Abstract	The return to civilian rule in 1999 definitely buried Abacha’s harsh military autocratic regime in Nigeria. Nevertheless, the last eight years under this new order have been paralleled by an increase in disrupting economic, ethnic and religious conflicts and polarization all around the country marking the state’s loss of the monopoly of violence. Paradoxically however, these conflicts are not undermining the state’s capability to govern and civilian rule is showing unprecedented stability. This contribution to the panel supports the suggestion made in the outline that we can attribute this seemingly contradictory situation to the federal structure and to systematic political corruption. The purpose of this contribution is however to show why the political system functions in this double-edged way. In a previous study I found how on the one hand, the current federal constitution provides incentives for centripetal behaviour at the political party and electoral level. The multiplication of states in Nigeria’s federal structure, the prevention of ethnic political parties and power-sharing through the ‘federal-character’ principle, have been quintessential in diminishing polarization and in preventing the disintegration of the Nigerian state along ethno-regional or religious lines. Yet, on the other hand, other elements of the federal structure create tensions at the inter-governmental and societal level. The over-centralization of power and resources within this federal system together with the growing number of states has served to heighten polarization and has caused the proliferation of ethnic identities and religious extremism. Likewise, while the institutionalization of power-sharing through the federal-character principle has been imperative in providing a sense of ethnic security, it has also increasingly led to the discrimination and marginalization of groups and to severe citizenship problems. This is linked to a biological and state-based definition of ethnicity – ‘indigeneity’ – as a basis for power-sharing, leading to the exclusion of ‘settlers’ and ‘non-indigenes’ residing in another ‘foreign’ state within Nigeria. In this contribution, the idea is to focus more on the movements, groups and organizations at the societal level that have perpetrated violence or that have contributed to polarization. What are the mechanisms through which the characteristics of Nigeria’s formal and informal institutions lead to centrifugal forces? In particular I am interested in three aspects. Firstly, in showing how the exclusion of certain groups not only from political participation but also from jobs and livelihood in general constitute mobilizing bases for these social movements. Secondly, in examining how and to what extent the federal system formally and informally centralizes power and resources and as such provides reasons for mobilization. Finally, I will also examine to what extent the centripetal behaviour induced by the political system at the regime level, hinders centrifugal behaviour in society. In this respect, I am interested in the relations between the regime’s elites – who experience centripetal incentives – and the movements. An analysis of these three aspects will clarify why and how the political system encourages conflicts but also how it prevents them from destabilizing the country as a whole.

The Double-Edged Effects of Nigeria’s Post-1999 Formal and Informal Political Institutions and the Mobilization of Centrifugal Societal Movements