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AEGIS European Conference on African Studies
11 - 14 July 2007
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands
Resisting Power-Sharing: National Congress Party and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan
| Panel |
27. CANCELLED: Reconstruction policies in post-conflict situations
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| Paper ID | 50 |
| Author(s) |
Ylonen, Aleksi Erik
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| Paper |
No paper submitted
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| Abstract | Timely implementation of peace agreements and carrying out reconstruction policies are integral in an attempt to avoid re-emergence of conflict. In addition, in order to provide a chance for peace, the peace implementation and reconstruction policies should take place in an atmosphere of sufficient trust and goodwill between all parties.
Almost two years has passed since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended over two decades of southern insurgency in Sudan. The agreement between the governing National Congress Party (NCP) and the Southern People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) rebels recognized the legitimacy of the Southern cause to the extent that the political wing of the insurgent organization was appropriated significant amount of juridical political power within remodeled state structures.
However, two years after the agreement the peace implementation and reconstruction remain threatened by slow progress and tension between the parties. While the CPA dictates specific deadlines for its implementation, these have not been met since the beginning. Particularly the internationally pressured NCP, which did not have sufficient incentives to be genuinely interested in peace in the first place, has failed to demonstrate goodwill in the process. Although it has had to share de jure political power with its former enemy, the NCP has retained de facto power in state institutions to the extent that ministries assigned to other factions remain largely under its control. In fact, the unwillingness of the NCP to share political power has been among the principal factors why peace implementation in Sudan has lagged behind schedule, while it is also linked to the persisting instability in the Southern Sudan.
The the slow advances in the peace process and the lack of de facto power-sharing and has had a destabilizing effect in the South. Many are losing faith, while armed bands and militias continue to roam causing violent incidents. This chronic disorder coupled with the NCP’s policy of gripping the political power, even in those national institutions assigned to the SPLA/M, maintains the volatile situation. Furthermore, the unstable atmosphere is fuelled by the Southern mistrust of the NCP’s willingness to uphold the agreement in the face of a history of broken peace deals by earlier Northern governments.
The paper argues that the NCP has developed a strategy to retain de facto political power despite of having to make de jure concessions to accommodate other parties in the national government. This enables it to control state’s existing resources to a large extent and to attract international support to keep serious challengers to its political power intact. It also engages in discussion about the limited ability of internationally pressured peace agreements to pressure the former parties to the conflict to comply with their commitments during peace implementation and reconstruction period. Finally, the paper demonstrates how peace agreements should be detailed enough to guarantee that de facto institutional power is shared in a just manner, while they should be implemented timely and comprehensively. Both of these factors would significantly enhance the prospects for long-term peace in Sudan.
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